Skip to main content
Internet Archive's 25th Anniversary Logo

Full text of "The Displacement Of Population In Europe"

See other formats

CO 03 : 

158789 >m 


Call No. 3 I >- - &A i -ll (> I $ Accession No. 1 


This book should be returned on or befpre the date last marked below. 



The resettlement of populations scattered by war and by enemy 
occupation is one of the problems with which Europe will be most 
urgently faced when the occupied countries are set free. Since 
hostilities began, millions of people have left homes destroyed or 
threatened with destruction; millions more have been transplanted, 
deported, or expelled to make room for foreign newcomers who have 
taken over their property; millions of others again have been taken 
prisoner or individually recruited as workers and sent away from 
their countries to serve the occupying power. 

The political, economic and social reconstruction of the liberated 
countries cannot be contemplated until some degree of order has been 
restored among this confusion of peoples. Political reconstruction 
requires that the nationals of each country shall be able to return 
within their own frontiers. Economic reconstruction depends not 
only on the re-equipment of industry and agriculture and on re- 
stocking with raw materials and seed, but also on the rebuilding of 
the labour force of each country. Lastly, social reconstruction is only 
possible if families are reunited and those who have been uprooted 
are resettled in their old homes or in new homes where, in the words 
of the resolution adopted by the Conference of the International 
Labour Organisation in New York|in 1941, they can "work in 
freedom and security and hope". 

It is obvious that the number and whereabouts of all those who 
will have to be redistributed and resettled cannot be determined 
until the war is over. For the time being every passing month merely 
complicates the problem still further. Workers are being snatched 
from their homes in thousands and tens of thousands; families are 
disintegrated ; whole groups are separated from their national com- 
munity and scattered or regrouped in distant places. But at a time 
when the war seems to be entering on a new phase, it may be useful 
to make a preliminary general survey of the position and a tentative 
estimate of the magnitude of the problems to be solved. 

In building up a general picture of the movements of the peoples 
of Europe during the war the first step was to list as fully as possible 
all the available sources of information. The second was to sift the 
information collected, retaining only the most typical and reliable 


items, and the third to arrange and present the data so as to bring 
out the leading trends and characteristics of the movements. 

To carry out this work the Office was able to secure the services 
of Professor Eugene M. Kulischer, who has prepared the present 
study in consultation with Mr. Pierre Waelbroeck, Chief of the 
Labour Conditions, Employment and Migration Section of the 
International Labour Office. In spite of the plentiful material which 
it has been possible to assemble with the help of a number of institu- 
tions and individuals, public and private, who have kindly made 
their information available, it is clear that under present circum- 
stances the results of a survey of this kind must necessarily be regard- 
ed in many ways as of a preliminary and provisional nature. Never- 
theless, the object of the study will have been achieved if it helps 
to show the magnitude and nature of the problems with which the 
world will be confronted at the end of the war and to demonstrate 
that, as the writer emphasises in his conclusions, they cannot be 
satisfactorily solved otherwise than by close international collabora- 

The International Labour Office. 





CHAPTER I. Migration Movements of the German People 7 

Transfer and Resettlement of Germans from Abroad 9 

Transfer of German Minorities 11 

The Baltic States 11 

Soviet-Occupied Western Ukraine and Western Bielo- 

russia (Provinces of Eastern Poland) 13 

Bessarabia and Northern Bukpvina 16 

Dobruja and Southern Bukovina 16 

South Tyrol 17 

The General Government 19 

Ljubljana 19 

Miscellaneous Groups 20 

Distribution and Areas of Resettlement 21 

Summary 24 

Movements of Germans from the Reich 27 

The German Colonists 28 

Officials and Non- Agricultural Workers and Employees. ... 31 

Refugees and Evacuees 33 

Summary 35 

CHAPTER II. Movements of Non-German Populations 39 

Pre-War Refugee Movements 39 

Movements of Peoples other than Jews 46 

Czechoslovakia 46 

The Protectorate of Bohemia-Moravia 46 

Slovakia 48 

Poland 48 

Refugees after the German Invasion 49 

Incorporated Western Polish Provinces ^ 50 

Eastern Polish Provinces (Western Bielorussia and West- 
ern Ukraine) 57 

Finland 60 

The Baltic Countries 62 

Denmark and Norway 64 

Netherlands 65 

Luxemburg 68 

Belgium 69 

France 70 

Alsace-Lorraine 70 

Other parts of France 75 

South-Eastern Europe 77 

Yugoslavia 78 

Greece and Bulgaria 81 

Rumania 83 

1. Hungaro-Rumanian Population Exchange 83 

2. Bulgaro-Rumanian Population Exchange 84 

3. Migration from and to Bessarabia and Northern 

Bukovina 85 

Hungary 86 

U.S.S.R 86 


The Expulsion and Deportation of Jews 95 

Earlier Forms of Expulsion and Deportation 97 

Countries and Territories of Expulsion and Deportation .... 99 

Western Poland 99 

Germany 100 

Protectorate of Bohemia-Moravia 101 

Slovakia 101 

France 102 

Netherlands 103 

Belgium 104 

Norway 104 

Hungary 105 

Rumania 105 

Yugoslavia 106 

Territories of Destination and Methods of Confinement. ... 107 

Ghettos 107 

Forced Labour Camps 108 

Total Number of Uprooted Jews Ill 

Summary 113 

CHAPTER III. Mobilisation of Foreign Labour by Germany 117 

Immigration of Foreign Labour before the War 117 

General Survey of Foreign Labour Mobilisation during the War. 122 

Analysis by country 132 

Czechoslovakia 132 

Sudetenland 132 

Bohemia and Moravia 133 

Slovakia 134 

Poland 135 

Norway and Denmark 138 

Netherlands 139 

Belgium 143 

France 145 

Yugoslavia and Greece 150 

U.S.S.R 152 

Italy 156 

Hungary 157 

Bulgaria 158 

Rumania 158 

Spain 1 59 

Summary 1 59 


MAP I. Transfer of German Minorities facing p. 38 

MAP II. Movements of Non-German Populations facing p. 116 

MAP III. Foreign Workers and Prisoners of War Employed in 

Germany at the Beginning of 1943 facing p. 162 

CHART. General Survey of Population Displacements in 

Europe since the Beginning of the War facing p. 170 


From time immemorial war has always caused widespread 
displacements of population. Driven abroad by the destruction 
of their homes, fleeing from the neighbourhood of the battlefields 
or from the threat of enemy occupation, floods of refugees have 
always taken to the roads in search of a haven which is never easy 
to find. 

It is many centuries, however, since the world witnessed popula- 
tion movements comparable to those set in motion by the present 
war. The size of modern armies, the distances over which their 
campaigns are conducted, the widening of the danger zone as a 
result of the enormous range of aeroplanes, have multiplied the 
risks to which civilians are exposed. While the authorities have 
tried to check uncontrolled movements, they have themselves 
organised methodical evacuations on a huge scale. Whole towns 
and districts have been cleared of their inhabitants to give the 
fighting forces complete freedom of movement or to safeguard the 
civilian population against bombing. Government departments 
and essential undertakings, together with their equipment and 
staff, have been transferred from one part of the country to another, 
and even abroad. Unreliable sections of the population have been 
removed from strategic areas as a precaution against sabotage and 

In Europe these movements directly due to the war have reached 
a special pitch of intensity at given times. Each of the German 
offensives drove before it a flood tide of refugees and evacuees. 
Relatively few of these people, however, crossed the borders of their 
own countries. In Poland, Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium, 
France, Yugoslavia and Greece most of them returned to their 
homes when the hostilities were over. In Russia, on the other 
hand, where the front has held, the unoccupied part of the country 
still harbours millions of refugees and evacuees from the regions 
under enemy occupation. Moreover, throughout Europe the sys- 
tematic evacuation from the coastal areas is only the prelude to 
the fresh compulsory removals of population which will inevitably 
accompany the reopening of the military campaign on the con- 


Europe has not been the only scene of these mass displacements. 
In China the number of refugees who have left their homes as a 
result of Japanese aggression is reckoned at 30 to 60 million. The 
invasion of Malaya led to the evacuation of a large section of the 
white population. From Burma, Indians fled with Europeans 
before the advancing Japanese armies. In Abyssinia and North 
Africa too, military operations have caused population movements. 
Even in America, so far from the actual theatre of operations, the 
war has led to certain displacements; over 110,000 persons of 
Japanese race or enemy nationality have been removed from the 
Pacific zone of the United States and transferred inland. 

But it is in Europe above all other continents that the transfers 
of population which have taken place since the beginning of the 
war present the most complicated pattern. War refugees and 
evacuees are only one factor in the problem. Within the territories 
occupied by the German armies, Germany has redistributed or 
dispersed the population and carried out mass removals of indi- 
viduals or families, whether in furtherance of political designs or 
of demographic and ethnical policy, or to supply its manpower 
requirements. Unlike the exodus of war refugees and evacuees, 
these transfers are not the direct result of the hostilities. To some 
extent they had already begun before the war. From each of the 
territories which successively came under a totalitarian regime 
floods of refugees, fleeing from political and racial persecution, 
surged into the neighbouring countries. On the eve of the war 
Europe was divided into two zones, one dominated by the centri- 
fugal forces of totalitarianism, while the other tried to arrest or 
control this forced immigration. Germany's conquest of the major 
part of Europe brought both zones under German control and gave 
its rulers a free hand to carry out the transfers they considered 
necessary to implement their policy. Within the vast expanses of 
territory controlled by the totalitarian Powers transfers of popula- 
tion assumed enormous dimensions. The mass displacements of 
non-German populations were matched by the transplantation of 
Germans or peoples of Germanic origin into the zones assigned to 
German settlement. Population exchanges were arranged between 
Germany and neighbouring or allied couhtries. The acknowledged 
aim of the German Government is to redistribute the population 
of Europe so as to establish German influence and leadership over 
the largest possible area. 

To these displacements of population in fulfilment of a long- 
term policy has been added the transfer of millions of workers. 
The requirements of the rearmament programme led, in Germany 
especially, to an increase in internal migration movements, closely 


connected with changes in economic structure; the transition 
from peacetime to wartime industry was accompanied by changes 
in the geographical distribution of labour, while the expansion 
of total industrial employment stimulated the rural exodus. Still 
more important was the influx of workers from other countries. 
Even before the outbreak of hostilities the growing needs of muni- 
tions industries had sucked up the labour reserves on the employ- 
ment market of each of the territories which came under German 
domination. This process has been intensified during the war. In 
the camps of prisoners of war, in the occupied territories and in 
those of its new allies, Germany found enormous reserves of 
labour which were at once drawn upon to meet the needs of German 
agriculture and war industries. From east and west, north and south, 
a constant stream of workers has been directed towards the Reich. 
In the opposite direction, a growing army of officials, technicians, 
employees and key workers has crossed the frontiers to administer 
the occupied countries and exploit their economic resources. Lastly, 
with the expansion of the war economy in the occupied territories 
and the strengthening of military defence works on their borders, 
these currents of migration have multiplied and crossed each other 
in every direction. At the present time the total mobilisation of 
Europe's labour force is proceeding under unified direction at a 
quickened tempo. Throughout the area under German control 
those who are capable of work are being recruited, transferred, and 
redistributed according to the dictates of Germany's economic 
and military plans. 

It is no easy task to reduce all these movements to an intelligible 
pattern and find a criterion for their classification. There is, in 
fact, no clear dividing line between war refugees and those officially 
evacuated; in many cases people who left their homes voluntarily 
would have been evacuated later had they waited for the official 
decision, and the situation of both groups is practically the same. 
In the same way it would be arbitrary to draw any distinction 
between a political refugee and a war refugee who did not return 
after his country had been defeated for fear of political or racial 
persecution. It is also difficult, if not often impossible, to distinguish 
between evacuation and deportation. The Alsatians evacuated at 
the beginning of the war who were not allowed to return after their 
homeland was annexed by Germany are no differently situated from 
those who were expelled from Alsace after the annexation. Even 
where it would be theoretically possible to sort out these various 
groups from one another, the information is often inadequate. 

Three main categories may, however, be distinguished among 
the masses of people involved in these movements. The first con- 


sists of Germans and persons of German origin who have been 
moved into occupied countries since the beginning of the war. The 
second comprises non-Germans who left their homes under the 
threat of invasion or who have been the victims of wholesale 
transfer, deportation or expulsion from the invaded territories. 
The third consists of prisoners of war and workers recruited indivi- 
dually in all the European countries under German occupation for 
work in Germany or in other occupied territories. Although it is 
becoming more and more difficult to distinguish between recruit- 
ment and deportation, there is at least one difference between 
labour recruitment and the deportations covered by the second 
group in that the former does not aim at changing the demographic 
map of Europe, but merely at temporarily transferring away from 
their country persons whom Germany wishes to use in the service 
of its war economy. 

In order to assess the consequences of all these migrations, 
voluntary or compulsory, for the countries concerned and the pro- 
blems they raise for the future, it would be important to know the 
age, sex and occupational distribution of the transferred persons 
and also their precise whereabouts. Unfortunately information on 
these points is scanty. Such particulars as are available have been 
included in this study, but as a rule it has been possible to give 
only the total figures. 

Even so far as the total volume of the movements is concerned, 
the information available does not always give a clear picture of 
the situation, especially for the most recent period. In many cases 
statistical information from official or semi-official sources is obtain- 
able, for instance in respect of the resettlement of German popula- 
tions and the recruitment of workers in the countries under German 
control. In other cases, however, there are only estimates from 
indirect sources, and those which appear to be the most trust- 
worthy have been selected from the data available. As it is clearly 
impossible at the present juncture to make a strict statistical study 
of the population movements concerned, all that has been attempted 
is a preliminary inventory of the available material. 

In drawing up this inventory, the author was fortunate in being 
able to call on the assistance of a number of institutions and indi- 
viduals who have helped him to carry out the necessary research 
and have placed their collections of material at his disposal. He is 
glad to acknowledge his debt of gratitude to the American Friends 
Service, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; the American National Red 
Cross, Washington; the American Jewish Joint Distribution Com- 
mittee, New York; the American Jewish Committee Research 
Institute on Peace and Post- War Problems, New York; the Belgian 


Information Centre, New York; the Board of Economic Warfare, 
Washington; the Central and Eastern European Planning Board, 
New York; the Czechoslovak Information Service, New York; 
the United States Department of Commerce, Washington; the 
Finnish Legation, Washington; the French Information Centre, 
New York; The French National Committee, Delegation to the 
United States, New York; the Greek Office of Information, Wash- 
ington; the Hias-Ica Emigration Association (Hicem), New 
York; the International Red Cross, Washington; the Institute of 
Jewish Affairs, New York; the Latvian Legation, Washington; the 
Lithuanian Consulate-General, New York; the Office of Population 
Research, Princeton, New York; the ORT Economic Research 
Committee, New York; the Polish Information Centre, New York; 
the Turkish Embassy, Washington; the Young Men's Christian 
Association, New York; and the Royal Yugoslav Government 
Information Centre, New York. Thanks are also due to Mr. Hanson 
W. Baldwin, military and naval correspondent of the New York 
Times; Mr. George Barrett, also of the New York Times; Dr. Brut- 
saert, Director of Medical Laboratories, Leopoldville, Belgian 
Congo; Dr. Myron K. Kantorowitz, Takoma Park, Maryland; Dr. 
Frank Lorimer, Washington; Dr. Philip E. Mosely, Ithaca, New 
York; Mrs. Irene B. Taeuber, Director, Census Library Project, 
Washington; and Mr. Sergius A. Vassiliev, Consulting Engineer, 
New York. 

Thanks to the valuable assistance received from all these sources, 
it has been possible, where no official figures were available, to 
scrutinise the existing material, to compare divergent data and to 
attempt at least some estimates when there were gaps in the existing 
documentation. It is on the basis of all this varied information 
that a synoptic table and a general analysis of the movements 
studied have been attempted in the final chapter of the report. 


The political expansion and military conquests of Germany 
have been followed by mass migration movements of people of 
German stock from abroad (Auslandsdeutsche) to Greater Germany 
and of German nationals (Reichsdeutsche) to the occupied terri- 

The first group of movements is not a purely wartime phenome- 
non ; it has precedents in the recent history of Germany. After the 
war of 1914-1918 a very large number of people of German nation- 
ality or origin, who before the war had lived either in territory 
detached from the Reich under the Treaty of Versailles or else- 
where, flocked back to live within the new German frontiers. 

The German Migration Office published the following estimates 
of the extent and net results of this immigration up to the end 
of 1920 1 : 

No. of immigrants 

From Alsace-Lorraine 120,000 

From other territories detached from Germany 500,000 

German nationals repatriated from other foreign countries 190,000-200,000 

(including 20,000 German colonials) 
"Racial" Germans 70,000 

(100,000 immigrants, of whom 30,000 re-emigrated) 
Baltic Germans 20,000 

(25,000 immigrants, of whom 5,000 re-emigrated) 

Total 900,000-910,000 

This estimate was substantially confirmed by the census of 1925. 2 
According to the census figures, the population of the Reich at 
that time included 1,377,000 persons who before 1 August 1914 
were living outside the German frontiers fixed by the Treaty of 
Versailles. Of this number, only 279,000 were foreigners. All the 
others were German nationals: 770,000 came from territories 
detached from the Reich; others were German citizens who had 
been living abroad before the war; others again were persons of 

1 Reichstagsdrucksache, 1920-22, No. 4084. The figures relate to immigration 
from the beginning of the war, but in fact by far the greater proportion took 
place after the war. 

2 Statistik des Deutschen Reichs, Vol. 401, Part II, pp. 538-541. 


German origin or German stock who had previously been nationals 
of foreign countries, the countries of eastern and south-eastern 
Europe among others, and had acquired German nationality after 
entering Germany. 

The magnetic pull of Germany on Germans from abroad, after 
slackening for some years, revived in a still stronger form after 
the introduction of the National Socialist regime. The rapid devel- 
opment of economic activity due to the rearmament programme 
attracted over half a million immigrants to Germany between 1933 
and 1939; during this period, in spite of the departure of some 
400,000 refugees 1 , Greater Germany (i.e. the old Reich, with the 
addition of Austria and the Sudetenland) showed a migratory gain 
of 93,000 persons. It is true that this consisted very largely of 
foreign workers recruited outside the frontiers of Germany to 
meet the labour requirements of the German war economy; but 
it also included a large proportion of Germans. Indeed, the German 
Statistical Office attributes the fact that Germany had a favourable 
balance of migration at that time mainly to this new wave of im- 
migration or repatriation of persons of German race or nationality, 
explaining that "the re-immigration of racial Germans, previously 
unorganised, was carried out methodically and on a vast scale 
after the 1939 census in order to colonise the newly acquired German 
living space". 2 

Thus, the mass transfer of Germans from abroad carried out 
during the war must be regarded as a direct continuation of the 
spontaneous movement of German minorities abroad to the Reich, 
organised methodically and directed towards a new demographic 
and political goal. 

The second movement, on the other hand that of Reich 
Germans into other European countries which has been in pro- 
gress since 1939, is a direct result of German conquests and has 
nothing in common with peacetime movements. During the years 
immediately following the last war, German emigration was on a 
very reduced scale. The sudden wave of emigration which followed 
the collapse of the German currency was short-lived. In 1923, 
German overseas emigration rose to 115,000, a figure which had 
not been reached since 1893, but owing to the joint effect of the 
United States quota restrictions and of German economic recon- 
struction during the Locarno period it dwindled again to something 
like 60,000 a year between 1924 and 1928. The world depression 
practically put a stop to all migration, and when it was resumed 
after the establishment of the National Socialist regime it took 

1 Cf. below, Chapter II, p. 42. 

* Wirtschaft und Statistik, No. 20, Oct. 1940. 


the form of enforced emigration. From 1933 to the outbreak of 
war practically the only emigrants from Germany were Jews and 
political refugees who were the victims of persecution or expulsion. 
It w;as only in 1938, simultaneously with Germany's first con- 
quests, that quite a different type of movement began, namely, 
the fanning out of Germans beyond the old German frontiers to 
the territories annexed, occupied or controlled by Germany. It is 
this movement, continually expanded by a variety of circumstances, 
which is described in the second section of this chapter. 


The victorious eastward march of the German armies in 1939 
was followed by a mass transplantation of people of German origin 
living in other countries to the newly enlarged territories of Greater 
Germany. A series of agreements concluded by the German Govern- 
ment in 1939 and 1940 resulted in the transfer of about 600,000 
Germans from eastern, south-eastern and southern Europe to 
Germany. This mass migration was described by German pro- 
paganda as a "return to the Fatherland", or "repatriation", terms 
which cannot, of course, be taken literally, since hardly any of 
the "repatriated" persons had any connection with the Reich. 
They were nationals of other countries, which they and their an- 
cestors had inhabited for many centuries. Moreover, most of 
them were not actually transferred to Germany, but were settled 
on foreign territories under German control. 

The ideological basis of this great, more or less forced, movement 
of migration was laid down by Chancellor Hitler in a speech to the 
Reichstag on 6 October 1939. He stated that the most important 
task of present day policy would be the establishment of a new 
order of ethnographic conditions that is, a resettlement of nation- 
alities which would ultimately result in the fixing of better dividing 
lines than in the past. Eastern and south-eastern Europe were 
largely populated by splinters of German stock, whose very exist- 
ence gave rise to constant international disturbances. In this age 
of the principle of nationalities and of racial theories, it was Utopian 
to believe that members of a highly-developed nation could be 
assimilated without trouble, and a far-sighted policy for ordering 
the life of Europe therefore demanded that resettlement should 
be carried out, so as to remove at least one cause of European 

In speculating as to the true reasons for Chancellor Hitler's 
repatriation policy three explanations are commonly advanced. 
These are that it was intended, first, to germanise Polish Pome- 
rania, Poznan and other districts taken by conquest from Poland 


and incorporated into the Reich, by settling repatriated Germans in 
place of the expelled Poles; secondly, to secure the needed man- 
power for the army and for German war industry; and thirdly, to 
create realisable assets abroad from the property of the repatriated 

With regard to the first point, Germany was, of course, very 
much interested in the rapid germanisation of the newly conquered 
territories. It was emphasised in leading German circles, however, 
that the colonisation of the eastern borderlands would not be effected 
by the settlement of foreign-born Germans, but mainly by the skill 
and labour of the peasants from the over-populated parts of south- 
ern and south-western Germany, and that this project had been 
postponed until the end of the war only so as to give settlement 
privileges to the returning soldiers. 1 On the other hand, it was 
pointed out that large numbers of Germans would be required to 
take over and administer the whole economic sector of the annexed 
territories; that the war and the gigantic problems it involved left 
no forces free to undertake this task, which would in fact be light- 
ened precisely by the resettlement of Germans " which the Ftihrer 
had ordered on a grand scale". 2 

The second point the need of manpower was probably not 
taken so seriously in 1939, when the world was still impressed by 
the constant German complaints of lack of "living space". But 
the crushing weight of this factor was clearly demonstrated by 
subsequent economic developments in Germany and by the Govern- 
ment's efforts to mobilise the whole German population men, 
women, and even children and to attract all available manpower 
from abroad. 

As to the financial aspects of the transfer, they are dealt with in 
the repatriation treaties, which stipulated that the property of the 
repatriated persons was to be liquidated and transferred to Ger- 
many little by little. Thus, the German Government hoped to 
receive large sums in foreign exchange which could be used for the 
purpose of financing necessary imports. 

All these factors may have been taken into consideration by the 
Government of the Reich. Nor should the part played by the fear 
of Communism in the decision of the Auslandsdeutsche to leave the 
land where they and their families had lived for centuries be under- 
estimated; many non-Germans who joined in the exodus emphasise 
the importance of this motive. 

1 Reichsarbeitsblatt, 15 Aug. 1940, No. 23, Part V, p. 397; Der Deutsche Volks- 
wirt, 31 Jan. 1941; Die Deutsche Volkswirtschaft,No.2S t Oct. 1941: "Wirtschaft- 
liche Festigung des Deutschen Volkstums". 

* Die Deutsche Volkswirtschaft, No. 28, Oct. 1941: "Wirtschaftsaufbau im 


Nevertheless, the main reason for the "repatriation" of the 
German minorities was in all probability political. Chancellor Hitler 
gave it as being the "elimination of international disturbances". 
In fact, however, this policy was not a general gesture of peace, 
but was rather determined by a definite political situation. The 
Soviet Union had occupied Eastern Poland and was ready to extend 
its dominion over the Baltic States and the eastern part of Rumania. 
All these territories had large German minorities, and if they had 
been left under Soviet rule the Reich would have had either to 
tolerate the expropriation of their property or to defend them. 
To adopt the first solution was to abandon the pretence of protecting 
all Germans; the second meant interfering with the internal policy 
of the Soviet Union and risking a conflict at a moment when this 
was not considered to be opportune. The situation was similar in 
the case of the Tyrolese, whose presence on the Brenner frontier 
was apt to disturb the good relations between the German and 
Italian Governments. The repatriation of the German minorities 
from these countries, therefore, provided a solution avoiding a 
conflict with powers with which Germany needed, at least tem- 
porarily, to remain on good terms. 

As will be seen below, the extent to which repatriation was 
actually carried out was mainly conditioned by these considerations 
of political expediency. Out of 600,000 repatriated Germans, about 
400,000 came from the Russian and 100,000 from the Italian sphere 
of influence. 1 

The Transfer of German Minorities 

The Baltic States. 

The Baltic Germans constituted the most ancient German 
colony in foreign lands. They were descendants of the Teutonic 
knights and Hanseatic merchants who conquered these countries 
seven centuries ago. But even before they lost their political and 
economic influence their demographic expansion had ceased. In 
Latvia, the number of Germans had shown a continual decline 
since 1881, a decline which became much steeper after the first 
world war. In 1918-1919, German volunteers under the leadership 
of General von der Goltz started a campaign to "liberate" the 
Baltic peoples from the Bolsheviks. This crusade, accompanied 

1 The remaining 100,000 may be accounted for by (a) migration from Southern 
Bukovina and Northern Dobruja, where, after the partition of the two Rumanian 
provinces, living conditions became more difficult; (b) transfers from the General 
Government, in order to create "ethnical" divisions in German-occupied Poland; 
and (c) migration from other countries with scattered German communities. 


by colonisation projects, ended with the eviction of the Germans 
by the Latvians, with the assistance of the Allied Nations. With 
them went a good many of the Baltic Germans, some of them land- 
owners who had been affected by the agrarian reform. The remain- 
ing Germans in Latvia and Estonia were concentrated in the larger 
towns, and suffered the fate which usually befalls purely urban 
groups stagnation and even decline by excess of deaths over 
births. In Latvia, in 1935, this excess had reached a rate of seven 
per thousand. Before 1914, the territory of the future Baltic States 
of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania contained more than 250,000 
Germans. When the exodus started, their numbers were estimated 
at between 110,000 and 130,000. Thus, the transfer only gave the 
final blow to the slowly dying German communities. 

The legal basis of this transfer was provided by treaties con- 
cluded by Germany with the Governments of Estonia (15 October 
1939) 1 , and Latvia (30 October 1939). 2 The arrangements were 
already in full swing at these dates, however, and the transfer 
started immediately after the treaties were signed. 

The treaties covered all the members of the German minority. 
Provision was made for defining persons belonging to this minority 
and for the ways and means by which German origin might be 
proved even by persons who were not formally members of the 
minority. Many non-Germans, however, native Estonians, Lat- 
vians and Russians, appear to have joined the departing Germans 3 , 
while others flocked into Sweden. These voluntary emigrants were 
members of wealthy families, business men, doctors, priests and 
others, who fled for fear of the economic and social consequences 
of a possible Russian occupation. 

The treaties also made arrangements concerning the property 
of the repatriated persons. They were allowed to take their house- 
hold goods, the tools of their trade (with some exceptions), a very 
limited amount of their jewelry, and a small sum in cash. 4 All their 
other property had to be liquidated and transferred in the form of 
the mutual exchange of goods between Latvia and Estonia and the 

1 Cf. Industrial and Labour Information, Vol. LXXII, No. 8, 20 Nov. 1939, 
p. 227. 

2 Idem, No. 10, 4 Dec. 1939, p. 274. 

3 This is emphatically stated by Dr. Joseph SCHECHTMAN, whose work on the 
transfer of German populations, prepared for the Institute of Jewish Affairs, 
has been consulted in manuscript by courtesy of the author. The evidence he 
quotes in support of his statement consists of (a) letters from the evacuated 
Baits (Baltenbriefe zur Rilckkehr ins Reich, Berlin-Leipzig, 1940), and (b) lists 
of persons who lost their Latvian citizenship through being evacuated to the 

4 This was limited to 50 crowns ($13.50) in Estonia and 50 lats ($10.00) in 


The transfer of Germans from the Baltic countries was described 
by the treaties as strictly voluntary. Persons who wished to be 
transferred had to make application in a prescribed form and within 
a prescribed time, and only after this application had been accepted 
did the applicant lose his Estonian or Latvian citizenship, and was 
obliged to leave the country. In practice, the transfer was carried 
out under strong moral pressure exercised by the local National 
Socialist leaders and in a wild panic provoked by rumours that 
the "Reds" were at the door. After the first panic had subsided 
many Germans began to reconsider their decision, and those who 
had not committed themselves refused to leave the country where 
they were comfortably established for an uncertain future. 

But the great majority, 63,832 in all 1 , were swept away by the 
current. The main transfer was concluded in January 1940. 

In July 1940 Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia were incorporated 
into the Soviet Union, and on 10 January 1941 a resettlement treaty 
was signed by Germany and the Soviet Union providing for the 
repatriation of all Germans from the above-named countries. Under 
this agreement, according to German sources, 16,244 Germans 
from Latvia and Estonia all who still remained there were 
repatriated. The number of persons transferred from Lithuania 
under it was 50,47 1. 2 According to an official Lithuanian source, 
the great majority were not Germans at all but Lithuanians fearful 
of Soviet rule, 35,000 of whom succeeded in obtaining the required 
certificate of German origin. Under the same agreement, 12,000 
Lithuanians and 9,000 Russians were transferred to Soviet con- 
trolled territory from the Lithuanian districts of Memel and 
Suwalki, annexed by Germany. All these transfers had been com- 
pleted by 25 March 1941. 3 

Soviet-occupied Western Ukraine and Western Bielorussia (Provinces 
of Eastern Poland). 

In his speech of 6 October to the Reichstag, Chancellor Hitler 
declared that the purpose of the resettlement scheme was to pre- 
vent international conflict, emphasising thereby that Germany 

1 This is the final corrected figure given by the Deutsche Umsiedlungs-Treu- 
hand-Gesellschaft (D.U.T.), as quoted by the Deutsche Post aus dem Osten, June 
1942. Earlier figures published in Wirtschaft und Statistik, 1941, No. 1, showed 
approximately 12,900 persons transferred from Estonia and 49,600 from Latvia. 

2 Deutsche Post aus dem Osten, loc. cit. Official Lithuanian sources give this 
figure as 52,600. This corresponds to information published in the Moscow 
Pravda (26 Mar. 1941), giving the total number of Germans repatriated from 
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania on the basis of the treaties between Germany 
and the Soviet Union as 68,805. 

8 Archivfur Wander ungswesen und Auslandskunde, 1941, No. 1-2, p. 43. 


and the Union of Soviet Republics had come to a mutual agree- 
ment on the matter. It was therefore naturally assumed that a 
wave of migration would also surge up among the hundreds of 
thousands of Germans living in Russia. But the facts did not meas- 
ure up to these expectations, and during the period that followed 
there was no question of a transfer of people of German race from 
the numerous German colonies within the former frontiers of the 
Soviet Union. 

After the collapse of Poland, Polish territory was divided into 
a German and a Soviet sphere of interest. Later, part of the Polish 
territory administered by the Germans was incorporated into the 
Reich 1 , while the rest of German-occupied Poland became a special 
separate administrative region known as 'The General Govern- 
ment for the Occupied Polish Territories". 

Germany's policy was originally to endow these three parts of 
dismembered Poland with a specific ethnical character. The in- 
corporated territories were to be wholly germanised. The General 
Government was set apart for Poles and Jews. The Russian- 
occupied provinces were to accommodate Russian, Ukrainian and 
Bielorussian emigrants from the German-occupied parts of Poland. 
This policy appears to have agreed with the intentions of the Soviet 
Government, which, while it had no interest in disturbing the 
economy of the Union by a sudden mass emigration from inner 
Russia, welcomed the possibility of strengthening the Bielorussian 
and Ukrainian elements in its newly acquired territory, while at 
the same time eliminating the German colonies in the neighbour- 
hood of the new German frontier, where they would constitute a 
permanent political and military danger. 

The agreement 2 concluded between the German and Soviet 
Governments on 3 November 1939 was in harmony with the aims 
of the contracting parties as described above. It dealt with the 
exchange of populations, and provided that all Germans residing 
in the Western Ukraine and Western Bielorussia (both formerly 
part of Poland) had the right to migrate to German-controlled 
territory, and all Ukrainians, Bielorussians, Russians and Ruthe- 
nians residing in the former Polish territories now within the 
German sphere of influence, to migrate to the territory controlled 
by the Soviet Union. A further agreement provided for the 
return to the territory of their permanent or legal residence of 
all persons who happened temporarily or accidentally to be in the 
other area. 

1 For details, see Chapter II, under Poland, pp. 50-51. 

2 Cf. Industrial and Labour Information, Vol. LXXII, No. 10, 4 Dec. 1939, 
p. 275. 


There were in German-occupied territory many persons who had 
come from Eastern Poland for business, study or other reasons and 
were caught there by the war, but who were regular residents of 
the Soviet-occupied area. On the Russian-occupied side there were 
the great mass of refugees who had fled from the German invasion 
further and further to the east. Hundred of thousands of them 
crowded into the cities; the population of Lwow, for instance, 
was more than doubled. The Germans, however, only permitted 
the re-entry of a number of Polish and Ukrainian refugees who had 
their residence in German-controlled territory, but refused to allow 
any Jewish refugees to return. 1 

The provision made for disposing of the property of the migrants 
was unusual; the migrants were to be allowed to take with them 
such of their property as was necessary for the continuation of their 
economic activity. 

In accordance with the first agreement, German colonists 
began to leave their homes in Volhynia, Eastern Galicia and the 
Bialystok region in December 1939. From 18 December 1939 to 
26 January 1940 2 a constant stream was crossing the Russo-German 
border in primitive horse-clrawn wagons, piled high with all their 
goods, and in mile-long railway trains. This trek brought to Ger- 
man-held territory 134,267 3 persons, most of them peasants who 
had abandoned settlements founded by their ancestors 150 years 
ago. In the opposite direction the number of Bielorussians and 
Ukrainians who were to move to Russian-occupied territory was 
roughly estimated as between 30,000 and 40,000. 

With regard to the persons who migrated under the additional 
agreement, no official estimate is available. 4 Such an estimate 
would, in fact, be valuable only if it were possible to distinguish 
between those whose return to their homes was genuine and thus 
did not increase but reduced the transfer of population, and those 
who took advantage of the situation to escape German domination. 

1 Concerning these refugees, cf. Chapter II, Poland, p. 58. 

2 According to a statement by Werner LORENZ, Chief of the Volksdeutsche 
Mittelstelle, who was in charge of this evacuation, quoted by Helmut SOMMER 
in Hundert-funf-und-dreissig Tausend Gewannen das Vaterland (Berlin, 1940). 

a Deutsche Post aus dem Osten, June 1942. This source does not give the num- 
bers who left from each region, but they cannot differ much from the figures 
published a year before in Wirtschaft und Statistik, 1941, No. 1. The total 
number at that time was estimated at 128,100 and was made up of 64,600 settlers 
from Volhynia, 55,400 from Galicia and 8,100 from Bialystok. 

4 The number of Poles who had to be returned to their previous homes in the 
territory under German control has been estimated at 14,000 (D.N.B. release, 
quoted by New York Herald Tribune, 20 Mar. 1940). A month earlier an Asso- 
ciated Press cable from Berlin referred to 60,000 Polish refugees who were to be 
moved from Soviet-occupied territory to the General Government (New York 
Times, 20 Feb. 1940). It was also reported that 80,000 Galician Jews were to be 
transferred to Russian-occupied territory (New York Times, 27 Dec. 1939). 


Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina. 

On 28 June 1940, Rumania ceded Bessarabia and Northern 
Bukovina to the Soviet Union. On 5 September 1940 an agree- 
ment was reached between Germany and the Soviet Union concern- 
ing the transfer of Germans living in these formerly Rumanian 
provinces. In general, this agreement reproduces the provisions of 
the treaty concerning the Russian-occupied eastern Polish prov- 
inces; it is, however, unilateral, no exchange of populations being 
provided for. 

The evacuation began in the autumn of 1940. Many of the 
Bessarabian Germans travelled up the Danube in groups as far 
as Belgrade, whence they were transported further by railway. 
A large number of migrants spent the winter in camps in southern 

The last Rumanian census, taken in 1930, showed that there were 
80,000 Germans in Bessarabia, There are no corresponding figures 
for Northern Bukovina, the number of Germans in the whole 
province of Bukovina being 76,000. Under the Russo-German 
agreement 136,989 persons 1 left Russian-occupied Bessarabia and 
Northern Bukovina for Greater Germany, including 12,500 from 
Cernauzti (Czernowitz), the capital of Bukovina. 2 

Dobrufa and Southern Bukovina. 

Already in November 1939 about 10,000 Germans from the 
Dobruja district had signified their intention of emigrating to 
Germany. They were farmers whose ancestors had settled in small 
Dobruja villages about 60 or 70 years ago, and who complained that 
they had no prospect of enlarging their holdings, since only Ruma- 
nians could then lawfully buy land in the Dobruja district. 

It was not until the autumn of 1940, however, after the parti- 
tion of the Dobruja, the southern part of which was ceded to Bul- 
garia, and of Bukovina, the northern part of which was occupied 
by the Russians, that the transfer of Germans from the Dobruja 
actually took place, together with those from Southern Bukovina. 
The transfer was regulated by a German-Rumanian Treaty of 22 
October 1940. Rumania took over the land and some of the mi- 
grants' other property in payment for the products supplied to 
Germany. The transfer was carried out simultaneously with the 
evacuation of Germans from Northern Bukovina, described above. 

The number of Germans transferred from Dobruja and Southern 

1 Deutsche Post aus dent Osten, June 1942. 

2 Wirtschaft und Statistik, 1941, No. 7. According to this source, 93,500 were 
transferred from Bessarabia and 42,400 from Northern Bukovina, 


Bukovina was originally given as 66, 400. l Many more moved later, 
however. The Bucharest agency of the Deutsche Umsiedlungs-Treu- 
hand-Gesellschaft was engaged throughout 1941 in arranging for 
their transportation and admission to Germany and for the settle- 
ment of their property problems. 2 The total number rose to 
76,765. 3 

South Tyrol. 

The transfer of the Tyrolese originated under conditions some- 
what different from those which produced the great German mi- 
gration from the east and south-east. The initiative was taken 
not by the Germans, but by the Italians. 

The South Tyrol, with a large German-speaking population, 
was annexed to Italy after the dismemberment of the Austro- 
Hungarian Empire in 1918. Measures were adopted by the Italian 
authorities to italianise the region. The only official language 
was Italian. Education was in Italian, place names were italianised. 
All officials were Italian, and Italian settlers were introduced. 
This policy was modified after the reconciliation between Germany 
and Italy in 1936, but the anti-Italian attitude of the Tyrolese 
Germans remained unchanged, and they openly expressed the 
hope that the Tyrol would soon return to Germany, especially 
after the annexation of Austria in March 1938. 

Two months later, at the meeting between Chancellor Hitler 
and the Duce in Rome, the Fuhrer agreed to the Duce's wish to 
have the frontier "purified". The division between the North 
and South Tyrol was to be racial as well as geographical. The 
Brenner was to become the ethnographical frontier. 

The formal agreement which settled the fate of the German 
Tyrol was signed by the Italian and German Governments on 21 
October 1939. This agreement made provision, first, for German 
nationals, and secondly, for Italian nationals of German origin. 
The former were unconditionally obliged to move from the Upper 
Adige region (the official Italian name for South Tyrol), while 
the latter had the choice either of remaining in Italy and becoming 
full-fledged Italians or of moving into Germany. It was understood 
at first that those who chose to remain Italian would have to migrate 
to some other part of Italy, away from the frontier. But ultimately 
this stipulation was relaxed, and the German Tyrolese who opted in 

1 Ibid.' 52,100 were given as transferred from southern Rumania and 14,000 
from the Dobruja; 7,000 came from Old Rumania, having their legal domicile 
in the transfer area of Bessarabia and both parts of Bukovina. 

2 Neues Wiener Tageblatt, 2 Apr. 1942. 

8 Deutsche fo$t <m$ dem Osten, June 1942, 


favour of Italian nationality were allowed to remain in the valleys 
where their ancestors had begun to settle as early as the thirteenth 

In fulfilment of this agreement, 10,000 German nationals had 
to migrate to Germany. The German-speaking inhabitants of 
Italian nationality had to opt for German citizenship before the 
end of 1939. The votes were cast in the Italian province of Bolzano 
and in certain districts of the provinces of Udine, Trento and 
Belluno. Altogether, 266,985 persons were entitled to opt, of whom 
185,085 chose to migrate to Germany. 1 

Thus, a majority of the Germans from the Tyrol officially 
registered their final decision to abandon their Italian citizenship 
and to migrate to Germany. But the extent to which this decision 
was carried out only partly corresponded to the vote. The agree- 
ment itself granted a generous time limit, up to 31 December 1942, 
for the optants to leave Italy 2 , and the Tyrolese Germans took full 
advantage of this opportunity of postponing their departure. 
During the whole of the year 1940, only 65,000 Tyrolese migrated 
to Germany 3 , and there was no considerable increase in this figure 
in the course of 1941. The total was only 72,000 up to the spring 
of 1942. 4 

Nor does the Italian Government appear to have pressed the 
optants to leave. Even the partial emigration of the Germans from 
the Tyrol was a severe blow to the local economy. The depopula- 
tion of mountain regions in general is a serious and much discussed 
problem in Italy 5 , which was artificially aggravated by the pro- 
posed "purification" of the frontier. It became more and more 
evident that the problem was not merely to remove the Germans 
from the Tyrolese valleys, but also to replace them by Italians, 
and there was a lack of suitable human material for resettlement. 
Lowlanclers, and even settlers from the Appenines, are not suitable 
for agricultural work in the Tyrol, where conditions are very differ- 
ent, and the neighbouring valleys of Piedmont, which are more or 
less similar in character, have virtually no surplus population. 

The report of the German Resettlement Trust for 1942, recently 
quoted by German newspapers 6 , admits that "the resettlement 

1 These figures are given by German sources. The Agefi News Agency pub- 
lished slightly different figures on 6 May 1942, stating that out of 317,947 Germans 
who had the right to opt, 180,000 voted for resettlement. The number of those 
who actually migrated was not given. 

2 According to the Neue Zurcher Zeitung, 26 Aug. 1942, quoting the Bozener 
Zeitung, the time limit was later extended up to the end of 1943. 

3 Die Deutsche Volkswirtschaft, No. 10, Apr. 1941. 

4 Deutsche Post aus dem Osten, June 1942. 

5 Cf. Lo Spopolamento Montana in Italia (Rome, 1932-1938, 8 vols.), edited by 
the Institute Nazionale di Economia Agraria with the assistance of the Comitato 
per la Geografia and other agencies. 

Cf* VQlkischer Beobachter and Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, 4 Apr. 1943. 


of the South Tyrolese continued to be difficult and troublesome'*. 
It is claimed that much progress was made in 1942, but no figure 
is given for the number of Tyrolese who were moved during that 

The General Government. 

The transfer of Germans from this territory, which covers all 
the German-occupied part of Poland not incorporated into the 
Reich, was effected on a different legal basis. It was based not on 
an international treaty, but on an Order of the German Govern- 
ment having the same authority in the provinces incorporated 
into the Reich as in the General Government. This did not, how- 
ever, affect the political, demographic and economic features of 
the operation, which even included a partial exchange of popula- 
tions, some of the Polish peasants expelled from the Incorporated 
Provinces having been sent to replace the repatriated Germans. 
Not all the Germans in the General Government were repatriated 1 , 
but only those from the areas to the east of the Vistula, from the 
district of Lublin. The number repatriated was 30,495. 2 The trans- 
fer took place in September and October 1940, after the close of 
the harvesting season. 

Ljubljana (Italian-annexed Slovenia). 

After Chancellor Hitler had announced, in his speech of 6 
October 1939, his plan for the resettlement within the borders 
of Germany of all Germans living abroad, propaganda was also 
carried on among the German minorities in Yugoslavia, numbering 
some 500,000, with a view to persuading them to make the sacrifices 
entailed by accepting the Fiihrer's invitation to "return home". 
But no practical steps were taken in this direction. 

The scheme was taken up again after the conquest of Yugoslavia 
in the spring of 1941, but this time only in respect of a small section 
of the German minority. The transfer of the large German popula- 
tion of Yugoslavia was no longer considered desirable. In view of 
their strategic situation, these Germans were regarded as serving 
a more useful purpose where they were as an instrument of control, 
an advance post of German domination in the Balkans. But an 

1 After the transfer there were still 63,000 "ethnical Germans" ( Vplksdeutsche) 
in the General Government, and many more had applied for recognition as Ger- 
mans, as being partly of German origin. Cf. Archiv fur Wander ungswesen und 
Auslandskunde, 1941, No. 1-2, p. 41. In the summer of 1942, 75,000 persons were 
counted as Volksdeutsche (Krakauer Zeitung, 15 July 1942, quoting the Europ&is- 
che Revue). 

2 Deutsche Post aus dem Osten, June 1942. The number reported in spring 1941 
by Wirtschaft und Statistik (1941, No. 1) was 30,300. 


exception was made for a group of Germans residing in the province 
of Ljubljana, the Italian-occupied part of Slovenia, who the German 
Government feared would lose their German character under Italian 
domination. This group, living in the district of Kocevije and 
numbering some 16,QQQ l , constituted a German island in the midst 
of a purely Slovenian population. In agreement with the Italian 
authorities, 13,500 of them 2 were transplanted from the land on 
which they had lived since the fourteenth century and moved to 
the Slovenian districts incorporated into the Reich. According to 
the Royal Yugoslav Government Information Centre, the scheme 
was at first willingly accepted by the people concerned; later on, 
however, they regretted their decision and wished to remain where 
they were, but had no option but to fall in with the plans for transfer, 
which were then all ready. The transfer started in November 
1941 and was completed in 1942. 

Apart from the Germans of Ljubljana, about 1,000 more 8 were 
transferred from other parts of Yugoslavia. On 6 October 1942 an 
agreement was made between Germany and Croatia for the repatria- 
tion of some 20,000 Germans from Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
some other parts of Croatia, mostly artisans, merchants and offi- 
cials, but including also some peasants. 4 The settlers were at first 
directed to a camp in Zhurz, near Lodz 6 , to be settled, since spring 
1943, in the Lublin area of the General Government. 6 

Miscellaneous Groups. 

Small groups of Germans have also been transferred from other 

From Bulgaria 7 423 Germans were repatriated in 1942. In 
spring 1943 another 800 were on the way to Germany. 8 

In France, exclusive of Alsace-Lorraine, 13,353 Germans have 
been "sifted" (durchschleust) and one-third of them were ' 'called 
back" for resettlement. The transfer was substantially carried 
out during 1941 and 1942. 9 

1 According to the 1931 statistics, there were at that time 25,100 Germans in 
Slovenia, 5,400 in the regions later occupied by Germany, and 19,700 in the regions 
later occupied by Italy. 

2 V&lkischer Beobachter, 4 Apr. 1943. 

8 The precise number was 993 (Deutsche Post aus dem Osten, June 1942.) 
*Relazioni Inter nazionali, 31 Oct. 1942; Neue Zurcher Zeitung, 10 Oct. 1942 
and 9 Feb. 1943. 

6 Marburger Zeitung, 30 Dec. 1942. 

6 Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, 4 Apr. 1943. 

7 Deutsche Post aus dem Osten, June 1942. 

8 Transocean broadcast, 13 Apr. 1943. 

9 Archiv fur Wanderungswesen und Auslandskunde, 1942, No. 1-2, p. 67; 
Die Deutsche Volkswirtschaft, 1942, No. 11, p. 362; VOlkischer Beobachter, 4 Apr, 


The transfer of a group from the Leningrad district started in 
the spring of 1942. These Russians were described as German 
minorities, and were said to be descended from Germans who 
immigrated at the call of Catherine the Great to cultivate the 
areas around St. Petersburg. 1 Two thousand one hundred and 
four persons have been * 'recognised as resettlers". 2 

Finally small groups are being repatriated from Slovakia and 
Greece (Heraklion). 3 

Distribution and Areas of Resettlement 

The resettlement of German immigrants of varied occupations 
and diverse geographical origin presented a difficult problem. 

Occupationally, the overwhelming majority over four-fifths 
of Germans from Volhynia, the General Government, Bessarabia 
and the Dobruja were peasants. Among those from Galicia two- 
thirds were peasants and the rest townspeople engaged in handi- 
crafts and trade. Among the migrants from Bukovina, the Narev 
region, and the Baltic countries, persons engaged in agriculture 
were in the minority, and the smallest rural group of all, numbering 
2,090 persons, was among the Baltic Germans from Estonia and 
Latvia, the great majority of whom had been engaged in industry, 
commerce and the liberal professions. 4 The percentage distribution 
by age and by occupation of the removed German minorities is 
given in the table on the next page. 

As already mentioned, the "repatriated" Germans have not 
been settled within Germany's former frontiers. The great majority 
were established on territories newly conquered from Poland, 
France and Yugoslavia and incorporated into the Reich while 
some tens of thousands were settled in former Austria. 5 

The main settlement area was in the incorporated Polish pro- 
vinces, namely the Warthegau, Danzig -West Prussia, and the 
Ciechanow district, now forming part of East Prussia, where the 

1 New York Times, 24 Apr. 1942 (despatch from Stockholm); Ostland, 26 Mar. 

2 Vdlkischer Beobachter, 4 Apr. 1943. 

8 Ibid. The Greek Germans have been reported to be assembled in a camp, 
their property having been sold with advantage. 

4 Wirtschaft und Statistik, 1941, Nos. 1 and 7. It was emphasised that the 
efficiency of the industrial workers among the transferred groups who came from 
more backward areas than the Reich must be improved (Reichsarbeitsblatt, 5 Feb. 
1942, No. 4, Part V, p. 85). 

6 The location of the branches of the Deutsche Umsiedlungs-Treuhand-Gesell- 
schaft, which is entrusted with the work of resettlement, is instructive. The five 
branches are in Poznan, Danzig, Katowice (all three in Western Poland), Inns- 
bruck (North Tyrol, Austria), and Marburg (Slovenia, German-annexed Yugo- 
slav territory). Other subsidiary branches are at Lodz and Ciechanow (Western 
Poland), Klagenfurt (Carinthia, Austria), Veldes and Rann (Slovenia, German- 
annexed Yugoslav territory). 




Distribution by age and occupation 1 

Percentage by age 

Percentage by occupation 

Area of 

















































General Govern- 










North Bukovina 


















South Bukovina 


















great majority of the Baltic Germans and of all the groups 
transferred from areas which were formerly part of Poland and 
Rumania were established. The number reported to have been 
brought into the area by the summer of 1942 was 497,000. Of 
these, 230,800 were settled in the Warthegau and 148,000 in Danzig- 
West Prussia. The remaining 120,000 odd had not yet been settled 
and were still living in camps. 2 The resettlement of Lithuanians was 
started in the Ciechanow district 3 , but this scheme was subsequently 
abandoned in favour of sending them back to Lithuania, as des- 
cribed below. 

The Ljubljana Germans were transferred to the border region 
of Southern Styria that is, to the part of Yugoslav territory in- 
habited by Slovenes incorporated into the Reich by the German 
Government. 4 

A very small minority of those transferred from Bessarabia, 
Southern Bukovina and Dobruja were established in Southern 
Styria, in Lorraine 6 , and in parts of Alsace where the Maginot 
Line formerly was. 6 

1 Wirtschaft und Statistik, 1941, Nos. 1 and 7. The percentages are calculated 
on the basis of figures for the spring of 1941. 

2 Danziger Vorposten, 2 July 1942. Similar figures are given in Archiv fur 
Wanderungswesen und Auslandskunde, 1942, No. 1-2, p. 7 7, in regard to settlement 
up to the end of 1941: Warthegau, 221,000; Danzig -West Prussia, 150,000. 
The settlement of 4,000 Germans in Upper Silesia was reported by the Krakauer 
Zeitung, 8 Sept. 1942. In 1942, another 3,700 families were settled in the War- 
thegau, Danzig - West Prussia, and Upper Silesia. 

5 Archiv fur Wanderungswesen und Auslandskunde, 1941, No. 3, p. 109; Die 
Deutsche Volkswirtschaft, 1942, No. 11, p. 362. 

4 Archiv fur Wanderungswesen und Auslandskunde, 1942, No. 1-2, p. 66; Die 
Deutsche Volkswirtschaft, 1942, No. 11, p. 362. 

6 Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, 4 Apr. 1943. 

6 Jacques LORRAINE: La France Allemande (1942), p. 205. 


Those transferred from France were reported to have applied 
for settlement in Alsace-Lorraine. 1 

The function assigned to the Germans transplanted into the 
newly incorporated territories was to germanise them by replacing 
the native populations who were being expelled. Thus, in the 
western Polish provinces, they took over the homes, jobs and 
businesses of one and a half million Poles and Jews who had been 
expelled into the General Government. 2 

The Tyrolese were the only group who as a whole were not 
settled in a conquered territory with a non-German population. 
Accustomed to their mountain villages, they could not be expected 
to settle in the different geographical and climatic conditions of 
the plains of Western Poland. The great majority of them were 
installed in the North Tyrol and the Vorarlberg, on the other side 
of the Alps, opposite their former homes, and others in Carinthia. 3 
To make room for them,, 2,400 peasant families have been removed 
from Carinthia since March 1942. 4 However, some Tyrolese Ger- 
mans have been settled in Southern Styria (German-annexed 
Slovenia), and according to the latest report of the German Re- 
settlement Trust they are also to be given preference for speedy 
settlement in Lorraine, Luxemburg, and the eastern part of the 
Sudetenland. This does not seem to be a large-scale settlement 
scheme, however. Thus, in Lorraine only about a thousand homes 
have been vacated for Germans transferred from the Tyrol as well 
as from Southern Bukovina. 5 

The change in German policy in 1942 6 opened up the General 
Government as a new resettlement area. The district of Lublin, 
from which Germans had been removed in 1940, has since 1942 
been allocated to the new groups of "repatriated" Germans from 
Bosnia and Croatia, the Leningrad district, Serbia and Bulgaria, 
as well as to the Baltic Germans and those transferred from Bessa- 
rabia, who had been taken to the Warthegau but could not be 
settled there. 7 

In spite of the care with which the settlement of the Baltic 
Germans was carried out, they do not appear to have acclimatised 
themselves very readily to their new surroundings. After the 
German conquest of the Baltic countries in 1941, the "repatriated" 
Baltic Germans asked to be allowed to return to their former homes. 

1 Archiv fiir Wander ungswesen und Auslandskunde, 1942, No. 1-2, p. 67. 

2 Cf. Chapter II, below, pp. 53-54. 

8 Archiv fur Wanderungswesen und Auslandskunde, loc. cit. 

4 According to the Royal Yugoslav Government Information Centre. 

6 Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, 4 Apr. 1943. 
Cf. below, Chapter II, p. 52. 

7 Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, 4 Apr. 1943. Industrial workers are reported 
to have been sent to the Protectorate of Bohemia-Moravia. 


This request was met with a firm refusal and it was pointed out 
to them that they had a more important national duty to fulfil 
where they were. 

Towards the summer of 1942 it was announced that the Ger- 
mans from Lithuania would be transferred back to their former 
homes. To reassure the Lithuanians, a local German paper ex- 
plained that the returning Germans would receive the property 
of Jews and other members of the non-Lithuanian population. This 
apparently includes the Poles, and the reported arrest of many 
wealthy Poles in the Wilno district may possibly denote that homes 
were being prepared for the returning Germans. 1 According to 
official Lithuanian sources, 11,000 of the genuine Germans trans- 
ferred to the Reich received permission to return to Lithuania. 
On the other hand, all applications from Lithuanians who had 
posed as Germans in order to obtain permission to emigrate have 
been rejected. 


According to the report of the German Resettlement Trust for 
1941, the number of persons covered by the repatriation schemes 
was 751,400. 2 Of these, 600,000 had actually arrived in Greater 
Germany before the end of 1941 or early in 1942. The table opposite 
gives a general idea of the geographical origin of the "repatriated" 
Germans, and of the main regions where they have been resettled. 
It will be noted that the difference between the numbers covered 
by the schemes as planned and as executed is accounted for mainly 
by the South Tyrolese. 

These figures, and especially the total of some 600 T 000 Germans 
from abroad transferred to the new German border provinces, 
are really impressive. 3 Nevertheless, a closer examination shows 
that, in the first place, even the racial aims of the resettlement 
scheme were very incompletely attained. Many of those who 
were repatriated as being "ethnical Germans" (Volksdeutsche) 
were of non-German origin. As mentioned above, many Estonians, 
Latvians, and especially Lithuanians, were transferred with the 

1 Kauner Zeitung, quoted by Novoye Russkoye Slovo (New York), 5 Sept. 1942. 
This is confirmed by a Berlin dispatch to the Stockholm Tidningen, quoted in 
Survey of Central and Eastern Europe, Feb. 1943. 

2 The report for 1942 mentions as a new task assigned to the German Resettle- 
ment Trust the establishment of re-emigrants from non-European countries. 

* The report of the German Resettlement Trust for 1942 shows a total of 
806,000 persons covered by the repatriation scheme. The increase was due partly 
to an enlargement of former groups, partly to the inclusion of German minorities 
from new territories: 20,000 from Bosnia, a few thousand from the Leningrad 
district, and minor groups from Slovakia and Greece. Some of them were actually 
transferred during 1942 and the first months of 1943. 




!NTo. covered 

No. trans- 

No. trans- 

Area of 

by the 

ferred as 

ferred as 

Main area of 


in spring 

in spring 



Estonia } 
Latvia 1 
Estonia and Latvia | 
(late comers) j 



| 63,832 








1 134,267 

Polish Provinces 

General Government 



Northern Bukovina 
Southern Bukovina 



1 136,989 
1 7f* 765 



/ / u, / oo 

South Tyrol 




North Tyrol (a 

few thousand to 

Carinthia and 





















1 Wirtschaft und Statistik, 1941, Nos. 1 and 7. 

2 Deutsche Post aus dem Osten, June 1942. All figures except those for the Tyrolese, the French 
and Ljubljana Germans are based on the report of the Deutsche Umsiedlungs-Treuhand-Gesellschaft 
(D.U.T.) for the year 1941. The figures for Ljubljana and France are taken from the V&kischer 
Beobachter, 4 Apr. 1943. 

Baltic Germans, while the Germans themselves have admitted 
that the settlers who came to Germany from Soviet-occupied 
areas included a number of Ukrainians. The "Bughollander", 
too, who were transferred with the Volhynian Germans, were defin- 
itely stated to be "as regards the language, utterly degermanised". 1 
Secondly, and even more important, the scheme has failed in its 
proclaimed object of obtaining better dividing lines between differ- 
ent nationalities. German minorities have been transferred from 
one non-German area only to be settled in another non-German 
area; other minority groups have not been transferred at all, while 
deportations and expulsions, as will be seen below, have led to 
an even greater mixture of races and peoples than before. 

As to the material benefits derived from the newcomers, these 
fell far short of the estimates made by National Socialist writers 
when the transfer had just begun. It is estimated that by these 

Sudost Echo (Vienna), 23 May 1941. 


transfers Germany has gained approximately 275,000 employable 
persons. This is a very modest figure compared with the millions 
of foreign workers now employed in Germany; and the net gain, 
after deducting those who crossed into Soviet territory in accord- 
ance with the population exchange provisions of the treaties, must 
have been smaller still. In addition to this indirect contribution 
to the German war effort, however, the direct utilisation of the 
"repatriated" Germans for military service must also be taken 
into account, Having been granted German citizenship, they can 
be (and in fact have been) enlisted in the army. 

There is little doubt that there was a wide discrepancy between 
the volume of repatriation which had been expected by many in 
Germany and that which actually took place. 

Some German authors had interpreted Chancellor Hitler's 
speech of 6 October 1939, referred to at the beginning of the present 
chapter, as denoting a radical change in the Reich's policy with 
regard to German minorities. It was said that "previously, the 
basic principle had been to strengthen German minority groups 
and to prevent them from weakening. . . Now, however, whole 
ethnic groups will have to migrate." 1 For "German people must 
have an unbroken living space", and "common blood shall not be 
separated by arbitrary frontiers". 2 

It was generally assumed that Germany had decided to re- 
patriate besides the 130,000 Germans from the Baltic States, 
135,000 from Russian-occupied Poland and 220,000 from the 
Tyrol all the German minorities from Slovakia (128,000), Yugosla- 
via (then numbering some S00,000) 3 , Hungary (480,000) 4 and 
Rumania (750,000). 

There are, however, strong grounds for believing that even at 
the outset no break with the traditional German policy in regard 
to minorities was contemplated, that the repatriation was purposely 
restricted to the Italian and Soviet spheres of interest, and that 
German minorities living within the territories of less powerful 
states were intended to stay at their posts to serve as the bulwarks 
of German expansion. 5 

Whatever the reason, no serious attempt to transfer these other 

1 W. GRADMANN, in Zeitschrift fur Politik, May 1941, p. 277. 

2 H. KRI#G: ibid., Jan.-Feb. 1940. The author claims to formulate in these 
words "the ideas repeatedly expressed by the Fiihrer". 

8 German sources even gave a figure of 700,000. Cf. Grembote (Bratislava), 
19 Feb. 1943. 

iy JFeo. iv^. ^ , ,. . TI 

4 Four hundred and seventy-eight thousand, according to the Hungarian 

Statistical Year Book for 1933. German sources gave the figure as 648,500. Cf. 

Nation und Staat, Mar.-Apr. 1939, p. 481. 

6 Joseph HANC: Tornado across Eastern Europe (New York, 1942), p. 231. 

This is also the opinion which Dr. J. SCHECHTMAN has formed after a thorough 

study of the problem. Cf. the manuscript quoted on p. 12 above. 


minorities has in fact been made. On the contrary, the German 
Government has used its influence to strengthen the position of 
German minorities, and to confer on them the legal status of a 
privileged "state within the State". 

But with Germany's territorial expansion there came a corres- 
ponding change in the whole approach to the problem of Germans 
outside the Reich and of Greater Germany. In November 1941 
a German economic periodical stated that the Eastern Territories, 
from Konigsberg through Warthegau and Upper Silesia to Austria, 
would form the future frontier of German settlement, adding, how- 
ever, that even beyond this ethnical frontier there would be op- 
portunities for Germans to "work and live in the Eastern Territories 
under German political and economic leadership". 1 And six months 
later a leading German newspaper put the position unambiguously 
as follows: "The proportions between space and people have been 
reversed. The problem of how to feed a great people in a narrow 
space has changed into that of the best way of exploiting the con- 
quered spaces with the limited number of people available." 2 

German migration towards the conquered territories was then 
already in full swing. 


The main movement of Germans across the borders of the 
Reich has been that of the German armies. Germany is estimated to 
have mobilised between nine and ten million men, the great majority 
of whom are outside the Reich, principally on the Russian front 
since the invasion of the Soviet Union. This is, of course, not a 
migration movement in the proper sense. According to a slogan 
coined by Chancellor Hitler and frequently repeated by National 
Socialist leaders, "the conquests of the German sword must be 
consolidated by the plough". The German victories throughout 
Europe did not, however, lead to any appreciable volume of German 
settlement apart from the resettlement of Germans from abroad, 
nor was there any real migratory movement of a nature to enlarge 
the settlement area of the German people. There are, of course, 
millions of Germans from the Reich in the territories conquered, 
annexed or occupied by Germany, but the overwhelming majority 
of them are directly connected with the military operations. 
Another category consists of persons evacuated to the occupied 
territories to escape the air attacks of the United Nations; a great 
many of these evacuees, if not the majority, are women and children. 

1 Die Wirtschaftskurve, No. 4, Nov. 1941, p. 272. 

2 Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, 22 July 1942. 


The German Colonists 

The extension of the area cultivated by the German people was 
one of the principal items in the National Socialist programme. 
Vigorous propaganda was carried out to further this aim, the ful- 
filment of which was to form the basis of the future German econo- 
my and to consolidate Germany's military conquests. Since 1940, 
National Socialist Party publications have persistently stressed 
that " the achievements of the sword can endure only if they are 
protected by a human rampart of German people, especially 
German peasants, above all in the East". 1 In the spring of 1942 
Joseph Buerkel, Gauleiter of Lorraine, announced the same policy 
in regard to the West, stating that "only a solid ring of German 
settlers around the Reich can provide a durable national frontier". 2 
And yet the number of German settlers in the conquered territories 
appears to be comparatively small. 

The main reason for this clearly lies in the war itself. Mobilisa- 
tion has diminished the number of hands available, while the need 
for workers in the German economy has increased. The agricultural 
population especially has been affected by mobilisation. In the 
Reich itself, farms are often managed by women with the help of 
prisoners of war or foreign workers. There are therefore no skilled 
German farmers to replace the local agriculturists, and the urgent 
need for continued agricultural production does not permit of the 
use of inexperienced hands. 

It was stated in German circles that the programme of German 
settlement in the east was deliberately left in the background, 
in order that room might be kept for the returning soldiers at the 
end of the war; and that in the meantime colonisation could be 
carried out only by the repatriation of the Germans from abroad. 3 
In Alsace-Lorraine, too, the final settlement plans were said to be 
held over until after the war and the return of the soldiers. 4 At 
the same time, German . economists themselves acknowledged 
that "after a victorious war the rising generation will diminish in 
numbers for many years, and certainly until 1947". 5 

The basis of this declining supply of manpower is demographic; 
the natural loss of the productive population is not made good by 
a numerically inferior rising generation. The number of young 

1 "German Occupation of Poland", Polish White Book, pp. 184-185. 

2 Cf. article by J. BUERKEL, in Frankfurter Zeitung, 24 Apr. 1942. 
8 See above, p. 10. 

4 Die Deutsche Volkswirtschaft, No. 12, Apr. 1941. 
6 Idem, No. 1-2, Jan. 1941. 


people entering the labour market yearly had fallen from over 
1,300,000 in 1926 to less than 1,100,000 in 1938. German statisti- 
cians calculated that, even without the war, there would have 
been a further steady decline from 1940 to 1947, resulting in a 
reduction of another 20 per cent, to about 900,000. The vast over- 
crowding of the labour market in the twenties and early thirties 
was produced by a generation born before the war of 1914-1918. 
The generation born between 1899 and 1914 was more numerous 
than the preceding one, decimated by war, and than the subsequent 
ones, reduced by the declining birthrate. This was the generation, 
constituting an abnormally high proportion of the population, 
which gradually entered the labour market from 1918 to 1933, 
and the situation it created was aggravated by the advent of the 
great depression. But in the demographic evolution of Germany 
this was only a passing phenomenon. There was no rising genera- 
tion in the following years to replace those eliminated by the war 
of 1914-1918. While the excess of births over deaths in such coun- 
tries as Italy and Poland was at the rate of over 9 and 11 per thou- 
sand and that of Russia over 12, in Germany it was less than 7 even 
if calculated as an average for the years 1933-1939, when exceptional 
efforts were made to increase the birth rate. This means that even 
without the wastage of war the German population would have 
had no surplus for populating new settlement areas. 

There is another obstacle to German colonisation projects in 
the incorporated territories of the east and west, the areas mainly 
affected namely, the competition of German farmers living on the 
spot. From the very beginning, the German "land reform" measures 
had strengthened the indigenous German element in the incorpora- 
ted territories. The local German minorities in the western Polish 
provinces as well as in Alsace-Lorraine were the first to profit by 
the German measures of expropriation. As will be seen below, 
about 1,200,000 Poles and 300,000 Jews were expelled from the 
incorporated Polish provinces in 1939-40. l Their undamaged 
property was given to the Germans in place of their own, which 
had been ruined by the war; small local German landowners and 
farmers' younger sons were transferred to more promising farms. 2 
From Alsace-Lorraine about another 200,000 persons were expelled, 
of whom some 75 per cent, had been farmers, and their land was 
used in the first place to enlarge the holdings of the neighbouring 
German peasantry. In Lorraine, and even more so in the adjacent 
Saar Basin, the land had been parcelled out from generation to 
generation into ever smaller fields, and to remedy this situation 

1 Cf. below, Chapter II, p. 54. 

2 Die Deutsche Volkswirtschaft, No. 28, Oct. 1941. 


German peasants were transferred from overcrowded areas to the 
land confiscated from the farmers of Alsace-Lorraine. 1 

As a result, the German settlement schemes did not fulfil the 
promises made for them. Among the Germans in the occupied 
territories, the colonists were not by any means the dominant 
group. The largest farming colony of German settlers from the 
Reich, that in Western Poland, numbers only a few tens of thou- 
sands. 2 The number of German peasants who settled in Bohemia- 
Moravia and Alsace-Lorraine is probably even lower. 

After the invasion of the Soviet Union it was announced that 
the large stretches of eastern territory occupied would, thanks to 
German methods of cultivation and organisation, become the 
main granary of the Reich. So far, however, there have been no 
reports of any appreciable influx of German settlers. Even in the 
case of Lithuania, adjacent to East Prussia, reports of the expulsion 
of Lithuanian peasants from their land, which was handed over 
with all its equipment and livestock to German colonists 3 , refer 
only to the Memel region, a narrow belt of land on the German 
border incorporated into the Reich on 22 March 1939. 4 A class of 
German agriculturists often mentioned as immigrating to Lithuania, 
as well as to Estonia and Latvia, are overseers, whose mission it is 
to improve the methods of farming and to make the local labourers 
work, but they are comparatively few in number. 

The situation in Western Bielorussia and the Western Ukraine 
(which from October 1939 until the German invasion were under 
Russian rule) and in the incorporated territories formerly belonging 
to the Soviet Union seems to be no different. Attempts to colonise 
these areas have been made by the German authorities, mainly, 
no doubt, in the Bialystok region, which was incorporated into the 
German province of East Prussia in June 1941 after the invasion 
of the Soviet Union, and had therefore, like all the incorporated 
territories, to be germanised. The German Ministry of Agriculture 
looked for settlers in Germany as well as in the Netherlands and 

1 Die Deutsche Volkswirtschaft, No. 12, Apr. 1941. The execution of this plan 
was reported to have originally affected 2,500 to 4,000 families. 

2 According to Polish sources. Some contribution appears to have been made 
by the Hitler Youth to the germanisation of the Warthegau. According to the 
Ostdeutscher Beobachter (25 Nov. 1942), during 1942 the number of youth camps 
in the Warthegau rose from 11 to 18 and the number of camps for young 
women from 14 to 22. Special efforts had also been made to attract suitable 
settlers, even among non-Germans, and the training camps had been opened 
to Norwegians, Flemings, Netherlanders and Danes. Altogether 900 people were 
enrolled. Many of the non-Germans subsequently settled in the towns, but efforts 
were made to get the Germans settled on the land. 

Izvestia, 11 Nov. 1942, quoting Vilnaer Zeitung. 

4 Other reports of the evacuation of Lithuanian homesteads for the benefit of 
Germans concern the repatriated Germans who left Lithuania in 1940 and re- 
turned in 1942. 


Denmark. "Those with proper qualifications were given from 20 
to 40 hectares, in special cases even more, of agricultural land in 
the East." 1 Information is lacking as to how far the German plan 
to obtain settlers from the Reich was successful, the only frequent 
references, occurring in particular in the Russian press, being to 
agricultural overseers. These "agricultural experts", who have to 
act as chairmen of the farms and are responsible for keeping up the 
deliveries of produce, are said to number "many thousands". 3 
Neither in character nor in number, however, can the entry of 
German agricultural immigrants into the Eastern Territories be 
characterised as a colonisation movement of the German nation 
towards the east. 

Officials and N on- Agricultural Workers and Employees 

This group of Reich Germans in the occupied territories consists 
mainly of civilian auxiliaries to the German army. The great major- 
ity are police and other Government officials, employees and workers 
on the militarised railways, and overseers, foremen and skilled 
workers engaged in building fortifications and armament factories. 
With few exceptions, they have been sent under orders and are 
performing work to which they have been assigned work directly 
serving military needs or the needs of the German war economy. 

The number of German officials in the occupied territories, who 
are often accompanied by their families, is very large. In the War- 
thegau alone they numbered 10,000 in 1941. 3 A German economic 
journal, discussing the heavy drain on manpower due to the war, 
mentions at the same time, and as though giving equal weight to 
each, the demand for labour in the armament industries and for 
the administration of the occupied territories. 4 Later, it was stated 
that the shortage of officials had been aggravated by the extension 
of the area to be administered. 6 Huge numbers are employed in the 
ordinary police force and in the political police (Gestapo and S.S.), 
and many more in various administrative branches connected with 
the German war economy. Thus, for instance, the employment 
offices of the Eastern Territories alone (not including Western 
Poland and the General Government, enlarged by the addition of 
East Galicia) employed 1,700 Germans in the autumn of 1942. 8 

Among the workers and salaried employees, many are engaged 

1 Central European Observer, 27 Nov. 1942. 

* According to the Deutsche Zeitung im Ostland, 30 Aug. 1942, 7,000 young 
agricultural instructors were sent from Germany to the Ukraine. 
1 Deutsche Post aus dem Osten, June 1942. 
4 Wirtschajtsdienst, 1 May 1942. 
6 Vdlkischer Beobachter, 19 Sept. 1942. 
6 Berliner Bdrsen Zeitung, 11 Sept. 1942. 


in running the more or less militarised railways. In the railway 
service of the General Government alone over 7,000 Germans from 
the Reich are employed. 1 There are also numbers of German fore- 
men and other skilled factory workers. The General Controller of 
Labour, Dr. Sauckel, has laid down that German employees and 
workers are bound to obey orders to go to work in the occupied 
territories. 2 The authorities concerned are advised to be sparing 
in their use of German skilled labour, directing it to the occupied 
territories mainly in accordance with military requirements. 

The influx of Germans of these categories from the Reich was 
especially large in Bohemia-Moravia where, as will be seen below, 
many Czech officials, railway and tramway employees, and others, 
were replaced by incoming Germans. 

Another area to which there was much German immigration 
was Alsace-Lorraine, whence hundreds of thousands of the local 
population had left or been expelled. 3 In both these territories, 
however, the shortage of manpower has made it generally impossible 
to replace the industrial workers. 

Many Germans from the Reich settled among the working 
population of the western Polish provinces, in addition to the 
Germans tranferred from eastern and south-eastern Europe. As 
to the occupied Soviet territories, the problem there was different. 
All officials and vast numbers of skilled workers had been evacuated 
by the Russians, and the difficulty was to supply these immense 
territories with the labour necessary to organise the construction 
of fortifications and to restore some of the mines and factories to 
working order. Instructions were therefore given that German 
craftsmen from the Reich might be employed in the Ukraine, but 
only to a limited extent and in ofder to fulfil the tasks which were 
most urgent and important for the war effort. 4 

Finally, mention must be made of the Reich Germans engaged 
in trade and commerce in the occupied countries. A tremendous 
volume of business has to be handled by the German firms respon- 
sible for the wholesale trade in the occupied countries and in some 
of those allied to Germany. The function of the centralised German 
wholesale traders in the General Government, for instance, is on the 
one hand "to supply the rural population of the regions assigned 
to them with necessary goods, particularly with agricultural tools, 
fertilisers and important commodities; and on the other to obtain 
the agricultural products of these regions and deliver them to be 
used'". This task has been entrusted in particular to firms from 

1 Krakauer Zeitung, 4 Sept. 1942. 

2 Reichsarbeitsblatl, 5 Aug. 1942, No, 21, Part I, p. 850, 

3 See Chapter II, pp. 70-75. 
* P.N.B., 21 Nov. 1942. 


Hamburg, Bremen and other Hanseatic cities which had lost their 
overseas trade because of the British blockade. "South-eastern 
Europe is already covered with a network of German firms, especi- 
ally those from Bremen and Hamburg, which have established 
branches in Serbia, Slovakia, Hungary, Croatia, Rumania, Bul- 
garia, Greece and Turkey, and have organised a vast exchange of 
goods between these countries and Germany. " The experience 
acquired here was later utilised in occupied Russia. Furthermore, 
Hanseatic shippers and forwarding agencies established branches 
in Riga and Reval (Tallinn), while other German firms were engaged 
in tobacco and cotton production and other businesses in the Bal- 
kans and the Ukraine. 1 Nevertheless, the number of Germans 
working abroad in commercial undertakings should not be over- 
estimated, since it must be remembered that retail trade, which 
commonly absorbs the great majority of the people engaged in 
commerce, is left in the hands of local merchants. 

Refugees and Evacuees 

All the movements of Germans from the Reich described above 
are controlled by the German Government in accordance with the 
necessities of war. In 1942, however, a new turn in military events 
caused mass dislocation of a different kind among the German 
population. This was the evacuation resulting from the bombing 
of German cities. About the beginning of 1942 there were already 
reports of the removal of many factories from the Ruhr to Austria 
in order to escape British air raids. 2 Then came the heavy bombing 
of Cologne and other industrial centres in the Rhineland and the 
Ruhr, as well as on the sea coast, and the removal of factories and 
the evacuation and flight of the population began on a grand scale. 

The first reports spoke of a general exodus from the cities of the 
Rhineland and other heavily bombed regions, reminiscent of scenes 
on the French roads two years earlier. In some cases it was an aim- 
less wandering into the open country to escape the horrors of the 
raids, but many such refugees definitely left their homes. Later, 
this haphazard flight of people in fear was transformed into organis- 
ed evacuation, and women and children were removed in an orderly 
manner to safer regions. At the same time the more difficult task 
was undertaken of transferring industrial workers together with 
the factories where they had been employed. The number of refu- 

1 Die Deutsche Volkswirtschaft, No. 20, July 1942. This same periodical had 
reported in Nov. 1941 that forty firms formerly engaged in overseas trade were 
operating in the General Government. Wirtschaftsdienst, No. 2, 9 Tan. 1942, 
reported that German overseas firms, especially Hanseatic houses, whicn had been 
operating in the General Government for two years, had been entrusted with the 
wholesale trade in Western Bielorussia and the Western 

1 New York Times, 2 Jan. 1942, 


gees from Cologne, the first heavily bombed city, was estimated 
at WOjOOO. 1 Large numbers are reported to have left Aachen, 
Diisseldorf and Mainz on the Rhine, the industrial cities of Wup- 
pertal, Essen, Solingen and Dortmund in the Rhine-Ruhr region 2 , 
Munster and Bielefeld in Northern Westphalia, Bremen, Hamburg 
and Wilhelmshaven 3 on the North Sea, and the Baltic ports of 
Kiel, Liibeck and Rostock. 

A rough estimate of the number of these evacuees can be made 
on the basis of a report of the German Extended Child Evacuation 
Scheme issued in October 1942. According to this report, no less 
than 1,700 special trains, besides other means of transportation, 
were used to remove women and children from the danger zones. 
German press reports gave the number of evacuated children alone 
as 1,300,000. 4 This does not include those who travelled by road or 
took ordinary trains on their own initiative. Furthermore, many 
workers were removed with the factories where they had been em- 
ployed. All these would add up to millions. An estimate of over 
two million for the end of 1942 might be considered conservative and 
must have been by far surpassed, after the heavy bombings of 1943. 

The Child Evacuation Scheme selected reception areas in safe 
districts of the Reich, as well as in Slovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, 
Denmark, and the Protectorate. Reports about other refugees 
mention different regions where they took shelter. The hotels of 
Berlin were reported to be crowded with them. 5 Many went to 
Bavaria and South Baden and other parts of the Reich more remote 
from the bombed areas, but great masses seem to have taken refuge 
in occupied or allied countries. Austria 6 , Bohemia-Moravia, and 
Alsace-Lorraine are often mentioned in this connection. During 

1 This was reported by the London correspondent of the New York Times, 
23 July 1942, on the basis of a "reliable foreign source". The Moscow radio 
estimated the number of refugees at 200,000. 

2 According to recent reports from London and Berne, the evacuation of 
3,000,000 persons not essential to the Ruhr's industries was ordered in June 1943, 
more than 1,000,000 having already moved (New York Times, 25, 26 and 27 June 
1943). In Aug. 1943 hundreds of thousands more left Hamburg and Berlin. 

8 According to a Swedish Press report, quoted by the New York Times, 3 
Mar. 1943, all women and children were evacuated from Wilhelmshaven by 
special trains. 

4 The normal period of evacuation was said to be 6 to 9 months. It was added, 
however, that the camps in which children over 10 years were housed (those under 
10 years having been billetted with families) "were not necessarily temporary 
structures" (Vdlkischer Beobachter, 24 Sept. and 17 Oct. 1942). In any case, the 
limited period for which the children were housed does not mean that they were 
all sent home afterwards. This would rather have been an exception in cases 
where children were housed during repairs, the area itself not being considered 
as endangered. In the ordinary way, the children would have been housed until 
their parents had established themselves elsewhere. 

6 Izvestia, 26 July 1942. 

1 Thirteen thousand families in Vienna, according to an Overseas News 
Agency (O.N.A.) report from Berne, 9 June 1943; 7,000 children and mothers in 
Styria from Cologne alone, according to a German press report. 


the summer and autumn of 1942, a large number sought refuge in 
Paris. The first wave, coming mainly from Cologne, was followed 
by 30,000 more from the Rhineland; they settled in the suburbs 
of Paris. Another 20,000 were established in Dijon and 10,000 
more were expected in Chaion-sur-Marne. 1 Even the Netherlands 2 
and Belgium 1 , so easily accessible to the raiders, were chosen for the 
evacuation of children and attracted goodly numbers of fleeing 
Germans. In Slovakia, the large increase in the German population 
is probably to be attributed to the influx of refugees. In regard to 
Poland, there is definite information concerning 50,000 German 
children sent to the General Government from the parts of the 
Reich most subject to Allied air raids. 4 Furthermore, it is reported 
that in Warsaw many refugees from the Rhineland took over the 
dwellings of Poles who had been forcibly moved to the outskirts 
of the city. 6 German refugees were to be found even as far afield 
as Kiev and Athens. 

Factories from the bombed areas, together with their skilled 
workers, were reported to have been moved to southern Germany, 
the Protectorate and Poland, as well as to Norway (where, for 
instance, a section of the famous chemical works, /. G. Farben, 
was established) and to the occupied Soviet territories. 


It is difficult to estimate the total number of Germans from the 
Reich in the territories occupied or controlled by Germany, but 
some of the information available may be quoted to give an idea 
of the volume of this immigration into certain countries. 

The first big influx of Germans went to Bohemia-Moravia, 
mainly to Prague. The best modern apartment houses were cleared 
of their Czech tenants for German occupation; the best suburbs 
were transformed into German residential quarters. The total 
number of Germans in Prague was estimated in spring 1942 at 
200,000. Pilsen and Brno also received numerous immigrants 
and even many smaller towns witnessed the rise of German colonies. 

* Pour la Victoire (New York), 17 Oct. 1942. 

1 Netherlands News, 11/25 Nov. 1942. 

8 It was reported that evacuees from heavily bombed areas in western Ger- 
many had gone to live in Brussels, thus creating a housing shortage there (News 
from Belgium, 14 Nov. 1942). Furthermore, construction of barracks in the Belgo- 
German frontier area for evacuees from the Ruhr has been reported (idem, 3 Apr. 
1943). In July 1943, 30,000 Ruhr workers were reported transferred to Luxemburg. 

4 Krakauer Zeitung, 15 Oct. 1942. More groups of children were reported to 
have been sent at the beginning of 1943 to the Tatra Mountains on the Slovenian 
frontier (idem, 3 Mar. 1943). 

6 Nowy Swiat, 22 Sept. 1942 (O.N.A. report from Zurich). 

8 According to the Czechoslovak Information Service. Cf . also Eug. V. ERDELBY: 
Germany's First European Protectorate (London, 1942), p. 244, and Rene* KRAUS: 
Europe in Revolt (1942), pp. 244-245, where an influx of 250,OOOjGermans to Prague 
is mentioned. 


Since then, the influx of refugees from bombed areas has con- 
siderably increased this total. 

A hint of the extent of immigration into Slovakia may be gleaned 
from the increase in the German population there. Before the Ger- 
mans occupied Bohemia-Moravia and obtained control of Slovakia, 
the German press usually referred to the Germans in Slovakia as 
numbering about 128, 000. l In 1940, after the dismemberment of 
Slovakia, the figure of only 79,000 2 was given, whereas a figure 
of 160,000 has since been reported. 3 If these figures are reliable, 
they would seem to indicate recent German immigration which 
may well consist of refugees from the bombed areas. 

Another area into which there has been considerable German 
immigration is Alsace-Lorraine. In November 1940 German author- 
ities declared that about 200,000 Germans were to move into Lor- 
raine. No information is available as to the carrying out of this 
programme, but there can be little doubt that the figure announced 
was reached and, taking Alsace and Lorraine together, even exceed- 
ed, particularly when it is remembered that these provinces had 
lost something like 500,000 of their French-speaking population. 4 
Some idea of the number of Germans residing in other parts of 
France may be obtained from a report from Stockholm that 100,000 
Germans in Paris were being trained on Sundays in street fighting 
and other forms of partisan warfare. 5 This despatch refers to 
"German civilians holding positions in various Reich administra- 
tions in Paris". But even assuming that the figure quoted above 
includes all the male Germans in the Paris region not belonging 
to the army of occupation, the total of Germans, including women 
and children, in France (excluding Alsace-Lorraine) would be at 
least twice as large. 

Numerous incidental reports also suggest an extensive German 
infiltration into the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark and Norway. 6 

Early in 1943 a German source 7 announced that "more than 
400,000 Germans from the old Reich were induced to settle down 
in Warthegau by the favourable opportunities offered to them 

1 Der Deutsche im Ostland, Jan. 1939: "Volksdeutscher Aufbau im Ostland". 

2 Franz RIEDI,: Das Deutschtum zwischen Pressburg und Bartfeld, 1940 (publish- 
ed by the Deutsches Auslandsinstitut). This figure is approved by Archivfur Wan- 
derungswesenundAuslandskunde(No. 1-2, 1941, p. 52) as "probably approximately 

8 Berliner Illustrierte Nachrichten, 8 Oct. 1942. 

4 Cf. Chapter II, below, p. 75. 

5 New York Times, 31 Aug. 1942. 

8 According to a statement of the Norwegian labour leader, Martin Tranma*!, 
there are at present about 400,000 Germans, military and civilian, in Norway 
(Swedish Press, 14 Apr. 1943). Preparations for a German influx have been 
reported from Kristiansund (Gtoteborgs-Posten, 3 Apr. 1943). 

7 Transocean broadcast, 31 Jan. 1943. 


there". It seems probable, however, that this migration was due 
not only to the attraction of the inducements offered, but also to 
the expulsive force of the Anglo-American bombing. 

The influx into Danzig -West Prussia and Silesia was, of 
course, much smaller. Yet even assuming that it amounted only 
to a quarter of the immigrants into Warthegau, i.e. 100,000, the 
total of Reich Germans in the incorporated Polish provinces would 
amount to half a million. 

As to the General Government, apart from the 50,000 evacuated 
children noted above, information is available for Cracow, where 
the German population increased from 500 in 1933 to 24,800 in 
August 1942. l Plans made by the Governor of Warsaw for the 
evacuation of 40,000 apartments in the Polish capital in order to 
make room for Germans have also been reported. 2 The completion 
of this scheme, which had already been begun, would mean an 
influx of about 200,000 Germans. 

The total number of Germans from the Reich in the occupied 
parts of the Soviet Union is undoubtedly large. No credit can be 
attached, however, to a report that there are in Kiev about 300,000 
Germans, including both foremen and skilled workers transferred 
there to operate factories and evacuees from bombed areas. This 
report is not confirmed by any other source, and it is implicitly 
contradicted by another report of about the same date from Kiev, 
which described living conditions in the city in detail without men- 
tioning the presence of a number of German immigrants large 
enough to double its decimated population. 3 If the figure of 300,000 
has any basis at all, it can only apply to all Germans from the Reich 
in the whole of German-occupied territory east of the General 

The table following gives a tentative estimate of the number 
of Reich Germans in some occupied and allied territories into which 
they have probably immigrated in the largest numbers. The table 
is based on the figures quoted in the text, allowing for an 
estimated number of 1,000,000 German refugees abroad evacuated 
from the bombed areas to cover those who have not been included 
in any other group. The object of the table is only to give a rough 
idea of German civilian emigration and its distribution, and the 
estimates given are rather conservative than the reverse. 

1 According to the German-published Russian paper, Novoye Slovo (Berlin), 
quoted by Novoye Russkoye Slovo (New York), 24 Aug. 1942. 

2 Nowy Swiat, 22 Sept. 1942 (O.N.A. dispatch from Zurich). 

8 Novoye Russkoye Slovo, 30 Dec. 1942. The report states that "only houses 
occupied by Germans are heated". The word 'only' would be strange if it covered 
the apartments of half the city's population, especially as mention is made of 
"hospitals overcrowded with wounded German soldiers". 


Country or region N - ^erman 

Alsace-Lorraine ............................... 300,000 

Other parts of France ............................ 200,000 

Belgium, Netherlands, Denmark, Norway ........... 200,000 

Bohemia-Moravia .............................. 400,000 

Slovakia ...................................... 80,000 

Incorporated Polish Provinces .................... 500,000 

General Government ............................ 300,000 

Other German-occupied Eastern Territories .......... 300,000 

Total 2,280,000 

The total number of German civilians from the Reich abroad, 
including south-eastern Europe and the neutral countries, must 
therefore be in the neighbourhood of 2,500,000. 


NOTE : The arrows indicate the area of origin, 
the area of resettlement and the numerical 
importance of the various German minority 
groups transferred up to 1942 under agree- 
ments concluded between the Reich and the 
Governments concerned. For fuller explana- 
tions and for sources of figures, see chapter I, 
section I. 






The population movements described in the present chapter 
are largely the continuation and extension of the forced migrations 
characteristic of Europe during the pre-war years, when they arose 
successively in all the countries which came under a totalitarian 

When National Socialism came into power in Germany in 1933, 
Europe had barely finished disposing of the refugee problem be- 
queathed by the first world war. The problem of the Greek refugees 
from Asia Minor had been solved by a huge population transfer carried 
out under the Treaty of Lausanne of 30 January 1923. Three 
hundred and eighty-eight thousand Moslems were transferred 
from Greek territory to Turkey in exchange for 800,000 persons 
of Greek origin who had left Turkey at the time of the Smyrna 
defeat 1 , and many others who migrated between 1922 and 1924 
from Eastern Thrace, Anatolia and Istanbul. The total of 
Greek refugees, including some tens of thousands from Russia 
and Bulgaria, has been estimated at 1,300,000. 2 

The problem of Russian refugees had taken longer to solve. 
From 1918 to 1922 there had been a considerable stream of emigra- 
tion from Russia; from Southern Russia, through Siberia, over 
the frontiers of the Baltic countries, of Rumania, and especially 
of Poland, the civil war and the revolution had caused the departure 
of a very large number of military personnel and civilians, variously 
estimated at anything between 900,000 and 2,900,000 8 , the most 
probable figure being 1 ,500,000. Most of these refugees, however, had 

1 Sir John HOPE SIMPSON: The Refugee Problem (London, 1939), pp. 14 and 26. 

*Idem, p. 17. 

* The first figure is given by Dr. ISJUMOV who made an enquiry for Sir John 
HOPE SIMPSON (op. cit., pp. 80, 82), the latter by H. von RIMSCHA, in Der russische 
Bilrgerkrieg und die russische Emigration (Jena, 1924), pp. 50-51, on the basis of 
the figures for refugees assisted by the American Red Cross. Soviet authors 
estimated the total of refugees at 2,000,000. Cf. E. Z. VOLKOV: Dinamika naro- 
donaseleniya S.S.S.R. za vosemdesiat let (1930), p. 185; N.P. OGANOVSKY: Ocherki 
po economicheskoi geographii S.S.S.R. (2nd edition, 1924), p. 71; P. T. JURID and 
N. A. KOVAI,EVSKY: Economicheskaya geographiya S.S.S.R., Vol. 1, 1934, pp. 73 
and 78. The same figure is given by Russian emigre* authors; cf. B. NIKITINE, 
in Revue des Sciences Politiques, 1922, II, p. 191; and V. K. DAVATZ and N. N. 
Lvov: Russkaya armiya na chuzhbine, 1923, p. 12. 


ultimately managed to settle in the country of their choice in 
Europe or elsewhere, and the problem might have been regarded 
as solved had not the unemployment crisis and the restrictions 
placed on the employment of foreigners suddenly revived it. 

From 1933 onwards the refugee problem assumed a different 
aspect. At that date there began a series of forced migrations, the 
prelude to the mass displacements of non-German peoples which 
Europe has witnessed since the beginning of the present war. The 
National Socialist revolution in Germany caused the flight of many 
Germans compromised by their previous political activities, while 
others left the country to escape from a regime founded on theories 
they could not accept. But the great majority of the refugees were 
Jews who were gradually forced to leave by persecution and by 
their exclusion from every form of economic activity. 

The first panic flight of refugees followed immediately on the 
establishment of the National Socialist Government. The second 
came after the promulgation of the anti-Jewish Niirnberg laws of 
IS September 1935, and the third after the annexation of Austria 
and the pogroms of November 1938. At first, France and other 
European countries opened their frontiers to the refugees and 
temporary facilities were given for emigration to Palestine. Later, 
however, European countries, still in the throes of the world de- 
pression, raised difficulties to their entry, while restrictions were 
also placed on admission to Palestine. Moreover, the process of 
leaving Germany, was complicated by the Reich's financial policy 
towards emigrants, which in the years immediately preceding the 
war practically amounted to complete expropriation. While en- 
couraging the departure of Jews, the German Government endea- 
voured at the same time to confiscate everything they possessed. 
The refugees were not allowed to take with them either money, 
jewelry, furs, furniture, or the tools of their trade. The normal 
difficulties involved in liquidating property in a hurry were increased 
by special regulations. The emigrant had to pay a u flight tax" 
of 25 per cent., and the remainder of his property was put in a 
blocked account which could be used only for payments in Germany. 
In order to transfer his blocked marks abroad, the refugee had 
to sell them to the Reich's Golddiskontobank, which in 1938 paid 
only 9 to 14 per cent, of their value, so that in the end he received 
only about 8 per cent, of the proceeds of the sale of his property. 

In spite of all these obstacles, however, a great many persons, 
both Jews and others, were able to emigrate from Germany. 
According to the census of 1933, Germany then had a Jewish popula- 
tion of 499,700, to which must be added 3,100 Jews from the Saar 
(census of July 1933), giving a total of 503,000. Sir Herbert 


Emerson, High Commissioner for Refugees, has estimated the entire 
number of Jews who left Germany between April 1933 and 1 July 
1939 at 215,000. l Adding emigration during the months of July 
and August, the total would be about 226,000. 

On 12 March 1938 Austria was annexed by Germany, and the 
application of the anti- Jewish policy to the 180,000 2 Austrian 
Jews followed immediately. "The effect was more catastrophic 
than in Germany, because a process spread over five years in 
Germany was carried out in a few months in Austria. The whole 
programme, built up by a series of administrative and legal measures 
in Germany, was applied at one blow to Austria." 3 The new wave 
of emigration was, however, restricted by "the impossibility for 
the refugee to take out even the minimum of resources to keep 
him going until he could find his feet, and because frontiers had 
been closed against immigration. The way out for many in Vienna 
was not emigration, but suicide." 4 Nevertheless the Jewish exodus 
from Austria was even on a relatively larger scale than from 
Germany. Sir Herbert Emerson estimated the number of Jews 
who emigrated from Austria up to 1 July 1939 at 97,000, and up 
to the outbreak of war the total would probably be about 106, 000. 5 

After the Munich agreement German rule was gradually ex- 
tended over Czechoslovak territory. The annexation of the Sudeten- 
land on 1 October 1938 provoked a mass flight from this territory to 
unoccupied Bohemia-Moravia. Among the refugees there were 
again a great number of Jews, estimated at a total of 17,000 6 , this 
constituting the great majority of the Jewish population of the 
Sudetenland which numbered 23,000. In the following March 
the mutilated remains of Bohemia-Moravia were also occupied. 
Even before the occupation, Jewish emigration started on a large 
scale. The number of settled Jews in unoccupied Bohemia-Moravia 
was about 90,000 7 , and to them must be added 17,000 refugees 

1 International Assistance to Refugees: Supplementary Report Submitted to the 
Twentieth Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the League of Nations by Sir Herbert 
Emerson, High Commissioner for Refugees, 20 Oct. 1939 (LEAGUE OF NATIONS, 
A. 18 (a), 1939. XII). 

2 Report of the Jewish Community of Vienna on Emigration, Retraining and 
Social Care, 2 May 193831 July 1939. 

3 Sir John HOPE SIMPSON: op. cit., p. 126. 

4 Idem, p. 141. 

6 Der Deutsche Volkswirt, 7 Feb. 1941, gave the figure of 105,000 Jewish emi- 
grants from Austria up to the census of May 1939. According to the report of 
the Jewish Community of Vienna, 104,000 Jews left Vienna (where almost all 
Austrian Jews were then concentrated) up to 31 July 1939, including 1,680 who 
went to Germany. The report of the American Jewish Joint Distribution Com- 
mittee states that up to the end of 1939 about 124,000 Jews had escaped from 

6 According to the Institute of Jewish affairs. 

7 The Czechoslovak census of 1930 shows 117,600 Jews in Bohemia, Moravia 
and Czechoslovak Silesia. From this number must be deducted 23,000 in the 
Sudetenland and a few thousand in Silesia, occupied by Poland. 


from the Sudetenland and some 15,000 from Germany and Austria. 1 
The number of Jews who emigrated from Bohemia-Moravia up to 

I July 1939 is estimated by Sir Herbert Emerson at 17,000, con- 
sisting almost entirely of Jews who had fled at an earlier date from 
Germany, Austria and the Sudetenland* According to an estimate 
of the Institute of Jewish Affairs, legal and illegal emigration during 
the year 1 October 19381 October 1939 amounted to some 39,000. 

The total Jewish emigration from Greater Germany between 
April 1933 and 1 July 1939 was estimated by Sir Herbert Emerson 
at 329,000. According to the figures given above, it must have 
amounted to between 360,000 and 370,000 up to the outbreak of 

These figures refer only to confessional Jewish refugees. From 
the National Socialist standpoint the Jewish problem is a question 
of race and not of religion, and the anti-Jewish laws are applied also 
to other so-called "non-Aryans" i.e., to Christians of Jewish or 
partly Jewish origin so that German policy also provoked the 
emigration of "non- Aryan 1 ' Christians. Furthermore, many 

II Aryans" emigrated also for political reasons, especially immedi- 
ately after Chancellor Hitler assumed power. The Gestapo evalu- 
ated their number in 1933-1934 at 20,000 (the number of Jewish 
emigrants being given as 90,000). Mr. James G. McDonald, High 
Commissioner of the League of Nations for German Refugees, 
estimated in his letter of resignation that the non-Jews, including 
political emigrants and non -Aryan Christians, constituted IS to 20 
per cent, of the total number of refugees in 1935. Taking into 
consideration the Christian refugees as well as the emigration 
since 1 July 1939, Sir Herbert Emerson estimated in his report of 
20 October 1939 that a total of 400,000 refugees had left Greater 
Germany since 1933. 2 

By no means all the refugees who fled from Greater Germany 
escaped from persecution. Many of them went to countries which 
subsequently came under German domination during the war. 8 

1 On 1 Aug. 1939 there were 14,800 Jewish refugees in the Protectorate 
(not including those from the Sudetenland), according to the official statistics 
reported by the Jewish Community of Prague. 

2 Apart from the Jewish refugees, the High Commissioner's supplementary 
report of 20 Oct. 1939 mentions about 20,000 Czechs and political refugees from 
the Sudetenland. The Reich Statistical Office gives the figure of 400,000 as a 
rough estimate of the number of refugees up to the census of May 1939 (Wirtschaft 
und Statistik, Nos, 5-6 and 20, 1940). 

8 The distribution of German refugees at certain dates up to the end of 1937 
is shown by Sir John HOPE SIMPSON'S diagrams and tables. For the period after 
1937 information is contained in the reports of the American Jewish Joint Distri- 
bution Committee for the years 1938, 1939, 1940, 1941 and the first five months 
of 1942, the annual reports of the Hebrew Sheltering and Immigration Aid Society 

(Footnote continued on next Page.) 


Palestine was the only overseas country of importance for im- 
migration purposes during the early years. Later, the refugee 
colonies in the countries of Western Europe were scattered all over 
the world, while a growing current of overseas emigration also went 
directly from Germany. In December 1937 about 60 per cent, of 
the total number of refugees, estimated at 154,000, were in oversea 
countries, the proportions being as follows: Palestine (27.2 per 
cent.), United States (17.1 per cent.), South America (13.4 per cent.), 
South Africa (3.1 per cent.). 

The increased emigration to the United States and to Latin 
America could not, however, absorb the new wave of refugees 
which rose after the annexation of Austria and the pogroms of 
November 1938. Once again masses of Jews fled to France, Belgium, 
the Netherlands and other neighbouring countries. In December 
1939 the percentage of German refugees in overseas countries was 
nearly the same as two years before (about 55 per cent.). But in 
view of the increased total of Jewish refugees from Greater Germany 
over 360,000 this indicated that over 160,000 refugees still 
remained in Europe. Of this number, some 50,000 were in Great 
Britain, and, in countries which have remained neutral 1 , the others 
some 110,000 were in countries which came under German 
occupation or became Germany's allies in the course of the war. 2 
Only a few thousands of the German refugees in these countries 
succeeded in emigrating from Europe before the German offensive 

(Hias) and Hias-Ica Emigration Association (Hicem), the reports of the Jewish 
Communities and Committees presented to the Joint-Hicem conference held 
in Paris on 24 Aug. 1939 (these reports, which give the numbers of Jewish refugees 
in some European countries on 1 Aug. 1939, have been consulted by courtesy of 
I. Dijour, Executive Secretary of the Hias-Ica Emigration Association), the 
report of the Vienna Jewish Community (with a map illustrating the dispersal 
of the Vienna Jews over the world), the German statistics of overseas emigration 
in 1935-1939 (Wirtschaft und Statistik, 1941, No. 18), and the statistics of immi- 
gration into the United States and Palestine. Cf. also I. DIJOUR: "Jewish Emi- 
gration from Europe in the Present War", in Jivo Bleter (Journal of the Yiddish 
Scientific Institute), Vol. XIX, No. 2, Mar.-Apr. 1942, pp. 145-156; Arieh TARTA- 
KOWER: "The Jewish Refugees' 1 , in Jewish Social Studies, Vol. IV, No. 4, 1942, 
pp. 311-348; American Jewish Year Book, Vols. 43 and 44 (New York, 1941-1942); 
and Marc WISHNITZER: "Migration of Jews", in The Universal Jewish Encyclo- 
pedia, Vol. VII. It should be borne in mind that many German Jews arrived in 
the United States not directly from Germany, but via other European countries, 
while others entered not as immigrants but as visitors. 

1 On 1 Aug. 1939 there were 42,600 refugees in Great Britain and 2,500 
assisted refugees in Switzerland, according to the reports of the Jewish Communi- 
ties and Committees. 

2 On 1 Aug. 1939 there were 71,000 refugees in France, 14,000 assisted refugees 
in Belgium and 300 refugees in Luxemburg, according to the same source. The 
figure of 71,000 seems to include also Russian Jewish refugees who had entered 
France long before the war. The report of the American Jewish Joint Distribution 
Committee for 1939 gives the number of refugees from Greater Germany in Dec. 
1939 as 38,000. The total of refugees in Belgium was 25,000 and in the Nether- 
lands 23,000, according to Max GOTTSCHAUC, President of the Hias-Ica Emigra- 
tion Association (Hicem), in American Jewish Year Book, Vol. 43, p. 324. 


of May 1940 and later (up to November 1942), mainly from the 
unoccupied part of France; others escaped to England. The rest 
were submerged in the mass of the Jewish population of Nazi- 
dominated Europe and shared their fate. 

Another mass movement of refugees in the pre-war period came 
from Spain. The Civil War at first gave rise to a tremendous in- 
ternal movement of population fleeing before General Franco's 
advance; in August 1938 the Catalonian Government stated that 
there were 2,000,000 refugees on Republican territory. 1 The sub- 
sequent conquest of Catalonia by General Franco led to a mass 
movement across the frontier. The Republican army retreated 
into French territory together with a crowd of civilian refugees; 
a report presented to a committee of the French Parliament stated 
that there were a total of 450,000 Spanish refugees in France, in- 
cluding 220,000 belonging to the Republican army. A return 
movement to Spain started in September 1939. Other refugees, 
in particular Basques, emigrated to Latin America; still others 
were able to find employment in France, especially in agriculture 
and in the metal-working industries. At the end of 1939 the French 
Government was supporting 51,400 Spanish civilians and 71,300 
militiamen, 2 In February 1940 the French Minister of the Interior, 
Albert Sarraut, stated that there remained in France 140,000 
Spanish refugees. About 300,000 had left France, between 20,000 
and 25,000 having gone to Latin America while the rest had re- 
turned to Spain. 

Thus the events which took place from 1933 to 1939 left the 
countries of Europe at the outbreak of the war with a heritage of 
some 300,000 political, religious and racial refugees 160,000 from 
Greater Germany and 140,000 from Spain to whom must be added 
the Czechs and Slovaks expelled from their homes as a consequence 
of the dismemberment of the Czechoslovak Republic. 3 

With the outbreak of war a new period of population displace- 
ment began. The hostilities did not at first completely put an end 
to overseas emigration from Germany and Nazi-dominated coun- 
tries, which continued, though on a very restricted scale, even after 
the United States had entered the war. The total number of Jews 
who emigrated from Europe during the war may be estimated at 
about 135,000, of whom some 65,000 went to the United States, 
about 30,000 to Latin America, 35,000 to Palestine and 5,000 to 
other overseas countries. A further 15 or 20 thousand went to the 

1 Sir John HOPE SIMPSON: op. cit., p. 164. 
The I.L.O. Year-Book, 1939-40, pp. 227-228. 
1 Cf . below, pp. 46-48. 


neutral countries, Sweden, Spain and Switzerland. 1 Finally, between 
10,000 and 12,000 were reported to be in North Africa; since the 
arrival of the British-American army, these are now being released 
from the camps in which they had been interned. 2 To all these must 
be added the non-confessional Jews and the "Aryan" refugees. 
Assuming that they constituted 20 per cent, of the whole number 
of refugees 8 , the total would be about 200,000. 

After the Franco-German armistice an attempt was also made 
to evacuate Spanish refugees overseas. Negotiations between 
France and Mexico led to an agreement for the transfer of a large 
number of them, but for various reasons this agreement could not 
be carried out. In the summer of 1941 it was reported that the 
Vichy Government had sent Spanish internees to French North 
African possessions for employment on the Trans-Saharan Rail- 
way and other construction work. 4 The number remaining at 
the time of the occupation of North Africa by the British-Ameri- 
can forces was slightly over 3,000. 5 

But while, as more and more countries have become involved 
in the war, overseas emigration has gradually dwindled to what is 
now virtually a standstill, mass displacements of population within 
the European continent have been taking place among the peoples 
of the countries invaded by Germany. The war itself, invasion, 
bombing, have led to the flight or evacuation of millions. As a 
corollary to the transfers of German populations described in the 

According to recent information there are about 11,000 foreign refugees 
in Switzerland. Estimates as to the number of refugees in Spain vary from be- 
tween seven and eight thousand the estimate of the U.S. Department of State 
and 18,000 the estimate of the Spanish Government (COMMON COUNCIL FOR 
AMERICAN UNITY: Interpreter Releases, Vol. XX, No. 9, Series A, Immigration, 
No. 3, 19 Mar. 1943). According to the latest figures issued by the Social Board, 
there are in Sweden, apart from slightly over 9,000 Norwegians, 2,400 refugees 
from Germany and 1,300 others (Swedish Press, 5 Mar. 1943). All these figures 
which indicate the current position naturally include pre-war refugees as well. 

2 J.D.C. Digest, Feb. 1943. 

8 Some figures may be quoted to substantiate this estimate. In 1939-1940, 
1,640 non-Jews arrived from Germany in the U.S., representing 7.5 per cent, of 
the total of immigrants coming directly from Germany. In 1939-1940 and 1940- 
1941, among the immigrants into the U.S. from France, Belgium, Holland and 
Luxemburg, there were 3,200, or 24 per cent., non-Jews. The proportion in the 
emigration to the Congo, Curacao, etc., may have been even higher (I. DIJOUR: 
loc. cit., pp. 147-148). On the other hand, not all non-Jewish emigrants were poli- 
tical or racial refugees. The percentage of non-Jews among the Polish war refugees 
in transoceanic countries varies from 10 per cent. (Shanghai) to 40 per cent. 
(Brazil), according to Polish sources. It has also to be remembered that the 
important emigration to Palestine was purely Jewish. 

4 New York Times, 15 June and 6 July 1941. 

6 According to an announcement of the Joint Commission for Political Prison- 
ers and Refugees in French North and West Africa (New York Times, 6 Apr. 1943). 
Other estimates are substantially higher. Cf. Aufbau (New York), 22 Jan. 1943, 
and New York Post, 6 Apr. 1943. It has been reported that the Mexican Govern- 
ment will admit the Spanish refugees and that approximately 1,500 of them 
wish to emigrate. 


preceding chapter, local populations have been deported to make 
room for the newcomers. More mass expulsions have been carried 
out by Germany's allies in the territories of the defeated countries 
they have annexed. Population transfers and population exchanges 
have been organised by treaty or imposed following frontier changes. 
All these movements, which are often interdependent and 
difficult to disentangle from one another, are described together 
in the first part of this chapter for each of the countries affected. 
There is one class of deportations, however, which for the sake of 
clearness has been dealt with separately because it reveals a definite 
design pursued by Germany or under German influence throughout 
Axis-occupied and Axis-controlled Europe; this is the deportation 
of Jews, which is described in the second part of the chapter. 


The Protectorate of Bohemia-Moravia. 

The proclamation made by the Fiihrer on 16 March 1939, just 
after the occupation of Prague, began with the words: "Bohemia 
and Moravia have for a thousand years belonged to the living 
space of the German people 1 '. This claim was given political reality 
by Chancellor Hitler's Decree of 16 March, the first article of which 
laid down that Bohemia and Moravia "belong henceforth to the 
territory of the Greater German Reich". Since then the Germans 
have been persistently trying to establish themselves in the country 
of the Czechs, not only politically and economically but also demo- 

Within the framework of a general scheme for the removal of 
the Czech population and resettlement of the area by Germans, 
the region of Moravska-Ostrava was to serve as a bridgehead for 
German ethnical penetration. German language corridors were 
to be cut across Bohemia and Moravia to isolate the Czechs from 
the Slovaks and to separate Bohemia from Moravia. The forma- 
tion of a ring of German settlements round Prague was to complete 
this programme for the dismemberment of the Czechoslovak nation 
and people. In fulfilment of the scheme, more than 10,000 workers 
from the Czech mines and smelting works of Moravska-Ostrava 
were sent to Germany. In addition, 6,000 Jews from the same 
region were deported to Poland. 1 

About a hundred Czech villages were evacuated, some of them 
just after the outbreak of the war and others in 1940: forty-two in 

1 Cf. below, p. 98, note 2. 


north-eastern Moravia (Vyskov district), the others in the Elbe 
Valley (Melnik district), near Pilsen (Chrastava district) and in 
the neighbourhood of Prague, in order to surround the capital 
with a "Germanic Iron Circle . 1 The expelled Czech peasants 
(estimated at 70,000) were replaced by German settlers. 2 There 
is some doubt as to how many German settlers have been moved 
in, since the settlement scheme met with various difficulties. For 
one thing, it threatened the labour supply of the Czech munition 
industries, and for another, German agriculturists refused to transfer 
in sufficient numbers to replace the highly efficient Czech farmers. 
As a result, the settlement scheme was abandoned for the time 

German immigration on a grand scale came later and was 
of quite a different social composition, being mainly urban in 
character. The advance guard consisted of German Gestapo, SS 
men, and other officials, but as the programme of germanisation 
proceeded the influx grew steadily greater. New German officials 
were constantly being appointed and naturally brought their 
families with them; this process of substituting German for local 
officials was promoted by a Decree of July 1939 requiring that 
negotiations between Czech authorities and the " Protectorate 
Department" must be conducted in German exclusively. Many 
of the Czech railwaymen were replaced by Germans. In Prague 
and Brno, the majority of Czech tramway conductors were dis- 
missed and their places taken by Germans, on the pretext that the 
Czechs could not properly pronounce the new German names of 
the streets. Even students from all parts of the Reich were sent 
to the reopened German University of Prague. 8 But German 
immigration was mainly swelled from 1941 onwards as a result of 
the bombing of German cities; factories, workers, women and 
children were evacuated to the Protectorate. 

The overwhelming majority of German immigrants came 
from the old Reich, especially from Prussia, and not from Austria. 
On the other hand, the majority of emigrating Czech workers went 
to Austria, the largest colony being in Linz. 4 There has been there- 

1 Bug. V. ERDELEY: op. cit., pp. 239-244; Rene* KRAUS: op. cit., pp. 344-345; 
New York Herald Tribune, 20 Feb. 1940. No information is available as to the 
present whereabouts of these expelled Czech peasants. 

a The rumour that some of these settlers came not from the Reich but from 
Bessarabia is not confirmed by the German reports concerning the resettlement 
of the "repatriated" Germans. For the first time the D.U.T. report for 1942 
mentioned that the industrial workers among repatriated groups are resettled 
in the Protectorate. 

1 Cf. Eug. V. ERDELEY: op. cit., pp. 59, 193, and 244-245. 
4 According to the Czechoslovak Information Service. Cf. also Eug. V. ERDE- 
: op. cit., pp. 191 and 193. 


fore a straight flow of migration crossing Bohemia-Moravia from 
north to south, the Germans entering Bohemia from the north 
and the Czechs emigrating to the south. 


Following the Munich Agreement of 30 September 1938, the 
Vienna Conference of 3 November 1938 awarded the southern 
part of Slovakia to Hungary. In this region there were numerous 
Slovak settlers, who as a result of the agrarian reform in Czecho- 
slovakia had been granted holdings of land some of which had 
formerly belonged to the big Magyar landowners. This land reform 
was declared void in the territory incorporated into Hungary, and 
within a few weeks the settlers were expropriated and expelled. 1 
They were joined by officials and employees of public offices and 
public utilities, and in some districts also by small business men 
and tradesmen. According to the Czechoslovak Information Service, 
the total number of Slovaks expelled was between 60,000 and 

On 14 March 1939, the day before the German occupation of 
Bohemia, Slovakia declared itself independent. There followed a 
Hungarian occupation of certain other districts of Slovakia and of 
the whole of Subcarpathia, resulting, according to the Czecho- 
slovak Information Service, in another migration of 20,000 to 
30,000 people who were expelled and sent to Slovakia or to Bohemia- 
Moravia. 2 

On the other hand, numerous groups also had to leave Slovakia. 
According to the Czechoslovak Information Service, about 130,000 
Czechs in Slovakia, many of them officials and teachers, were 
dismissed from their posts and forced to go to Bohemia-Moravia. 3 


Mass movements of Poles during the war have taken three 
forms: first, the flight of the Polish population before the German 
invasion in September 1939; secondly, the expulsion of Poles from 
the western Polish provinces incorporated into the Reich, which 
took place mainly in 1939-1940; and thirdly, the transfer of the 
population of the eastern Polish provinces (Western Bielorussia 
and the Western Ukraine) to the eastern areas of the Soviet Union, 
organised by the Soviet Government partly in 1939-1940 after 

1 Sudost Echo, 23 May 1941. 

* R. NOWAK, in Zeitschrift fUr Geopolitik, Vol. XVI, 1939, p. 19, affirms that 
60 per cent, of this number were Czechs. 

8 Wirtschaft und Statistik, 1941, No. 2, states that many nationals of the 
Protectorate emigrated from Bratislava. 


occupying these territories, but mainly in the summer of 1941 on 
the eve of the German invasion. Two further movements of the 
Polish population are dealt with in other parts of this study, namely 
the recruitment of Polish workers for Germany and German- 
occupied territories, and the deportation of Polish Jews, 1 

Refugees after the German Invasion. 

In September 1939 there was a mass flight of the Polish popula- 
tion before the rapid advance of the German army. The majority 
of these refugees remained in the territory occupied by Germany 
as a result of the Polish campaign. The influx to the capital, which 
kept up its resistance longer than the rest of the country, was 
especially large. The day after the German invasion began, the 
Associated Press reported that refugees from Western Poland and 
the Polish Corridor were crowding into Warsaw, and this move- 
ment continued throughout the German advance. The increase 
in the population of Warsaw, estimated a few months later at 
about 300,000, was attributed mainly to the influx of these refugees 
driven from their homes by war. 2 

Other refugees succeeded in escaping to Eastern Poland (i.e. 
to Western Bielorussia and the Western Ukraine) before or after 
it was occupied by the Soviet Union, or in crossing the Polish 
frontiers. The first of these groups will be dealt with below in con- 
nection with the population transfers from Western Bielorussia 
and the Western Ukraine to the east, but some figures are given 
here concerning those who went from German-occupied Polish 
territory directly to other countries. 

Such part of the Polish army as left Polish territory retreated 
mainly to Rumania and Hungary, where it was interned. Never- 
theless, tens of thousands of Polish soldiers, after overcoming all 
kinds of difficulties, found their way to France. 8 A number of 
civilians also went to Rumania and Hungary, mostly politicians, 
officials and Jews. At the end of 1939 the number of Polish civilian 
refugees in Rumania was about 17,000, many having already 
managed to leave the country, and in Hungary 15,000. 4 In 1940- 
1941 the departures continued, while other Polish refugees were 
removed from Rumania to Poland after Rumania had joined the 
Axis. At the end of 1942 the number of Polish refugees remaining 
was 9,000 in Hungary and 4,000 in Rumania. Three thousand of 
those who had left Rumania and Hungary found themselves in 

1 Cf. Chapter III, pp. 136-139, and Chapter II, pp. 98-100. 
* New York Times, 3 Sept. 1939, 24 Feb. and 28 July 1940. 
The Black Book of Poland (New York, 1942), p. 590. 
4 The I.L.O. Year Book, 1939-1940, pp. 220-221. 


Italy and others in the Balkan States. However, the great majority 
reached France (in May 1940 there were 25,000, some of whom 
escaped to England and America; on 1 November 1942 in the then 
unoccupied zone there were 11,000, 800 others being in Algeria), 
England where there were 5,000 civilians at the end of 1942, 
Switzerland (2,000), and Palestine (over 5,000). ! 

Many of the refugees from Poland sought refuge in Lithuania, 
including the Wilno region, which had been part of Poland but 
which the Soviet Union had since occupied and handed over to 
Lithuania. According to official Lithuanian sources, the influx 
from Poland consisted of about 14,000 members of the Polish 
army who were interned by the Lithuanian authorities, and 75,000 
to 8Q,000 civilian refugees, of whom all but 10,000 were Jews. 
Another reliable source gives the figure for civilian refugees as 
only 30,000, which seems consistent with the figure of 15,000 Jewish 
refugees given by the American Jewish Year Book. There were also 
2,000 Polish refugees in Latvia. 2 Of all the Polish refugees in the 
Baltic countries, some 2,000 succeeded in crossing Siberia and 
going to America 3 , while nearly the same number landed in Japan 
and Shanghai (which had 950 Polish refugees when it was occupied 
by the Japanese). Many others were among those who were trans- 
ferred from the Baltic States to the eastern part of the Soviet 
Union in June 1941. 

Incorporated Western Polish Provinces. 

After the collapse of Poland and the partition of Polish territory 
into a German and a Soviet sphere of interest, some of the Polish 
territories administered by the Germans were incorporated into 
the Reich. These were the so-called "reconquered provinces", 
that is, the German-Polish provinces which Germany had lost 
after the war of 1914-1918, with the addition of considerable areas 
of the part of Poland which was under Russian rule before 1914. 
Two new German provinces were made out of the annexed territory, 
along with the Free City of Danzig: Warthegau, covering most 

1 All these figures are derived from Polish sources. The total of Polish-Jewish 
war refugees in Palestine, including those who arrived after 1942 through Iran 
(cf. below, p. 59), has been estimated at 6,800. 

* Another group which might also be considered as refugees are the 17,000 
Polish agricultural labourers, out of the 25,000 who used to migrate annually 
to Latvia for the harvesting season, who were stranded in Latvia when war 
broke out. 

8 The total of Polish refugees, i.e. those who came from west and east, was at 
the end of 1942, according to Polish sources: 1,800 in Brazil, 1,500 in other South 
American countries, 1,500 in the United States, 1,000 in Canada. Apart from 
them, many persons of Polish origin returned from Poland to the United States 
as American citizens. 


of the Polish province of Poznan and part of the Polish province 
of Lodz, and Danzig-West Prussia, comprising the Free City of 
Danzig, Polish Pomerania and the rest of Poznan, while a third 
province, Upper Silesia, consists partly of German and partly 
of former Polish territories. The Ciechanow (Zischenau) district 
was merged into the province of East Prussia. The rest of German- 
occupied Poland became a separate administrative territory under 
the name of the "General Government for the Occupied Polish 
Territory", later simply the "General Government". 1 

It was intended that the Incorporated Polish Provinces should 
become completely German, both racially and culturally. This policy 
was in harmony with the administrative tradition of Prussian rule over 
Polish territory, which had been a policy of germanisation for over 
a hundred years, culminating in the so-called "Hakatist Movement" 
of the last years of the nineteenth and the early twentieth century. 2 
But the National Socialist policy of germanisation was essentially 
different from its predecessors. Former Prussian rulers had tried 
to germanise the annexed Polish provinces by assimilating the 
Poles, planting German settlers among them to assist and expedite 
the process. In the new German policy, however, settlement was 
the main theme, and germanisation was only a means of expanding 
the German "living space". Chancellor Hitler in Mein Kampf 
had originated the slogan that the German living space lies to the 
east. But in Poland the Germans found a land more thickly popu- 
lated than the adjacent parts of Germany itself, and a large-scale 
German settlement scheme could be carried out there only after 
first ridding the country of its own dense population. Accordingly, 
Germany's policy was not to germanise the Poles, but to expel 
them and settle Germans in their place. At the same time the 
political, economic and cultural life of the area had to be germanised 
to prepare it for German settlement. 

Some time was required for the stabilisation of this German 
policy. At first, isolated attempts to increase the German element 
in the territory suggested that the policy of germanisation was to 
be extended even to the General Government. However, this trend 
was soon reversed, and some of the old-established German colonists 
were "repatriated" from the General Government, which was 
destined to become the settlement area for the Poles from the 
Incorporated Provinces and also for the Jews from all parts 

1 After the invasion of the U.S.S.R., Eastern Galicia, formerly in the Russian 
sphere of influence, was included in the General Government, while the Bialystok 
region became part of the province of East Prussia. 

2 Cf. Richard W. TIMS: Germanising Russian Poland. The H.K.T. Society 
and the Struggle for the Eastern Marches in the German Empire, 1894 1019 (New 
York, 1941). 


of German-controlled Europe. 1 The Incorporated Provinces 
Warthegau and Danzig- West Prussia were, on the other hand, to 
become wholly German. This, of course, was merely the dominant 
principle of racial segregation in the east. Its application was sub- 
stantially modified by practical considerations, especially those 
connected with the prosecution of the war. 

The germanisation of the Incorporated Provinces was both 
rapid and thorough. 2 The Polish population, which formed 87 
per cent, of the total population, and even now, after mass expulsion, 
still constitutes about three-fourths of the whole, is ignored by the 
German administration. The Poles have been completely excluded 
from local government; thus, for instance, in Lodz, which still has 
a large Polish majority, the city council is composed of 14 former 
Polish nationals of German origin and 24 Germans from the Reich. 
The names of cities have been germanised; for instance, Lodz has 
become Litzmannstadt. The streets have been given new German 
names, often in honour of National Socialist leaders. The use 
of the Polish language is banned in public life. Polish newspapers 
have been suspended, and the publication of books in Polish is 
prohibited. There are no Polish schools whatsoever. But the most 
radical method of all adopted to destroy the Polish character of 
the Incorporated Provinces was the actual eviction of the Polish 

1 With Germany's further expansion there seems to have been another re- 
versal of the German view of the function to be performed by the General Govern- 
ment. In the summer of 1942, news reached the Polish Government in London 
tnat the population of whole villages in the districts of Lublin, Zamocz, Sieradz, 
Lask and Olkusz (all located in the General Government) had been evicted from 
their homes and the land occupied by German colonists imported from Volhynia 
and Rumania. 

It seems that these cases mark a change in German colonisation policy. An 
article by Dr. Adolph DRESLER (Hamburger Fremdenblatt, 4 Oct. 1942) points 
out that the "racial Germans" in the General Government have become a weighty 
factor in the establishment of German leadership in the east. Organised in "the 
German fellowship", they form solid islands in an area inhabited by aliens, 
islands which are to serve as starting-points for further German expansion and 
at the same time as a link with the more remote occupied areas further east. 
Another article by Commissioner GLOBOTZNIK, published in the Krakauer Zeitung, 
3 Jan. 1943 (quoted in Survey of Central and Eastern Europe, Feb. 1943), deals 
with the colonisation of the Zamocz area, where "there are numerous Volksdeuts- 
che and people of German origin. Because the soil is very fertile it has been 
decided that, after the area has been cleared, many racial Germans who have 
been evacuated from other territories and German ex-servicemen will be settled 
there." As has already been seen, the General Government became, in fact, in 
the course of the year 1942, a new area for the resettlement of repatriated Ger- 
mans (cf. above, Chapter I, p. 23). 

According to the Polish Information Office, the removal of the Polish popula- 
tion from the General Government was connected with the construction of a 
line of fortifications running from the River Bug through the province of Lublin 
to Northern Galicia. In Aug. 1942, and again in Dec. 1942 and Jan. 1943, tens of 
thousands of Poles were removed from this area. Some of their land was taken 
over by transferred "racial Germans", and the rest remained unoccupied. 

1 A vivid picture of the process of germanisation is given by S. SEGAL: The 
New Order in Poland (1942). 


This compulsory mass transfer was carried out according to a 
preconceived plan which prescribed the very harshness of the 
methods used. In a speech made at Bromberg on 26 November 
1939, Gauleiter Forster declared: 

The German cause has been entrusted to our keeping by the Fiihrer, with the 
definite mission of re-germanising this country. It will be our highest and most 
honourable task to do everything in our power to ensure that in a few years every- 
thing in any way reminiscent of Poland shall have disappeared. This applies 
particularly to the racial purging of the country. Whosoever belongs to the Polish 
people must leave this land. We hope that in this struggle for the triumph of our 
German cause we shall never become merciful, that we shall always show the 
necessary harshness. 1 

Similar declarations were made by other prominent National 
Socialists. Thus, Dr. Frank in a speech delivered at the end of 1939 
in Kalisz (since incorporated into Germany) on the occasion of 
his appointment as General Governor, spoke as follows: 

After the victory of our armies, the German colonists entered the struggle. 
Ten years from now, not a plot and not a farm will remain that is not German. 
Our colonists are coming to fight without mercy the Polish peasant. If God exists, 
he has chosen Adolf Hitler to chase this rabble out of here. 2 

The expulsion and deportation of Poles from the Incorporated 
Provinces to the General Government started in October 1939 at 
Gdynia, whence the majority of the Polish population was removed. 
In spite of the many foreign Germans and newcomers from Danzig 
settled in Gdynia, the number of its inhabitants declined sharply. 
The importance of this city, which under German rule had been a 
primitive fishing village and had been built up by the Poles into 
one of the most important ports on the Baltic, has almost com- 
pletely disappeared. It has been renamed Gotenhaven, but people 
call it "Totenhaven". In November and December 1939 there 
were large-scale expulsions from the city of Poznan. Later the 
process was extended to other towns, and then even to the country 
districts. 8 

The purging of the Incorporated Provinces of their non-German 
inhabitants was indeed carried out " without mercy" and with 
great harshness. The Polish White Book gives the following account 
of this evacuation, based on original German orders and the accounts 
of many eye-witnesses: 

1 "German Occupation of Poland", Polish White Book, 1941, p. 181. 

New York Herald Tribune, 5 Oct. 1941. 

8 Statistics of the actual removal of population from these cities are scarce. 
According to the official German statistics, on 1 Jan. 1942 only 40 per cent. 
of the population of Gdynia was still Polish, compared with 98 per cent, in 1936, 
when the total population was 83,400; while of the 314,000 inhabitants of Poznan 
over 190,000 were Poles, as compared with 238,000 in 1931. Cf. Poland Fights, 
5 Dec. 1942. 


The deportations of the Polish inhabitants are of a coercive character, and, 
as a rule, are ordered suddenly without any previous warning to those concerned. 
Deportations are often effected during the night. The inhabitants must leave 
their homes on extremely short notice; they are given from twenty minutes to 
two hours at the utmost to start on their journey. In these conditions, especially 
in the early months, when people were not yet accustomed to German adminis- 
trative methods, the deportees, when hardly awake, were obliged to leave their 
homes not only without baggage of any description but sometimes only half clad. 

In many cases the measures also served the secondary purpose 
of providing workers for Germany ; thus, able-bodied men and women 
were sent to the Reich and the others to the General Government. 
The German authorities limited their own responsibility to the 
bare transportation of the expelled Poles to the General Govern- 
ment; no provision was made for them on the way, and after their 
arrival they were entirely abandoned. The Polish Ministry of 
Labour stated in a communiqu6 of April 1942: 

They have met a very hard fate and their life is steadily becoming still harder. 
In the beginning, the population of the General Government helped as much as 
possible, but as the war continues, everybody is becoming too poor to help 
others. Only 10 per cent, of the population which had been deported from the 
annexed territory has found employment in trade, industry, etc.; the rest, which 
means 1,000,000, have to be kept by charitable institutions or by private persons 
who still have enough to share it. There are fewer of those who can afford that 
every day. 

Later, the evicted Poles were used for compulsory labour. 

It is generally estimated that during the first two years of 
German domination about 1,500,000 persons were deported from 
the Incorporated Provinces to the General Government, 1,200,000 
of them being Poles and 300,000 Jews. 1 The figure has not risen 
substantially during recent months, and is now estimated at 
1,600,000, making with 60,000 Jews who fled from Western to 
Central Poland 2 during the hostilities a total of 1,660,000. As will 
be seen, there were no further mass expulsions from the Incorporated 
Provinces after the early part of 1942, except in the case of Jews. 

Poles and Jews were expelled from the Incorporated Provinces 
to make room for German immigrants, and had to give up their 
homes, all their personal belongings, their place in economic life, 
and their farms or businesses to the newcomers. Accordingly, 
eviction and deportation went hand in hand with total confiscation. 
The order of eviction and deportation allowed the deportees to 

1 German Occupation of Poland, p. 22. Cf. communique* of the Polish Ministry 
of Labour, Apr. 1942; also S. SEGAI,: op. cit., pp. 45 and 56, and Jews in Nazi 
Europe, Feb. 1933 to Nov. 1941, Poland, p. 3. The only estimate differing from 
this is given by Hedwig WACHENHKIM, in Foreign Affairs, July 1942, who 
calculates the number of Poles (exclusive of Jews) evicted to the General Govern- 
ment at between 1,500,000 and 2,000,000. 

a Cf. below, Chapter II, p. 99. 


take with them only one suitcase, weighing from 40 to 100 Ibs. 
and containing personal effects only. All valuable objects, such 
as jewelry, gold and silver, stocks and bonds, and money in excess 
of a very small sum varying from 20 to 200 zloty, had to be left 
behind. 1 Real estate and businesses were taken over by German 
trustees, to be used, like the household furnishings of the deportees, 
mainly for the establishment of "their German heirs". 

Legal justification for the confiscation was not provided until 
afterwards, in the form of a Decree issued by Field-Marshal Goring 
on 17 September 1940. Under this Decree, the properties of Polish 
citizens were to be confiscated: 

(1) If the owners were Jews; 

(2) If the owners had fled; 

(3) If the owners had acquired the property after 
1 September 1939; 

(4) If the owners had settled after 1 October 1918 on 
territory which belonged to the Reich before 1914; 

(5) If the property were required in the public interest 
and, in particular, for the defence of the Reich or to 
strengthen the German element in the country. 

The last clause was especially intended to cover the expropriation 
of the expelled and deported Poles. 

A German report published in October 1941 gives details of 
the Polish and Jewish property confiscated by the German author- 
ities and handed over to an official trustee. 2 This comprised, in 
Poznan, 17,300 handicraft workshops, 17,200 commercial under- 
takings, and 3,500 industrial undertakings; and in Lodz, 7,500 
commercial undertakings, 6,400 handicraft workshops, and 2,400 
textile undertakings. Moreover, the trustee took over 73,000 
Polish and Jewish real estate properties in Poznania. 

The large estates and undertakings became German State 
property or were turned over to big concerns organised by the 
National Socialist Party. But the bulk of the land which had 
belonged to Poles was used to settle about 500,000 incoming 
Germans, nearly all from foreign countries. Thus, roughly speaking, 
the property of one and a half million evicted Poles and Jews and 
the basis of their economic activity were used to start half a million 
Germans on a new life. 

Germanisation by expulsion and settlement began immediately 
after the German conquest, and during the first months hundreds 
of thousands of people were deported. The bulk of the deportations 
took place in the first year of German domination; in the second 

1 German Occupation of Poland, p. 23. 

* Die Deutsche Volkswirtschaft, Oct. 1941, No. 28. 


year the process slowed down, and later there were only isolated 
cases. The expulsion of Polish peasants was the first to be stopped. 
Generally speaking, no Polish workers were deported to the General 
Government; those who were not transferred to the Reich or to 
other German-occupied territories were left at home to continue 
their usual occupations. 

It would be tempting to explain the decline of eviction and 
deportation by the crude material fact that once the better-off 
Poles and Jews had been expelled and their property seized there 
was little to be taken from those who remained. Nevertheless, 
this would be an over-simplified explanation of the change in 
German Policy. 

There were in the Incorporated Provinces of Western Poland 
nearly 400,000 farm holdings, many of them very small, and almost 
all in Polish hands. The original German plan was to expropriate 
and evict all these Polish farmers, to eliminate all "dwarf farms", 
and to create medium-sized farms throughout the annexed area. 
It was planned at first to settle the " repatriated " Germans, and 
then to bring in peasants from south-eastern Germany, from Baden 
and Wiirtemberg, where the constant division of holdings had 
resulted in too dense a peasant population on exceedingly small 
holdings. The official review of the National Socialist Party wrote 
in January 1941: 

The East calls all those who have shown their readiness, and amongst whom 
so many are now wearing field uniform. After the war they will all be able to utilise 
their knowledge and experience. Not under the hot sun of Africa, but here in 
the East the land is ready for starting on one's own soil from the beginning^ 
A beautiful new country is waiting here; it has a German face, and many have 
shed their blood for it. The German East will be colonised by German people; it is 
going to be a rich country of peasants and children, a granary of the Reich and of 
the nation's blood. Thus, the German living space is secured for all time. And 
the war which must now be carried on has found its most beautiful fulfilment. 1 

Another article in the same number of this review contains 
some information on the adjustment of the ' 'repatriated 11 Germans, 
and paints the position in very different colours. 

Artisans of all kinds, engineers, doctors and teachers are welcome collaborators 
who can exercise their old professions from the day of their arrival in the new 
provinces of the Reich. It was more difficult to accommodate farmers, because it 
was essential that a convenient farm should first be vacated for them. 

Later, it became clear that the Polish farms were too small; that 
"agriculture in the east could not get along without the help of 
Polish hands, at least during the early years", and that "colonists 

1 National- Sozialistische Monatshefte, Jan. 1941, p. 19. 


who took over the holdings left by Poles would for a long time be 
dependent on the help of the community". 1 

Polish peasants could be deprived of their land, and those who 
were not expelled to the General Government could be forced to 
emigrate to eastern Germany and work there on the big estates. 
But the Germans could not replace them. The German economy 
needed the most abundant harvest possible from the land and the 
newcomers were unfamiliar with local methods of cultivation. 
German industry, absorbed in war production, could not deliver the 
implements for the newly enlarged farms. And, most important of 
all, there were no labourers except the Poles, either for agriculture 
or for any other work. The decisive factor was that the economy of 
the country needed hands which the German people did not offer, 
and could not produce. 

Thus the expulsion of Poles from the Incorporated Provinces 
was halted 3 , and for good reasons. Nevertheless, plans of eviction 
and colonisation have revived since the summer of 1942, this time 
in connection with the problem of the "half- way stratum", i.e. 
those people whose language was Polish but who had German 
blood in their veins, of whom the Germans have discovered close 
on a million in the province of Danzig -West Prussia. 2 These people 
were to be put on the list of German people (Volksliste) as proba- 
tioners; thereafter, those who proved acceptable would be subject 
to military service (this probably being the real reason for the 
scheme) , while those who did not prove acceptable would be deported. 

Having no Germans to replace them, the German Government 
searched for settlers of other nationalities accepted as being of 
German blood, and evolved the scheme of colonisation by settlers 
from the Netherlands. Attempts to establish settlements of Nether- 
landers in the Western Provinces were first made in the fall of 1941, 
and resumed in the summer of 1942. It may be that further efforts 
in this direction will now be made, but the main scheme for the 
removal of millions of Netherlanders to the east is designed to 
colonise the German-occupied territories of the Soviet Union and 
will be described later. 4 

Eastern Polish Provinces (Western Bielorussia and Western Ukraine). 

According to official Soviet sources, during its march into 
Poland the Russian Army captured 181,000 Polish prisoners. A 

* Ibid., pp. 28, 29 and 31. 

* Hamburger Fremdenblatt, 22 Sept. 1942. 

8 According to the report of the Reichgesellschaft filr Landbewirtschaftung 
"for the most part the Poles were left in their farms although their property 
was confiscated 11 (Frankfurter Zeitung, 15 May 1943). 

4 Cf. below, pp. 65-67. 


Moscow broadcast reported that most of these prisoners were freed, 
but that liberation did not extend to "noblemen and officers". 
Consequently, when the reorganisation of the Polish army was 
undertaken in the fall of 1941 numbers of Poles were still interned 
in prison camps. 

Other Polish citizens voluntarily entered the Russian-occupied 
territories in their flight from the Germans. The majority were 
Jews, but there were also many non-Jewish refugees among them, 
especially members of the intelligentsia. Many more entered the 
Russian-occupied area as a result of the German-Soviet Treaty 
of 3 November 1939. It was estimated that the Treaty involved 
the transfer of 30,000 to 40,000 White Russians and Ukrainians 
to the Russian-occupied area in exchange for over 130,000 Germans 
who went to the Reich and a number of Polish refugees (14,000 
or even more) who chose to return to German-occupied Poland. 
The total of Jewish refugees from German-occupied Poland was 
estimated by the Institute of Jewish Affairs at 200,000. The number 
of non-Jewish refugees seems to have been lower. 

In the winter of 1939-40, and again in June 1940, a number of 
refugees were deported by the Soviet authorities to the eastern 
part of the Soviet Union. This measure is said to have been applied 
to those refugees who neither returned to their homes nor accepted 
Soviet citizenship 1 , but other categories also seem to have been 
involved in the transfer. The first batch of exiles were reported to 
have been members of the Polish intelligentsia, State and local 
government officials, teachers, judges, lawyers and the professional 
classes generally, together with a number of Jews and Ukrainians 
of the same classes and other middle-class people. Later, the same 
measure is said to have been applied on an even larger scale to 
Polish and even Ukrainian farmers; and deportation was not limited 
to the refugees from German-occupied Poland but was extended 
to residents of the Eastern Provinces. A White Paper presented 
to the United States Department of State by the Polish Embassy 
asserted that the total number of persons deported reached 400,000. 
Another source gives the number as 300,000. 

The main movement from Soviet-occupied Poland to the east 
began in June 1941, immediately before the German invasion, and 
increased in volume after the invasion had begun. Hundreds of 
thousands of people were either forcibly removed or evacuated 
to inner and Asiatic Russia. Others fled as best they could from 
the invading German army. According to a statement issued by 
the Polish Foreign Minister on 7 May 1942, one and a half million 

i American Jewish Year Book, Vol. 43 (1941), p. 291. 


persons were transferred. The Joint Distribution Committee 
estimates the total number of evacuees from Soviet-occupied Polish 
territory at two million, of whom 600,000 were Jews 1 , these figures 
including those who were transferred in 1939-1940. On the basis 
of information collected locally, an estimate from a reliable source 
gives the total of refugees as 1,200,000, the detailed figures being 
as follows: 

Transferred to: No. of persons 

Archangelsk, Vologda, Kotlas 150,000 

Molotovsk 50,000 

Saratov, Buzuluk, Tchkalovsk 100,000 

Sverdlovsk, Chelyabinsk 50,000 

Kazakhstan (Semipalatinsk) 350,000 

Omsk, Tomsk, Barnaul 100,000 

Krasnoyarsk, Kainsk 50,000 

Yakutsk, Aldana 30,000 

Uzbekistan (Tashkent) 250,000 

Southern regions 50,000 

Extreme north 20,000 

In the fall of 1941, following an agreement between the Soviet 
Union and the Polish Government in exile, 348,000 Poles who 
were in internment camps were released 2 and allowed to join the 
newly formed Polish army. In 1942, 75,500 Poles crossed from 
Russia into Iran 8 , where the Polish army numbered 100,000 at 
the beginning of 1943. 4 According to information furnished through 
the American Red Cross, 37,750 civilians also found their way 
along the shores of the Caspian into Iran. On 30 December 1942, 
notes were exchanged between the Prime Minister of Poland and 
the Foreign Secretary of Mexico concerning the transfer from Iran 
to Mexico of a number of Polish refugees provided that the Polish 
authorities assumed responsibility for their maintenance during 
the war and their repatriation after the war. One thousand five 
hundred Jews were evacuated to Palestine up to the end of 1942. 
Other Polish refugees went through Iran to India. There are 3,000 
adults and some children in Karachi (Province of Sind), and 800 
children have been received by the Maharanee of Nawangar. 6 
Others went to Africa. At the end of 1942 there were 7,000 Poles 

1 The figure of 600,000 is also accepted by the Institute of Jewish Affairs, 
whereas S. SEGAL (American Jewish Year Book, Vol. 44, p. 239) assumes 
it to have been 500,000. On 5 Jan. 1943 the number was estimated at 350,000 
by S. WOLKOWICZ, Jewish Telegraphic Agency correspondent in Russia; cf. 
Contemporary Jewish Record, Apr. 1943, p. 185. 

2 The number of Poles who remained in the internment camps was 45,000. 

1 Statement made on 7 May 1943 by the Foreign Vice-Commissar of the 

4 According to a statement by the British India Office, published in the New 
York Times, 25 Jan. 1943. This number includes between 25,000 and 30,000 of 
the Polish corps which had been formed in North Africa and then removed to 

Polish Review. 25 Tan. 1943, Vol. Ill, No. 4, p. 15. 


in Uganda and Tanganyika and 420 in Rhodesia. 1 Up to March 
1943, the total number evacuated to the British East African 
colonies had reached 12,000. The number of Polish refugees in 
Iran did not diminish by evacuation alone. Many of them joined 
the Polish Army and the Women's Auxiliary Corps (2,500 up to 
the end of 1942); many others perished (1,200 up to the end of 
1942). A report of 5 March 1943 showed 12,000 Polish refugees 
still remaining in Iran. 2 


The war between Finland and Russia started on 30 November 
1939. Military action led to the evacuation or flight of hundreds 
of thousands of persons from the war-stricken areas. A few were 
evacuated to foreign countries; from 5,000 to 6,000 women and 
children were reported to have gone to Sweden, and a few hundred 
to Norway. There is no information about their return. Only some 
of those who had been evacuated to the interior of Finland came 
back when the hostilities had ceased. 

Under the treaty of 12 March 1940, Finland ceded to the 
U.S.S.R. (a) the Karelian Isthmus, including the Eastern Islands 
in the Gulf of Finland, the city of Viborg (Viipuri) and the region 
around Lake Ladoga; (&) part of the communes of Kunsamo 
and Salla in the middle of the eastern frontier; and (c) the western 
part of the Rybachi peninsula on the Arctic. Furthermore, the 
fortress and peninsula of Hango, between the Gulf of Finland and 
the Gulf of Bothnia, were leased to the U.S.S.R. for 30 years along 
with the surrounding islands. 

The inhabitants of the territory ceded to the Soviet Union 
were free to continue to live there or to migrate to other parts of 
Finland, but only one per cent, of the population remained. The 
Karelian Isthmus (including Viborg, the second largest city in 
Finland, and the region around Lake Ladoga) was among Finland's 
most thickly populated areas. The majority of its population, 
which before the war numbered some 420,000 persons 3 , were 
transferred to the interior with whatever movable property they 
could arrange to take away in the few days allowed them by the 
treaty. 'They had very little opportunity to take any kind of 
property with them. Their cattle had already been evacuated; but 
apart from that, all that could be saved was perhaps their money, 

1 Quoted from a memorandum presented on 20 Jan. 1943 by the British Ambass- 
ador in Washington to the U.S. Secretary of State, in Interpreter Releases, Vol. 
XX, No. 9, Series A: Immigration, No. 3. 

2 According to information furnished through the American Red Cross. 
8 Social Tidskrift, Helsinki, Nos. 9-10, 1942. 


but very little else/' 1 The refugees from the other areas ceded to 
Russia, which were sparsely populated, numbered only a few 
thousands. The total number of those who left the ceded areas 
during the war and after the conclusion of peace was some 450,000, 
or about one-eighth of the total population of Finland. 

In a country of meagre natural resources, the resettlement of 
these people was a difficult task. About 180,000 of them were 
estimated to belong to the farming population, and an attempt 
was therefore made to settle them on the land so that they could 
continue their former occupation. With this end in view, the pre- 
vious land settlement legislation was amended by an Act promul- 
gated on 28 June 1940, giving priority in the allotment of land to 
Finnish farmers and fishermen who had moved out of the territory 
bordering on the new national frontier. The land to be provided 
in each locality for this purpose was primarily State-owned. Where 
other land could not be obtained by voluntary transfer, the pro- 
perty of churches, communes, companies, and persons deriving 
their main income from non-agricultural occupations, as well as 
neglected holdings and any other suitable land, could be expro- 
priated and employed for the purpose of resettlement. The scheme 
provided for the creation of about 39,000 new holdings. By the 
end of 1940, after four months of the operation of the plan, some 
7,000 had actually been created. 2 

The number of evacuees who had previously earned a living 
in industry, handicrafts, commerce, the liberal professions, con- 
struction or other works was about 270,000. They were mainly 
put to work on various kinds of reconstruction work, especially 
on State schemes. 3 

As to the geographical distribution of the resettled evacuees, 
press reports show that those from Viborg (Viipuri) and the Kare- 
lian Isthmus were settled in central Finland and along the coast 
of the Gulf of Finland, and those from the Ladoga area were moved 
towards Vasa and Abo on the Gulf of Bothnia. The small group of 
people from Hango was distributed near by in the province of 

Resettlement proceeded slowly but steadily, until the whole 
scheme was reversed by the march of events. In June 1941 the war 
between Finland and the Soviet Union broke out again. Viborg 
and the Karelian Isthmus were recaptured, and in December 
Hango too was abandoned by the Russians, A return movement of 
the evacuated Karelians began in the autumn of 1941. The number 

1 Eljas KAHRA: 4I Reconstruction in Finland", in International Labour Review, 
Vol. XLIII, No. 5, May 1941, p. 503. 

Ibid., pp. 507-9, 

Ibid., pp. 510-12. 


of those repatriated up to the end of September 1942 was officially 
given as 220,000. 1 This figure does not seem to have risen much 
since that date; it was reported to have reached 237,500 in February 
1943. 2 The number of evacuated Karelians who had not been re- 
patriated was about 180,000. 

Finally, it should be noted that during the present war the 
serious food shortage has led once again to the evacuation of children 
from Finland. Several thousands were reported to have been sent 
to Sweden and Denmark for the duration. 8 In Sweden alone, the 
number of Finnish "foster-children" was estimated at some 20,000 
in January 1943. 4 

The Baltic Countries 

Mention has already been made of the transfer of 63,800 Baltic 
Germans to the Reich under treaties concluded by Germany with 
Estonia and Latvia in October 1939. In the same month Lithuania, 
Latvia and Estonia signed treaties granting certain air and naval 
bases to the Soviet Union. Reports from Estonia stated that the 
quartering of Russian troops there had led to the removal of a 
number of Estonians, the local population having had to evacuate 
the district assigned to the Russian troops. The evacuated Esto- 
nians were granted the land and homes of the repatriated Germans 
for settlement. 6 

In July 1940 Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia were incorporated 
into the Soviet Union, and under an agreement between Germany 
and the Soviet Union a further 66,700 Baltic Germans were then 
transferred to Greater Germany from Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania, 
of whom about 35,000 were not really Germans but Lithuanians. On 
the other hand, 21,000 Lithuanians and Russians were transferred 
to Lithuania from districts annexed by Germany.* 

The Soviet occupation of the Baltic States was followed ^by 
three further movements across the border. In the early days of 
the Soviet occupation some Lithuanians crossed the German fron- 
tier for fear of "Sovietisation". They were estimated to number 
about 2,000 persons, 1,300 having been registered in Berlin alone 7 , 
and after the occupation of Lithuania by the Germans in June 

1 Social Tidskrift, loc. cit. 

2 Radio Lahti and other Finnish sources. 

3 New York Times, 31 Jan. and 1 and 2 Feb. 1942 (based on German broad- 
casts and Swiss press reports). 

4 Communication to the I.L.O. In the last few months the Finnish Govern- 
ment has, in agreement with the German authorities, transferred to Finland some 
10,000 Ingermanlanders of Finnish origin from the neighbourhood of Leningrad 
(Dagens Nyheter, 26 June 1943). 

New York Times, 12 Nov. 1939. 

Cf. Chapter I, p. 13. 

7 Information received from the Lithuanian Consulate General in New York. 


1941 they were not allowed to return to their country. 1 Secondly, 
there was a movement into the Baltic countries from the Soviet 
Union, both of Russians and of former Baltic communists who had 
spent most of their lives in the Soviet Union and were now return- 
ing to their native land. These newcomers were employed in 
Government departments and in the various newly established 
State enterprises. Thirdly, there was some forced transfer of popu- 
lation from the Baltic States, the Soviet authorities having deported 
to inner Russia those who had formerly played a prominent part 
in politics. It is estimated that during the period concerned a 
thousand persons were deported from Lithuania. 

Mass migration, both compulsory and voluntary, from the 
Baltic States to the interior of the Soviet Union took place in June 
1941, just before the German invasion of Russia and immediately 
afterwards. The German army crossed the Soviet frontier on 22 
June 1941. Before this move, the Soviet authorities arrested and 
removed from the Baltic States a large number of former officers 
and Government employees, intellectuals and business men and 
farmers, some of them with their families. Many others were 
evacuated or fled when the invasion was imminent. 

In Lithuania, according to official data, this migration numbered 
about 65,000 persons. Some 35,000 persons were deported two weeks 
before the outbreak of the war, and another 30,000 left Lithuania, 
for the most part voluntarily, immediately after the aggression. 
Among them were about 10,000 Jews. 

In Latvia, 14,700 persons were exiled on 13 and 14 June 1941. Six 
thousand were arrested and exiled after 14 June 1941, and another 
12,200 were reported as missing. The list of trains in which the 
arrested persons were deported shows that nearly two-thirds of the 
coaches were sent to Asiatic Russia. 2 In addition, many Latvians 
fled before the invading armies and were glad to be evacuated. 
These included not only Soviet Russian employees who had entered 
the country since 1940, but also many permanent residents of 
Latvia. Their presence in Russia is attested by a report that in 
November 1941 tens of thousands of Latvians evacuated to Russia 
were in military training camps east of the Volga preparing to join 
the new Soviet armies. 3 According to the Institute of Jewish Affairs, 

1 New York Herald Tribune, 30 Nov. 1941. 

2 The Latvian Legation in Washington has furnished a list of deported Latvian 
citizens compiled by the Latvian Red Cross. This gives detailed statistics of 
those exiled on 13 and 14 June 1941, arrested and exiledafter 14 June, and missing 
and killed, with particulars of their occupation. Another detailed list gives the 
number of trains in which Latvian citizens were deported to Soviet Russia, com- 
prising 824 coaches, a figure which supports the total of 32,000 exiled and missing 
given by the Latvian Red Cross. 

8 United Press despatch of 7 Nov. 1941, based on an Exchange Telegraph 


the number of Jewish refugees alone from Latvia was 15,000. The 
total of those who left Latvia is estimated at nearly 60,000. l 

In Estonia, according to the estimates of local authorities, 
61,000 persons, including almost all of the 5,000 Estonian Jews, 
were transferred to Soviet Russia. 2 

Denmark and Norway 

The German occupation of Denmark and Norway in April 
1940 resulted not only in the recruitment of workers for Germany 
and German-controlled countries, but also in the migration of 
Danish and Norwegian agriculturists to the German-occupied 
Eastern Territories. Danish farm managers are reported to be 
going there 3 , and Norwegian and Danish youths are volunteering 
as settlers. The whole movement seems, however, to be on a very 
small scale. Thus in July 1942 the Danish Nazi press complained 
that while over 200 young Norwegians had passed through Copen- 
hagen recently on their way to the east, the numbers of Danes 
were "considerably smaller' 1 . 4 Another report refers to some hun- 
dreds of Norwegian "Quisling" youths undergoing training in the 
province of Poznan in preparation for settlement in the occupied 
Eastern Territories. 6 

Political persecution provoked a flight from Norway across the 
Swedish frontier. According to the latest figures issued by the 

1 Cf. K. R. PUSTA: The Soviet Union and the Baltic States (Washington, D.C., 
May 1940), p. 51. The German source gives even higher, and apparently exagger- 
ated, figures. Thus Novoye Slovo, the Russian paper published in Berlin, writes 
that 200,000 persons were evacuated from Latvia (quoted by Novoye Russkoye 
Slovo, 6 Mar. 1942). 

2 K. R. PUSTA: op. cit. The author gives these figures as though referring to 
deportations only. It is a fact that 7,000 persons had been imprisoned prior to 
their evacuation, but there can be no doubt that many Estonians also left the 
country voluntarily in order to escape the advancing Germans. German sources 
exaggerate the number of persons evacuated to Russia. Novoye Slovo (Berlin), 
for instance, reported that 150,000 persons were evacuated from Estonia, This 
is clearly an exaggeration. The Estonian population was estimated at 1,122,000 
in Dec. 1939 and at 1,010,000 on 1 Dec. 1941. Assuming that the excess of births 
over deaths in 1940 and 1941 was more or less the same as in 1939, the natural 
population increase would be some 2,500. On the other hand, it may be assumed 
that the exceptional circumstances led to many deaths through violence. Taking 
all these factors into account, the migratory loss during the period concerned 
would amount at the most to 1 10,000. According to Pusta, 32,000 of the Estonian 
population were mobilised by the Soviet Government, so that, after deducting 
this figure, there remains a migratory loss of less than 80,000 (including some 
thousand additional Germans repatriated early in 1941). The Russians and 
Estonians who came to Estonia under Soviet rule were only temporary residents. 
The number of German immigrants in Sept.-Nov. 1941 was negligible. 

8 Cf. I. JANUSHKIS, in Socialistichesky Vestnik, 3 Oct. 1942, p. 225, quoting 
Deutsche Zeitung im Osten. The Danish Minister Gunnar Larsen, during his 
journey to the east in the summer of 1942, "signed some contracts" providing 
for the sending of Danish colonists and managers to farms in the Ostland. 

4 Faedrelandet, 10 July 1942. 

5 Svenska Dagbladet, quoted in Survey of Central and Eastern Europe, Feb. 1943. 
Cf. also above, Chapter I, p. 30, and below, pp. 65-66. 


Swedish Social Board, the number of Norwegian refugees in Sweden 
was a little over 9,000. 1 


The great exodus from the Netherlands was caused by the 
German invasion on 10 May 1940. Two thousand four hundred 
civilians from the Netherlands escaped to England. 2 Others, estim- 
ated at some 50,000, fled into France; most of these were repatriated 
after the armistice, and the number of Netherlanders who still 
remained in France in the summer of 1941 was given by a well- 
informed source as only 5,000. 

Later, a new movement, this time towards the Reich, started 
in the Netherlands in the form of the recruitment of workers for 
employment in Germany. 8 In addition, many others have been 
removed from their homes, while it is proposed to send still more 
as settlers to the east. 

According to National Socialist theory, the "germanisation" 
of the Eastern Territories can be achieved only by colonisation. 
This was emphasised again in the summer of 1942 by the Chief 
of the Gestapo, Himmler, who is also the German Commissioner 
for the Consolidation of Germanism. "Our task", he said, "is not 
to germanise the east in the former sense, in other words to teach 
the people living there our German speech and German law, but 
to bring about a position in which only people of German blood 
live there." As no true Germans were available for this purpose, 
recourse was had to the Netherlanders as "people of German blood". 

Attempts to settle Netherlanders in the western Polish pro- 
vinces incorporated into the Reich were made in the fall of 1941. 
The German press reported that 10,000 farmers and labourers 
were being transferred from the Netherlands to the Warthegau. 4 
No information is available as to the fulfilment of these intentions. 
In the summer of 1942, the German press again reported a scheme 
for the transfer of Netherlanders to Western Poland. Young men 
from Flanders and the Netherlands, as well as from Denmark and 
Norway, arrived in the provinces of Danzig - West Prussia, War- 
thegau and Upper Silesia 6 to begin agricultural work, and a settle- 
ment for Netherlands artisans was created in Poznan. 6 

But the great German scheme for the removal of millions of 

1 Swedish Press, 5 Mar. 1943. 

2 Report submitted by Sir Herbert Emerson, High Commissioner for Refugees, 
Geneva, Jan. 1941. 

Cf. Chapter III, pp. 141-142. 

4 Kdlnische Zeitung, 10 Nov. 1941. 

6 Ostdeutscher Beobachter, 11 July 1942. Cf. above, Chapter I, p. 30. 

6 Idem, 2 Aug. 1942. 


people from the Netherlands to the east was planned as a solution 
of German settlement difficulties not in Poland, but in German- 
occupied Soviet territory. In the winter of 1941-1942, Netherland- 
ers together with Belgian and Danish farmers were reported 
to have been sent to occupied Russia as managers of former Soviet 
collective farms. Although they were described as "pioneers** and 
"colonisers", in reality their job was merely that of salaried over- 
seers of Russian agricultural workers, and they numbered only a 
few hundreds. 1 Not until the summer of 1942 did the German plan 
to transfer Netherlands farmers to the east become a vast scheme 
for the mass migration of some 3,000,000 Netherlanders to colonise 
the German-occupied Soviet territories, and especially to build a 
better community of German blood on the Baltic coast. 

A great deal of propaganda has been spent on promoting this 
scheme. The Germans stressed that, next to Belgium, the Nether- 
lands was the most densely populated area in Western Europe; 
that the country urgently needed a wider basis for its food supply ; 
and that the waste regions of the east would "compensate the 
Dutch for the colonies they have lost forever". 2 Not merely the 
settlement of farmers is contemplated; undertakings are urged to 
transfer entire industrial plants with their machinery and staff 
from the Netherlands to Russia. 8 To organise settlement in the 
east, the Netherlands East Company was created, directed by 
Netherlands Nazis and "collaborationist" business men. The 
financial basis of this concern is significant; the Netherlands Bank 
is entitled to draw on the clearing account for Germany's debt to 
the Netherlands, on which payment was stopped in 1941 and which 
now exceeds one billion guilders, to finance the company. Another 
source of capital is constituted by the assets of dissolved companies 
which formerly traded with the Netherlands Indies. 

It is, however, easier to provide a paper money basis for a 
scheme of colonisation than to furnish the settlement area with 
the two main factors necessary for its execution capital, in the 
form of the means of production, agricultural and other machinery, 
cattle, seed and so forth, and labour to cultivate the new land. 
The German war economy has no surplus production on the scale 
required for the establishment of millions of settlers. There is no 
means, under existing circumstances, of moving vast numbers of 
colonists across the European continent with the huge amount of 
livestock and other equipment necessary, even if their requirements 

1 Netherlands News, 26 Nov.-lO Dec. 1941, 26 Jan.-lO Feb. 1942. 

8 Essener National Zeitung, quoted in an Associated Press despatch from 
London of 11 June 1942. Cf. also the London correspondence of 24 Aug. 1942 
in New York Times, 30 Aug. 1942. 



were reduced to a minimum. Above all, there is no willingness on 
the part of the Netherlanders to trek east under German leadership. 

Since the summer of 1942, the German and German-controlled 
Netherlands press have constantly harped on plans for mass migra- 
tion for agricultural as well as for industrial settlement. 1 But 
execution lags far behind planning. Groups of Netherlands peasants 
and artisans were sent to Bielorussia and the Kharkov region, their 
numbers being unspecified. 2 For the Baltic regions, only 300 had 
actually left up to August, mostly engineers, technicians and archi- 
tects. Commissioner-General Schmidt is reported to have an- 
nounced that "at the most 30,000 agricultural pioneers might be 
expected to settle in the east with a view to augmenting Poland's 
food supply ".* Roskam, the local Nazi leader of the Netherlands 
peasantry, admitted after having visited the Ukraine that the 
work of colonisation in the occupied Russian territories was at the 
preliminary stage; the German and Netherlands farmers who were 
already there still merely managed and directed the work of the 
local population. 4 Immigrants were arriving in groups of several 
dozens of persons. 6 In view of all these facts, no credit can be 
attached to rumours of tens or even hundreds of thousands of 
Netherlands colonists in German-occupied Soviet territory. The 
plans for establishing "a second Brabant, a second Gelderland or 
Limburg" in the east are for the time being suspended. 

Finally, mention must be made of a population shift within 
the country, produced by evacuation from the coastal areas. In 
several places (i.e. the Province of Zeeland, part of Southern Holland 
and the greater part of Northern Holland) all the inhabitants are 
reported to have been sent to Groningen and Friesland, in the 

1 The Kuban territory in particular, since retaken by the Red Army, was 
recommended as ideal territory for Dutch farmers. Cf . De Storm (a Dutch Nazi 
publication), 18 Dec. 1942, quoted by Netherlands News, 11-25 Jan. 1943. 

* Die Deutsche Volkswirtschaft, No. 20, July 1942. Nieuwe Rotterdamsche 
Courant, 23 June 1942, reported that a group of 85 engineers and artisans had 
been sent to Kharkov, 30 per cent, of them being Netherlanders, and a " technical 
command" of Netherlanders to Kiev. 

8 New York Times, 30 Aug. 1942. 

4 Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant, 16 and 18 Sept. 1942. It has even been 
asserted that this should be the permanent role of the Netherlands agriculturists 
as well as of the Germans in the Eastern Territories. The Netherlands Nazi Agri- 
cultural Front official De Waard, when asked whether agricultural labourers 
would be sent to the Ukraine from the Netherlands, replied: "No, we'll start 
work with local labour. The Germanic peoples must feel far above the Slavic 
peoples. It would be wrong if we worked there because it would be detrimental 
to German prestige. We must employ Ukrainian workers, who are plentiful, 
women and children included." (Netherlands News, 11 and 25 Jan. 1943.) 

5 A Hilversum broadcast reported in Aug. 1942 that the Netherlands East 
Company had taken over certain estates in the Wilno region as its first agricultural 
settlement and that peasants from the Netherlands would soon leave for the east. 
It was recently announced (Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant, 30 Apr. 1943) that 
the Netherlands East Company was planning to send a first experimental group 
of fishermen to Lake Peipus on the Russian-Estonian frontier. 


eastern Netherlands. 1 In March 1943 it was estimated that at 
the Hague alone 280,000 persons had been ordered to move to the 
eastern Netherlands, as an anti-invasion precaution. 2 


Large-scale emigration from Luxemburg began even before 
the German offensive. The closing of many metal works situated 
near the frontier caused an exodus of workers and their families to 
France to seek factory work there. Many wealthy people were also 
reported to be moving to France. In March 1940 as niany as 15,000 
visas were granted by the French Legation in Luxemburg. 

During the campaign of May 1940 (Luxemburg having been 
invaded on 10 May 1940) some 70,000 3 Luxemburgers were said to 
have fled to France. These refugees were speedily repatriated by 
the Germans. 

Under German rule a new and far-reaching shift of population 
seems to be taking place in the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg which, 
according to the census of 1935, has only 297,000 inhabitants. In 
the first year of German domination deportations from Luxemburg 
appear to have been of a purely political character, mainly affecting 
the intellectuals. A change of tactics on the part of the German 
authorities appeared in the winter of 1941-42, when in order to 
germanise the country a large-scale exchange of population was 
decided upon. The first step in this scheme affected several hundred 
more or less influential families, who were transplanted into various 
remote parts of Germany, and also workers, who were sent into the 
neighbouring districts of Trier and Coblenz. Luxemburg having 
b^en incorporated into the Reich, these workers are not listed in 
the statistics of foreign labour in Germany, but according to Lux- 
emburg sources their number already exceeded 3,500 in January 
1942 4 , and has since been constantly increasing. 5 On the other 
hand, great numbers of German publfc and party officials were 
s l ent to Luxemburg with their families as "pioneers" in the colonisa- 
tion of the country. 

In September 1942 these measures seem to have been extended 
on a massive scale. The increased deportations were supposed to 
herald still more drastic action, and a Nazi newspaper published 
in Luxemburg stated that those residents of Luxemburg "who are 
reverting to anti-German agitation and are still unwilling to become 
conscious members of the National Socialist Reich. . . will be 

* Netherlands News, 1 Nov. 1942; Vrij Nederland, 28 Nov. 1942. 

Netherlands News, 11-25 Mar. 1943. 

1 Cf. below, p. 75, under France. 

4 Inter-Allied Review, 15 Jan. 1942. 

6 At the end of 1942 it was estimated at 10,000. 


resettled within the German Lebensraum" . The Germans were 
quoted as saying that they were prepared to deport the entire 
population if necessary and bring German workers in to keep the 
iron mines running. 1 

The Commissioner for Information of the Government of the 
Grand Duchy of Luxemburg estimated the total of people removed 
to Germany (deported to concentration camps, recruited workers, 
and boys and girls in Hitler Youth camps) at 10 per cent, of the 
entire population, i.e. 30,000. 2 


After the German invasion on 10 May 1940 the population 
of whole villages and tqwns fled before the invader, remembering 
the fate that had befallen them twenty-six years before. Many of 
these refugees were trapped by the German break-through to the 
sea, and after the surrender of the Belgian army in June 1940 they 
returned to their homes. Nevertheless, 15,000 Belgian civilians 
escaped to England. 8 The main flood of Belgian refugees, estimated 
at 1,000,000, overflowed into north-eastern France, mingling with 
the fleeing French population. After the armistice the Belgian 
refugees were soon re-evacuated, partly with German help, and 
virtually all of them seem to have been sent home, except the 
few who succeeded in leaving for America or tried to reach a Spanish 
or Portuguese port. Some 1,500 persons reached the Belgian Congo. 

Under the German occupation the main displacement of popula- 
tion was that of workers recruited for the Reich. Attempts were 
also made to interest the Belgians in the scheme for the colonisa- 
tion of the German-occupied Soviet territories with the help of 
settlers from the Netherlands, as described above. At the end of 
1942, it was reported that a European Union for Agricultural, 
Commercial and Industrial Expansion in the East had just been 
formed in Belgium, corresponding to the Netherlands East Com- 
pany. 4 But apart from a few Belgians appointed as managers of 
former Soviet collective farms 5 , rumours of the sending of Belgian 
colonists to the e v ast have not been confirmed. On the contrary, 
according to information received in March 1943, it was announced 
in Brussels that the scheme to establish an agricultural colony of 
Belgian families in the Ukraine has been "temporarily abandoned". 6 

1 New York Times, 16 and 17 Sept. 1942, quoting the Luxemburg Nazi news- 
paper Nationalblatt. 

2 The United Nations Review, 15 Apr. 1943. 

8 Report submitted by Sir Herbert Emerson t High Commissioner for Refugees, 
Geneva, Jan. 1941. 

4 Message (London), Dec. 1942, p. 22. 
6 Cf. above, p. 66, Netherlands. 
6 News from Belgium, 27 Mar. 1943. 


It may be noted that in Belgium, as in the Netherlands, an 
internal migration movement was produced by evacuation from 
the coast. 1 

A Isace-Lorraine. 

The first migration from Alsace and Lorraine took place at the 
beginning of the war. Both for the protection of the population 
itself, and in order to facilitate military operations, the French 
authorities ordered the evacuation of the regions adjacent to the 
Maginot Line which were within range of the enemy's guns. Stras- 
burg was especially affected by this measure, the entire population, 
numbering some 200,000 persons, having been evacuated. The 
towns and villages in Alsace-Lorraine between the frontier and the 
Maginot Line, and immediately behind it, were similarly affected. 
The total number of people evacuated in September 1939 is estima- 
ted at between 200,000 and 300, OOO. 2 Some of the evacuees were 
received in neighbouring districts, and later sent gradually further 
afield to various parts of central, southern and western France; 
others went directly to the south-west of France. A great many 
were sent to Perigueux and the surrounding district. 

The German offensive in May 1940 was marked by another 
exodus from Alsace-Lorraine, but not on so large a scale as the 
first, and this time from the districts in the more remote rear. 

In summer 1940, when the movement had reached its height, a 
generally well-informed source estimated the number of persons 
from Alsace-Lorraine who had been evacuated or had fled from their 
homes since September 1939 at 400,000. An official German source 
gives the number of evacuated "Alsatians" as 370,000. 3 A return 
movement took place after the armistice, when the German occupa- 
tion authorities tried to induce the Alsatians and Lorrainers to 
return home. The majority did so, to the number of 300,000 (out 
of 370,000), according to the German official figures, and 250,000 
(out of a total of 400,000) according to the other source just quoted. 4 
But at the same time a new movement was set in motion by the 
expulsion orders of the German authorities. 

It was not the first time that there had been a forced mass 
migration from this unhappy land, which more than once has 

1 In a single case reported by La Belgique Independante( London), 14 Jan. 1943, 
10,000 persons were evacuated. 

1 Pour la Victoire, 9 Jan. 1943; New York Times, 6 Apr. 1941. 

8 Reichsarbeitsblatt, 20 Dec. 1940, No. 35, Part V, p. 615. 

4 The Vichy correspondent of the New York Times (29 Apr. 1941) reported 
the number of inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine who ultimately remained in the 
unoccupied zone as 130,000. For comparison, it may be mentioned that eight 
months earlier Paris Soir (11 Aug. 1940) gave the number as 200,000. 


had to undergo a change of sovereignty. Goethe depicts a 
similar exodus of Alsatians in his Hermann und Dorothea; and 
again in 1871, when Alsace-Lorraine was annexed by Germany 
after the Franco-Prussian war, nearly half a million, or one-third 
of its inhabitants, who opted for France had to leave Alsace-Lor- 
raine and were gradually replaced by 400,000 Germans. 1 After 
1918, when a new page of history was again turned, 130,000 of the 
inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine, many of them German officials, 
emigrated to the Reich 2 and were replaced by French newcomers. 

Yet these previous emigration movements, even though more 
or less compulsory, were not to be compared with the removal of 
the population of Alsace-Lorraine after the German occupation 
in 1940. Expulsion was not only carried out on a massive scale, 
but in a spirit very different from that of the German Government 
in 1871 or of the French Government in 1918. The people concerned 
were given no choice between expatriation and recognising the "New 
Order' '. Their only choice lay between unoccupied France and 
Poland, and no one chose Poland. Of course, even in 1918 some 
categories of newcomers from the Reich had been forced to leave 
Alsace-Lorraine, but ample time was given them to collect their 
belongings and make financial arrangements with their banks. 
This time they received only a few days', and in some cases only 
a few hours 7 notice before leaving. They were permitted to take 
only a few personal effects, limited in weight to 50 kilograms (about 
110 Ibs.) for each adult and to 30 kilograms (about 65 Ibs.) for 
each child, and 1,000 francs (equivalent to about $23) in cash. 

Immediately after the occupation of Alsace-Lorraine the German 
authorities began to prepare the ground for the building up of a 
"natural wall" to make the German frontier secure. The expulsion 
started with Alsatian Jews in July 1940. According to information 
given by the Institute of Jewish Affairs, the Jews in Alsace-Lorraine 
numbered approximately 35,000 and lived, in contrast with both 
the German and the French Jews, mostly on the land and in small 
towns. Some 15,000 were evacuated from the frontier zone at the 
beginning of the war, including some 11,000 Jewish inhabitants 
of Strasburg and Mulhouse. Many others fled at the time of the 
German offensive in May 1940 and were subsequently forbidden 
to return. 3 The rest of the better-off farmers were the first victims 
of expulsion. The Jews from Lorraine were expelled some time 
later along with other groups. In a speech made in Strasburg on 
19 March 1941, Gauleiter Wagner announced that 22,000 Jews 

1 A. and E. KUUSCHER: Kriegs- und Wanderziige: Weltgeschichte als Volker- 
bewegung (Berlin, 1932), pp. 158 and 210. 

Reichstagsdrucksache, 1920-22, No. 4084. 

8 These Jewish evacuees and refugees are included in the total of Alsace- 
Lorrainers who remained in unoccupied France after the armistice. 


had been expelled from Alsace-Lorraine. The combined result of 
flight and expulsion was the almost complete elimination of the 
Jewish residents of Alsace-Lorraine. 

Some weeks later, beginning on 11 August 1940 in Alsace and 
five days later in Lorraine, expulsion was extended to the non- 
Jewish population. The process of expelling French-speaking 
people continued over a considerable period of time, from summer 
1940 until spring 1941 and even later. In Alsace it progressed 
more slowly and gradually, and the percentage of expulsions was 
lower than in Lorraine. This difference is attributable to the fact 
that the majority of Alsatians speak a German dialect, so that 
most of the Alsatians expelled, apart from the Jews, were French 
immigrants who had entered the province after its restoration to 
France in 1918. In Lorraine expulsion was more radical and at 
times violent, especially just before the announcement on 30 No- 
vember 1940 that Lorraine was to be annexed to Germany and to 
form, together with the Saar, the new German province of the 
Westmark. This mass expulsion started on 11 November 1940, 
and on 30 November Marshal P6tain announced that 70,000 Lor- 
rainers had "come to seek refuge with their brothers of France*'. 
For some time thereafter the expulsions slackened, but they in- 
creased again in the spring of 1941, when a kind of enquiry was 
arranged among the population of Lorraine, the French Depart- 
ment of the Moselle, to establish which of them were willing to 
become genuine Germans. The rest were to be expelled as had 
been those before them. 

The total number of persons expelled from Alsace-Lorraine 
can be estimated with some precision on the basis of official state- 
ments. The German Commissioner for Strasburg, Dr. Ernst, 
declared in August 1941 that more than 100,000 French people 
and Jews had been expelled from Alsace since the armistice. It is 
estimated that a similar number were exiled from Lorraine in the 
same period: 70,000 up to the end of November 1940, according to 
the abovementioned official statement, and 30,000 more since 
then. The total for Alsace-Lorraine would thus be 200,000 1 , or 
over one-tenth of the pre-war population of 1,900,000, 8 per cent, 
in Alsace and 14 per cent, in Lorraine. 

The criterion on which the expulsions were based is obscure. 
It was mainly the French who had settled in Alsace-Lorraine after 
1918 who were expelled, but not only they. On the other hand, 

1 New York Herald Tribune, 1 Sept. 1941. Another source already quoted 
estimates the number expelled at 250,000. The figure of 200,000 is accepted by 
Ren KRAUS (op. cit., p. 73). Maurice P. ZUBER in "The Nazis in Alsace and 
Lorraine" (Foreign Affairs, Oct. 1942, p. 170) refers to at least 70,000 Lorrainers 
and more than 100,000 Alsatians, not including "the great number of those who 
fled without waiting to be expelled 1 '. 


not all French-speaking pteopl'e were expelled; in some districts 
they remained entirely unmolested, while in others almost every 
French-speaking resident was ordered to leave. The feelings and 
sympathies of the persons concerned seem to have had an important 
bearing on the selection. 1 

Seventy-five per cent, of the expelled persons were farmers. 
Their property was used by the German authorities to enlarge the 
holdings of the local and neighbouring German peasantry. 2 In addi- 
tion, Germans from the Rhineland and the Palatinate came to 
replace the Alsace-Lorrainers who had been driven from their homes, 
businesses, work benches and lands. 8 Since spring 1941 Germans 
transferred from abroad have also been settled on the vacant lands. 4 
This particular transfer of property did not always go off smoothly; 
many of the farmers ordered to leave their homes set fire to their 
houses and barns, preferring to destroy them rather than let them 
fall into German hands. 

In November 1940, when the expulsions from Lorraine had 
reached their height, it was announced in Berlin that about 120,000 
Germans would move in to replade the expelled population. There 
is no information as to the execution of this plan. Joseph Buerkel, 
Gauleiter of Lorraine, describing German achievements in the 
farming districts in spring 1942, said that French-speaking zones 
had been "cleared", large estates divided into farms for as many 
German peasant families as possible, and small undertakings estab- 
lished in villages to give employment to Germans. With regard to 
the industrial areas in the north of Lorraine, his words indicated 
promise rather than performance. "Many foreign workers", he 
said, "live there. They must be replaced by German workers." 6 
And he added that "for purely economic reasons this situation 
cannbt be changed immediately". But there is no doubt that there 
was an influx of German officials into Alsace-Lorraine to replace not 
only French officials but also many Alsace-Lorraine officials of 
German "race". 

The mass expulsions from Alsace-Lorraine increased the burden 
of refugees to be maintained by the unoccupied zone of France. 
It seemed probable that their establishment would be largely 
facilitated by the fact that the great majority wefe farmers. There 

1 New York Times, 15 Nov. 1940 and 30 Mar. 1941; Christian Science Monitor, 
4 Feb. 1942. It was noticed that among those expelled were some persons who 
had been evacuated at the beginning of the war and had returned home after 
the armistice. Cf. New York Times, 6 Apr. 1941. 

* Cf. Chapter I, pp. 29-30. 

8 New York Times Magazine, 8 June 1941; New York Herald Tribune, 15 Nov. 

4 Cf. Chapter I, pp. 22-23. 

6 J. BuSRKEk, article in Frankfurter Zeitung, 24 Apr. 1942, reprinted in Les 
Documents (ed. Coalite's de la France Libre). 


was in south-western France much land lying abandoned and un- 
cultivated as the result of a rural exodus which took on great di- 
mensions long before the war of 1914-1918. A number of immigrants 
from Northern Italy had begun to settle there in the twenties, but 
this movement, helpful to both countries, ceased with the anti- 
emigration policy 1 adopted by the Fascist regime. Mobilisation 
for the army had contributed further to the shortage of farm hands 
and to the abandonment of land. The expelled residents of Alsace- 
Lorraine were therefore sent to the departments of Lot, Lot-et- 
Garonne, Gers and Tarn-et-Garonne, in south-western France; 
and some even farther afield into the Pyrenees. Some were granted 
holdings of abandoned land or uncultivated tracts with a view to 
permanent settlement; others obtained jobs as farm hands; while 
still others undertook the cultivation of plots of land placed at 
their disposal by the municipalities. But owing to the difficulty 
of obtaining fertilisers and seed, and other difficulties of transport 
and supply, many of these former farmers remained unemployed 
and had to be maintained by the Government. Among the indus- 
trial workers only a few found employment as factory workers or 
in building. A few emigrated to North Africa or French West 
Africa, and there was even talk of settling them in Guadeloupe in 
the West Indies. 2 

In the summer of 1941 there was a new wave of deportation, 
this time directed eastward. On 8 May 1941, compulsory labour 
was introduced in Alsace-Lorraine for young people of both sexes 
between the ages of 17 and 25. Not all of those who registered 
under this measure were employed in Alsace-Lorraine itself. 
Many of them were sent to the adjacent regions of southern 
Germany, to central Germany and to the Sudetenland. But many 
thousands of youths failed to register and fled to France and Switzer- 
land. By order of Gauleiter Buerkel their parents were arrested and 
deported into the interior. 3 This was only a beginning; deportation 
for this and other reasons to the Reich, as well as to the Eastern 
Territories, took on mass dimensions in the course of 1942. 4 The 
number of persons affected was estimated in the summer of 1942 
at over 200,000. 5 This was perhaps an exaggeration but since then 
the number has been constantly growing. 6 

1 Cf. S. WifOCBvsKi: L' installation des Italiens en France (Paris, 1934), pp. 63-74. 

2 New York Times, 15 and 17 Nov. 1940, 22 Jan., 30 Mar., 6 and 20 Apr. and 
1 May 1941. Cf. also the 1942 Bulletins of the American Friends (Quakers) 
Service Committee, who helped to restore abandoned villages for the resettlement 
of Lorrainers. 

* Cf. J. LORRAINE: op. cit., p. 72. 
4 New York Times, 6 and 21 Aug. and 6 Sept. 1942. 
6 Phillipe HARRIS, in Pour la Victoire, 11 July 1942. 

6 Pour la Victoire, 30 Jan. 1943, gives a total of 500,000, this figure including 
also workers sent to the Reich and young men mobilised for service in the army. 


The different groups of people who have left Alsace-Lorraine 
those evacuated in 1939, refugees in the summer of 1940, those 
expelled to unoccupied France in 1940-41, those deported into the 
Reich, and those who clandestinely crossed the frontier together 
total many hundreds of thousands, approaching half a million. 
This estimate does not include the numerous workers recruited 
for employment in the Reich, nor the Alsatians mobilised for Ger- 
man military service. 

Other Parts of France. 

In the days just before the outbreak of the war the French 
Government urged the civilian population of Paris to leave the 
capital, in the expectation that the war would start with bombing 
which would be especially dangerous in the densely populated Paris 
area. The evacuation was voluntary, although all who were not 
needed in Paris were asked to take refuge in regions less exposed 
to air raids. The evacuation of school children was organised 
through official agencies. In all, 500,000 people are estimated to 
have left Paris, but as the anticipated air raids did not occur a 
return movement began as early as September and by the winter 
the great majority of Parisians were at home again. 

The great exodus from France, as from Belgium, the Nether- 
lands and Luxemburg, was provoked by the German invasion in 
May 1940. 

According to the French News Service, on 31 May 1940 the 
estimated numbers of refugees in France were as follows: 2,500,000 
French refugees from the north; 1,000,000 Belgian refugees; 70,000 
from Luxemburg; and 50,000 from the Netherlands. The whole of 
this flood of humanity swept past Paris to the departments of 
inner France which were regarded as comparatively safe. 

Next came the great movement from the Paris area. This was 
partly an organised evacuation of Government offices and factories, 
partly an orderly departure of youths of military age, and partly 
an entirely spontaneous exodus. Two-thirds of the population of 
Paris and its suburbs were estimated to have left their homes. 
All these millions of people fled before the advancing German 
armies into central and south-western France. Only a fraction of 
them were able to cross the Spanish border and reach, through 
Lisbon, Great Britain or America. 

The number of refugees has been variously estimated. In his 
broadcast of 25 June 1940 Marshal P6tain stated that 1,000,000 
of the French population and 500,000 Belgians had left towns and 
cities for the country. The American Red Cross is reported to have 


aided 2,750,000 (though many of these were probably counted 
twice), while other estimates vary from ten to twelve and even 
twenty millions. A well-informed source gave the following figures: 
4,000,000 French refugees, 30,000 Poles (partly war refugees, partly 
miners who had lived in France for many years but were not granted 
French citizenship), 1,000,000 Belgians, 50,000 Netherlanders, 
70,000 Luxemburgers, and 50,000 Germans and Austrians (mostly 
Jews), who had found a temporary haven in France. 

Alter the armistice, repatriation began in respect of the refugees 
within the occupied zone as well as of those from the unoccupied 
to the occupied part of France. The first to be re-evacuated, partly 
with German help, were the Belgian refugees. As regards the 
French, it became clear that some of them, those from the Channel 
zone, were not to be allowed to return home. The return movement 
lasted for many months. On 9 October 1941, the following official 
figures of French refugees were given: 328,000 in the occupied 
zone, who were not permitted to return home, and 543,000 in the 
unoccupied zone, the latter number including about 100,000 persons 
from Alsace-Lorraine, or the remainder of those evacuated in 1939 
at the outbreak of war, and probably not including about 200,000 
expelled from Alsace-Lorraine in 1940-41. It was observed 1 that 
these figures did not include many thousands of refugees who, 
having means of their own, established themselves independently. 
Some of the Jewish refugees were able to secure visas for the United 
States or other American countries. Some of those who remained 
in unoccupied France were handed over to the Germans by the 
Vichy Government and sent to the ghettos and labour camps in 
eastern Europe, or fell into German hands after the occupation 
of the whole of French territory. 2 

In summer 1942 the German authorities started a new evacua- 
tion movement on a large scale in connection with their prepara- 
tions for defence against an Allied invasion. Mass removal of the 
coastal population took place, in particular, to a depth of 18 miles 
from the coast from Boulogne to Dieppe. The number affected was 
stated to be "more than a million". 3 It has been suggested that 
the evacuation was also a means of applying pressure on French 
workers to migrate to Germany for employment in the armament 

1 New York Times, 29 Apr. 1941 (Vichy despatch of 28 Apr.). 

* Cf. below, p. 103. 

8 New York Times, 27 June 1942, Associated Press despatch from London, 
quoting a "well-informed foreign source". Other reports refer to the evacuation 
of millions of French civilians, but even the figure of one million seems rather 
high, unless it includes all those who fled from the Channel zone in May and 
June 1940 and were not allowed to return later, as well as Belgians and Nether- 
landers removed from the coast and those evacuated since autumn 1942. In the 
latter case it would, on the contrary, be on the conservative side. 


factories. 1 The evacuees were transferred to the regions of Rheims, 
the Loire and the Sarthe. 2 This evacuation was resumed in autumn 
1942 3 and took on even greater dimensions in 1943 with the growing 
fear of an Allied invasion. All "unnecessary" civilians were ordered 
to evacuate seaside towns along the coast, in particular Le Havre, 
Cherbourg and Saint-Malo. 4 There were also mass removals of 
population from the Atlantic coast. 6 

In the most recent months more evacuations have also been 
reported from various parts of the Mediterranean coast of France, 
particularly from Marseilles 6 and Toulon. 

South-Eastern Europe 

Germany's expansion towards the south-east and the Axis 
conquest of the Balkans caused a series of mass displacements of 
population. Some of these migrations were set in motion by the 
victorious Powers, Germany and Italy, in their own interests, and 
Germany also arranged for an exchange of population between 
various Balkan States. Apart from this, however, a forced transfer 
was carried out by nations friendly to the Axis, namely Bulgaria 
and Hungary, which availed themselves of the opportunity to im- 
prove their own economic and demographic situation at the expense 
of the defeated countries. 

Indeed the whole of south-eastern Europe, with its predominant- 
ly agricultural structure, suffered from over-population. It was 
stated that on the eve of the war 43 persons were living on every 
100 hectares of arable land in Germany, and even fewer 37 persons 
per 100 hectares in France, whereas for the Balkan States the 
figures were: in Hungary 72 persons, in Rumania 97 persons, in 
Yugoslavia 114 persons, and in Bulgaria 116 persons per 100 hec- 
tares. Since 1925, moreover, the countries of south-eastern Europe, 

1 New York Times, 28 June 1942, reporting a speech by B. S. TOWNROE, 
Secretary of the United Associations of Great Britain and France. 

2 Pour la Victoire, 11 July 1942. 

* United Press despatch from Vichy, 2 Oct. 1942 (New York Times, 3 Oct. 

4 New York Times, 17 Apr. 1943; Pariser Zeitung, 24 Apr. 1943. A total of 
20,000 women and children had been removed from the Channel ports of Havre 
and Dieppe and the surrounding area, according to a Berlin broadcast recorded 
by the Associated Press (New York Times, 26 Apr. 1943). 

B Twenty thousand refugees from the coast of Brittany have arrived in the 
department of Loiret, according to Radio Vichy, 23 Apr. 1943. The civilian 
population has been evacuated from the naval base of Lorient (Pariser Zeitung, 
26 Mar. 1943) and from the coastal zone between Bayonne and the Spanish 
frontier (Deptche de Toulouse, 5 May 1943). .,_.,, , r * 

A census taken lately showed that the population had decreased from about 
1,000,000 before the war to less than 700,000 (Transocean broadcast, 19 Mar. 
1943). This decrease is the result of evacuation as well as of a migration to rural 
districts, owing to the food situation. According to the Swedish paper Arbeiaren 
(8 Apr. 1943), 40,000 persons have been expelled from their homes in Marseilles. 


like Poland, have lost the United States outlet for their surplus agrar- 
ian population, which played an important role in their economy 
before the war of 1914-1918. The Nazi press pointed out that the 
support of the Axis now gave the countries co-operating with it 
an opportunity to relieve their population pressure at the expense 
of their neighbours, while all suitable workers could be recruited 
for employment in Germany. 1 

Yugoslavia. 2 

After the invasion of Yugoslavia the country was carved up 
into seven parts; one part each was taken by Germany, Italy, Bul- 
garia and Hungary, while the remaining three parts formed the 
vassal states of Serbia, Croatia and Montenegro. 

Traffic between these different parts of Yugoslavia is forbidden 
to the local population, and even travelling within the territories 
of the separate areas is not allowed without a special permit. Free 
migration being practically impossible, the movement of peoples 
takes the form of forced transfer, more or less forced departure for 
employment in Germany, and clandestine flight. Certain features 
of population movements are common to all sections of Yugoslavia. 
Apart from the removal of workers from all parts of Yugoslavia, 
and of Serbian war prisoners to Germany, dealt with in another 
context 3 , the movements can be classified as follows: 

(1) Waves of terror, provoking the flight of the population. 
The number of Yugoslav refugees abroad is small and limited to 
groups of politicians and intellectuals, but there was a great 
movement of refugees in the interior of Yugoslavia itself. 4 

During the "purge" of the part of Slovenia annexed by Germany, 
many Slovenes escaped to the section annexed by Italy (Province 
of Ljubljana). According to a reliable source, at the turn of the 
year 1941-42, there were more than 10,000 refugees registered with 
the Red Cross in Ljubljana. 5 

From Croatia, about 250,000 Serbs and non-separatist Croats 
are said to have fled to Serbia and Italy to escape the Ustachi terror. 

1 These arguments are given in respect of Rumania by Wirtschaftsdienst, 1942, 
No. 1, and for Croatia by SudostEcho, 23 May 1941. 

2 The facts cited in this section are based on information supplied by the 
Royal Yugoslav Information Centre, unless otherwise stated. 

Cf. Chapter III, pp. 151-153. 

4 The extent of these movements has recently been shown by a census of refu- 
gees registered in Serbia. There were 72,524 families residing in the country 
amounting to 10 per cent, of the population. 

6 This is corroborated by the following statement in the Sildost Economist, 
20 June 1941 (published in Budapest): "The immigration to Ljubljana of num- 
bers of people from the former Drava Banat annexed by the Reich was the cause 
of a jump of about 5,000 in the unemployment figure in that city". 


In the early days of the Hungarian occupation of north-eastern 
Yugoslavia, several thousands of Serbs fled to Old Serbia. 

All the above migration movements concern persons fleeing 
from one part of Yugoslavia to another under a different military 
occupation and administrative regime. There was, however, also 
a similar movement within the limits of these same territories, 
particularly in what remained of Serbia and in Croatia. Thousands 
were forced to leave the smaller towns and villages, where life 
was insecure because of the irresponsible acts of the occupying 
forces and their supporters and of general conditions, and moved 
into larger cities such as Belgrade, Zagreb 1 and Nish. 

There was also a continual stream of refugees from all parts of 
Yugoslavia to the mountains to join the guerrilla forces. 

(2) Efforts of the occupation authorities to purge the country 
of elements which they regarded as dangerous. The Germans deport- 
ed 30,000 persons, mostly belonging to the intelligentsia, to Croatia, 
and 26,000 to Old Serbia, from the part of Slovenia incorporated 
in the Reich, most of them during the early part of the occupation. 

The Italians also deported to southern Italy 35,000 Slovenes 2 
and another 57,000 people from Dalmatia and from the Croatian 
coast. The Italians seem to be following the policy of thoroughly 
clearing the Dalmatian coast and of settling Italians there. 

(3) Changes in land ownership. The Yugoslav land reform 
laws were abolished in Croatia, in Bulgarian-held southern Serbia, 
in the north-eastern part of Yugoslavia annexed by Hungary, and 
in part of Old Serbia. In all these territories settlers who since 1918 
had occupied the land of large and foreign landowners were dispos- 
sessed and removed from their farms. This led to various transfers 
of population described below. 

In Slovenia, the repatriation of some 13,500 Germans from 
Kocevije, which was in effect a transfer from Italian-annexed 
Ljubljana to the German-annexed part of Slovenia, has already 
been described. 8 In order to make the necessary room for them, 
still more Slovenes had to leave their homes. There are detailed 
reports of the forced emigration of 45,000 Slovenes from the dis- 
tricts of Brezice and Krsko (17,000) and of Litija (28,000). This 
took place from 24 October to 16 December 1941. The persons 
concerned were sent to different parts of Germany, information 
being available on the destination of the following groups: 5,000 
to Lower Silesia, 16,000 to south-western Germany, and 12,000 to 

1 The population of Zagreb increased from 230,000 before the invasion of 
Yugoslavia to 350,000 in the autumn of 1942 (Novo Hrvatska, 15 Oct. 1942). 

2 This figure is confirmed by the St. Galten Tageblatt, which reported that 
35 000 Slovenes were in Italian concentration camps. According to Aufbau 
(Zurich), 3 Oct. 1942, 60,000 Slovenes had been deported to Italy. 

' Cf. Chapter I, pp. 19-20. 


northern and central Germany. The Slovenes were quartered in 
concentration camps, and employment office officials gradually 
selected groups of labourers from among them; many of the men 
were employed on agricultural work and the women on housework. 

In regard to southern Serbia (Northern Macedonia), occupied 
by Bulgaria, a pro-Axis paper stated that "only those Serbs who 
have immigrated since 1913 should be removed from here; their 
number is not large". 1 According to Yugoslav sources, about 
120,000 were transferred to what remained of Serbia under a Bul- 
garian Decree laying down that all citizens who settled after 
1 December 1918 must return to the place they came from. In south- 
ern Serbia about 100,000 hectares of land left by Serbs who had 
either been killed or deported to Serbia were divided among the 
Bulgarian peasants by the Bulgarian Government. 

In north-eastern Yugoslavia, annexed by Hungary (Banat, 
Backa, and Baranja), the Hungarian Government issued a law 
after the occupation providing that the property of all citizens of 
Yugoslav nationality who had settled in this area after 1 December 
1918 should be confiscated without any compensation for the 
capital and work they had invested in it over the past 20 years. 
In order to create a "pure Hungarian province", the Hungarian 
Government repealed the agrarian reform Act and reinstated the 
old landowners and their supporters, mainly the Hungarian aristo- 
cracy, in their property rights, while land was also granted to other 
Magyars for merit in the war. Information about the demographic 
effects of this measure is contradictory. According to the Royal 
Yugoslav Government Information Centre, the Yugoslav peasants 
were expelled, and the new owners settled Hungarian farmers on 
their properties. Information from another source, however, indi- 
cates that only the ownership of the land changed hands and that 
the Yugoslav peasants remained as tenants and labourers. The 
reports of the expulsion of peasants were said to be unreliable, as 
Germany, which according to an agreement with Hungary was to 
share the whole of the crop with Italy, would not have allowed the 
expulsion of the local peasants. Those who fled during the early 
part of the Hungarian occupation belonged to the Serbian intelli- 
gentsia. Information published by the Central and Eastern Euro- 
pean Planning Board on the basis of a report from a Swiss paper 
suggests, however, that large-scale settlement of repatriated Hun- 
garians has taken place in the newly acquired districts, whether 
or not the land allotted to the new settlers had been obtained 
by expelling its previous owners. 2 

1 Siidost Economist (Budapest), 6 June 1941. 

2 See below, Hungary, p. 86. 


(4) Repatriation of population. Apart from the repatriation 
of the Kocevije and Bosnian Germans and of the Hungarians, 
already mentioned, a large-scale repatriation of Croats has been 
carried out by the Croatian Government. In 1941 about 70,000 
Croats were transferred to Croatia from Serbia and Macedonia 1 , 
and negotiations concerning the repatriation of Croats from Bulgaria 
have also been reported. 2 

Greece and Bulgaria. 

After the second Balkan War of 1912-13 and the world war of 
1914-18, part of Macedonia and Western Thrace was ceded to 
Greece by Bulgaria. A number of Bulgarians had already migrated 
from the Greek provinces of Macedonia and Thrace into Bulgaria 
before the treaty, and a further migration of Bulgarians resulted 
from the Treaty of Neuilly (27 November 1919) which provided 
for a voluntary exchange of population between Greece and Bul- 
garia. According to Bulgarian sources the migrants totalled 
300,000. 3 German sources claim that as many as 500,000 Bulgarians 
migrated "as a result of Greek terrorism". 4 These figures are highly 
exaggerated. According to an investigation made by the Inter- 
national Labour Office at the request of the Bulgarian Government 
in 1926, and based on reports of Bulgarian authorities, the total 
of refugees entering the country between 1913 and 1925 was 
221, OOO. 5 A final estimate 10 years later, including immigration 
since 1926, gave a total of 251,000 Bulgarian refugees, of whom 
122,000 came from Greece (that is, from Greek Macedonia and 
Western Thrace) and the rest from Yugoslavia (31,000), from 
Turkey (70,000), and from Rumania (28,000). 6 

Greeks from Asia Minor were settled in Greek Macedonia and 
Western Thrace with the help of a commission appointed by the 
Council of the League of Nations and the Greek Government. 
Much of this settlement was in formerly swampy, malaria-ridden 
districts, which were drained and improved by the work of the 
commission and with the help of a loan issued for the purpose. At 
the request of the Bulgarian Government, the League of Nations 
also helped to settle 32,000 Bulgarian refugee families, particularly 
in eastern Bulgaria. Loans of 2,400,000 and $4,500,000 made to 
the Bulgarian Government helped in the execution of the scheme. 

After the German-Italian conquest of Greece in 1941, Western 

1 Neue Zurcher Zeitung, 23 July and 3 Nov. 1941. 

2 Der Angriff (Berlin), 28 Apr. 1942; Neues Wiener Tagblatt, 29 Apr. 1942. 
8 Sudost Economist, 6 June 1941. 

Wirtschaftsdienst, 22 May 1942. . 

6 INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE: Refugees and Labour Conditions in 
Bulgaria, Studies and Reports, Series B, No. 15 (Geneva, 1926), pp. 6-7. 
6 CL Sir John HOPE SIMPSON: The Refugee Problem (London, 1939), p. 25. 


Thrace was annexed and Eastern (Greek) Macedonia occupied by 
Bulgaria. The policy of "bulgarisation", carried out most thorough- 
ly in Western Thrace, is represented by the Axis press as intended 
to secure the repatriation of the Bulgarians who left the territory 
20 to 25 years ago. However, it is acknowledged that a further 
aim of this scheme is the resettlement of a number of Bulgarians 
from the mountains and from other unfertile regions of old Bul- 
garia. 1 

In the spring of 1942, the German press announced a great 
Bulgarian colonisation project, 100,000 peasants from Old Bulgaria 
having already applied for resettlement. 2 Later it was reported 
that according to a declaration by the Bulgarian Commissioner 
for Resettlement 50,000 Bulgarians were to be transferred 
from the "Old Kingdom 1 ' to the Aegean provinces. 3 It may 
be added that, according to some reports, 50,000 Bulgarians 
from the Zaporozhe district in the Ukraine are also to be repa- 
triated. 4 

According to the Greek Office of Information, based on reports 
relating to autumn 1942, at least 80,000 Greeks fled from the terri- 
tory annexed and occupied by Bulgaria to that which remained 
Greek. In addition, 25,OOOGreeks were deported to the interior of Bul- 
garia. On the other hand, the Bulgarian Government has sent about 
80,000 Bulgarians to live in Western Thrace. Their occupational 
classification is unspecified, but according to another source, most 
of them are new Bulgarian officials with their families. The occupied 
territories afforded a means of alleviating the situation of the 
Bulgarian officials, who were underpaid and very numerous (130,000, 
or with their families, 650,000) ; as the Government could not afford 
to raise their salaries, it decided to send some of the officials from 
Old Bulgaria to the annexed territory and to give all officials a 
compensation of about 10 per cent, for the resultant increase in 
their work. 6 

Mention must further be made of the emigration from Greece. 
Apart from workers recruited for employment in Germany, there 
are also Greek refugees abroad. Many civilians emigrated with 
the retreating Greek army, and later many fled to Egypt and the 
Near East. Of the 4,830 refugees admitted to Cyprus nearly all 
were from Greece. One thousand Greeks were evacuated to Mau- 

1 Sudost Economist, 6 June and 21 Nov. 1941. Leipziger Neueste Nachrichten, 
24 Dec. 1942. 

2 Wirtschaftsdienst, 1 May 1942. 

3 Survey of Central and Eastern Europe, Jan. 1942, quoting the Donau Zeitung. 

4 Nya Dagligt Allehanda, 27 May 1942, printed a report of the Swedish 
Svenska Telegrambyran that representatives of Bulgarians living in the Ukraine 
had arrived in Sofia to negotiate this repatriation scheme. 

6 Sudost Economist, 18 July 1941 and 31 July 1942. 


ritius 1 , several hundreds to Kenya 2 , and 2,000 Greek refugees 
have already reached the Belgian Congo while another 3,000 are 
expected there. 


After the war of 1914-1918 Rumania acquired vast territories 
with a large non-Rumanian population: Transylvania and the 
Banat from Hungary, Bukovina from Austria, and Bessarabia from 
Russia. In addition, not long before the war of 1914-1918, Dobruja 
had been acquired from Bulgaria. It was estimated that of the 
18,000,000 people in the new Greater Rumania, 5,000,000 were not 
ethnically Rumanian. 3 In some of the newly acquired territories, 
these non-Rumanians constituted the majority of the population. 

In the summer of 1940, Rumania lost the major part of these 
territories. In June 1940 the Soviet Union regained the former 
Russian province of Bessarabia and annexed Northern Bukovina, 
which had been under Austrian rule before 1919 and had an over- 
whelmingly Ukrainian population. On 30 August 1940, Rumania 
lost Northern Transylvania to Hungary, and on 7 September 1940, 
by the Treaty of Craiowa, Southern Dobruja was ceded to Bul- 

By these cessions, Rumania lost a large part of its territory 
and population. According to the census of 29 December 1930, 
Greater Rumania had a population of 18,057,000, and of this total 
6,161,000 then lived in the territories which are now no longer 
under Rumanian rule. All of these territories had large Rumanian 
minorities, great numbers of whom migrated into what remained 
of Rumania. The Rumanian census of 6 April 1941 indicated the 
total number of refugees from the ceded territories as 251,000. 4 

(1) Hungaro-Rumanian population exchange. After the world 
war of 1914-1918 Rumania annexed from Hungary the whole of 
Transylvania with its mixed population of Rumanians and Hun- 
garians. The Vienna Award of August 1940 partitioned Transyl- 
vania into two parts, divided between Rumania and Hungary, with 
an approximately equal population. In connection with this trans- 
fer of sovereignty, a voluntary population exchange was also prov- 
ided for. In Northern Transylvania, ceded to Hungary, Rumanians 
were allowed to opt within six months for either Rumanian or Hun- 
garian citizenship. Those choosing Rumanian citizenship were to 

1 According to a British statement issued in Washington on 4 Mar. 1943. 
1 News from Greece (ed. by the National Committee for the Restoration of 
Greece, New York), 17 Aug. 1942. 

8 Cf. Sir John HOPE SIMPSON: op. tit., p. 411. 
4 Wirtschaft und Statistik, 1941, No. 20. 


migrate to Rumania within the next year, and the same applied 
to those choosing Hungarian citizenship in Southern Transylvania, 
which remained under Rumanian sovereignty. The migrants were 
allowed to take with them their movable property and to liquidate 
that which could not be moved. 

The number of Rumanians who moved from Transylvania was 
estimated in 1941 at 100,000. Two years later it was reported 
that the census showed 202,233 refugees from northern Transylvania 
in Rumania. 1 

(2) Bulgaro-Rumanian population exchange. In 1914 
Bulgaria lost Southern Dobruja to Rumania. The whole 
territory of the Dobruja, situated between the lower Danube 
and the Black Sea, had a. mixed population of Rumanians and 
Bulgarians, the northern part being mostly Rumanian and the 
southern part mostly Bulgarian. The latter remained ethnically 
Bulgarian, in spite of the large number of Bulgarians who emigrated 
after 1913 to escape Rumanian rule. Under the Treaty of Craiowa 
of 7 September 1940, Rumania returned Southern Dobruja to 
Bulgaria. Arrangements were made for an exchange of population 
between the Bulgarians of Nor-thern Dobruja and the Rumanians 
of Southern Dobruja, to secure ethnical uniformity in each of the 
two parts of the region. The migrants were allowed to take with 
them all their movable property, including in particular livestock, 
but landed property was r seized by the State without any indemnity, 
the migrant being entitled to compensation from the country to 
which he was making his way. 

The Bulgarian census taken in Southern Dobruja on 31 January 
1941 showed a population of 319,600, including 62,000 Bulgarian 
migrants from Northern Dobruja. Nevertheless, the total popula- 
tion of this region showed a substantial loss in consequence of the 
emigration from Southern Dobruja of the Rumanians, who were 
more numerous than the Bulgarian immigrants. 2 The number of 
Rumanians who left Southern Dobruja was estimated at 110,000. 

On 1 April 1943 an agreement was signed between Rumania and 
Bulgaria arranging a new repatriation scheme wider than that 
stipulated in the Treaty of Craiowa and providing for a voluntary 
resettlement of all Bulgarians living in any part of Rumania and 
all Rumanians living in any part of Bulgaria. 3 In May, however, 
the Mixed Bulgarian-Rumanian Commission for the Exchange of 
Nationals announced that the Governments of the two countries 

1 Bukarester Tageblatt, 30 Apr. 1943. These refugees included 116,948 men, 
mostly aged between 21 and 40. Peasants formed the largest category. 

2 Wirtschaft und Statistik, 1941, No. 8. 
8 Transocean broadcast, 29 Apr. 1943. 


had abandoned the idea of resettlement 1 , the explanation given 
being that "neighbourly relations between Rumania and Bulgaria 
have become very cordial during the past few months". 2 

(3) Migration from and to Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina. 
In June 1940 the occupation of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina 
by the Soviet Union led to the flight of some of the Rumanian 
population. It should be noted that those who left were not the 
original Rumanian inhabitants of Bessarabia or the Moldavian 
peasants, who constituted about half of the population of the 
province, nor the peasants of Northern Bukovina. 3 The refugees, 
estimated at between 35,000 and 40,000 persons 4 , consisted entirely 
of Rumanians who had come into Bessarabia and Bukovina after 
1919, and were for the most part officials or persons engaged in 
the liberal professions. Most of the refugees from Bukovina went 
to Transylvania and those from Bessarabia to the neighbouring 
province of Moldavia. 5 

In June 1941, when Rumania joined Germany in invading the 
Soviet Union, there was a mass flight of Jews from Bessarabia and 
Bukovina to the interior of the U.S.S.R., their number being esti- 
mated at between 100,000 and 130,000.' Bessarabia and Northern 
Bukovina were retaken by the Rumanians, and the neighbouring 
part of the Ukraine, including the city of Odessa, came under 
Rumanian domination and was renamed Transnistria. These 
events led to the return to Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina of 
the Rumanians who in the summer of 1940 had fled to escape the 
Soviet occupation. Furthermore, a proposal was made a few months 
after the occupation of Bessarabia for the resettlement in Bessarabia 
of 100,000 Transylvanian Rumanians. 7 There was also a Rumanian 
influx into Transnistria 8 , which appears to have consisted in large 
measure of Rumanian police and other officials; thus, according to 
Tass, the number of special requisition officers was 4,600. 9 

1 D.N.B., 23 May 1943, despatch from Bucarest. 

2 Transocean broadcast, 25 May 1943. 

* The New York Times (14 Dec. 1940) published a United Press report from 
Bucarest six months later that Rumanian peasants from two villages in North- 
ern Bukovina had left for Rumania, being dissatisfied with life under Soviet rule. 

4 New York Times, 1 July 1940. 

6 The measures taken by the Rumanian authorities to deal with the refugees 
consisted mainly in preventing them from reaching Bucarest. After the riots in 
Sept. 1940, the new pro- Axis Rumanian Government took care of the refugees 
in a manner consistent with its general policy. All the rural land and dwellings 
to which Jews held title were confiscated and turned over to Rumanian refugees 
from Transylvania, Bessarabia, and Southern Dobruja. It was also hoped that 
places would be found for numerous refugees by ousting Jews from the liberal 

6 Cf. below, p. 106. 

New York Times, 20 Aug. 1941. 

8 For the deportation of Rumanian Jews to this territory, see below, p. 106. 

9 Izvestia, 14 Oct. 1942. 


In the autumn of 1942, the Rumanian Government appointed 
a committee for the repatriation of Rumanians living to the east 
of the River Bug, in the Ukraine on the Dnieper, in the Crimea, 
and in the Caucasus. The exact number of persons involved is 
unknown, estimates varying between 30,000 and 200,000. The 
repatriated Rumanians are to be settled in Transnistria, Bessara- 
bia, and . Bukovina. Some of them will be granted farms which 
belonged to the Germans repatriated in 1940 to Greater Germany. 


Through the frontier changes described above, Hungary re- 
covered nearly all the territories inhabited by Magyar populations. 
With regard to the small scattered minorities which still remained 
outside the new frontiers, the Government proposed to repatriate 
them gradually and appointed a special Commissioner for the pur- 
pose. The last annual report of this Commissioner shows that 
4,294 families comprising 17,614 persons were repatriated from 
May 1941 to the end of 1942, of whom 3,806 families comprising 
15,593 persons were transferred in 1941 and 488 families com- 
prising 2,021 persons in 1942. These persons were established in 
the southern part of the country in 32 adjacent settlements on land 
evacuated by Rumanians. Most of them came from Bukovina; 
others from Bosnia and Moldavia. At the end of 1942 the Com- 
missioner still had enough land available to settle from 1,300 to 
1,400 more families. 1 


The German invasion of Russia in June 1941 caused the dis- 
placement of many millions of the population, who fled before the 
invader. The Russian retreat was accompanied by the evacuation 
of the population and the removal of factories. The first purpose 
of this policy was to prevent men and vital materials from falling 
into German hands; hence the so-called "scorched earth" policy 
meant not only the removal of goods, but also their destruction if 
immediate removal was not possible. Secondly, the evacuated men 

1 Communication to the I.L.O. According to information published by the 
Central and Eastern European Planning Board on the basis of a report from a 
Swiss paper, the occupied Yugoslav province of Backa has been the main place 
of settlement for these repatriated Hungarians. Fifty-three thousand acres are 
said to have been allotted in this province to 3,806 Hungarian families, number- 
ing 15,600 persons, repatriated from Bukovina, while those repatriated from 
Bosnia were given an additional 2,900 acres. Four hundred and eight families 
numbering 1,600 members came from Moldavia and were also settled on Yugoslav 
territory. In addition, 600 persons received land for services rendered curing 
the recapture of the province of Backa (Survey of Central and Eastern Europe, 
Apr. 1943, p. 3). 


and materials were to be used in safer places eastward of European 
Russia and behind the Urals. 

The trek to the east had long been a fundamental feature of 
Russian expansion and development. In old Russia it took the 
form of the colonisation of that part of Asiatic Russia which is 
suitable for agriculture, namely the belt between the Taiga, the 
virgin forests of the north, and the parched land. In the new Russia, 
it was connected with the process of industrialisation which com- 
menced with the five-year plans. The industrial development of 
Soviet Russia, which was resumed after 1928, was not only designed 
to restore and enlarge the old industrial centres which had collapsed 
during the revolution and the civil war, but had the further object- 
ive of industrialising new areas in the more remote parts of the 
Soviet Union. The Soviet Government's policy in regard to the 
geographical distribution of industry was guided by two considera- 
tions first, that of the economic expediency of establishing factories 
near the sources of raw materials and power, and secondly, the 
strategic consideration of placing war industries in a position which 
would be as invulnerable as possible in the event of an invasion 
and creating a new self-sufficient industrial centre far behind the 
anticipated fighting lines. 1 Both considerations contributed towards 
the same result a trend towards industrial development in and 
behind the Urals. 

This orientation of Russian industry was intensified as a result 
of the war. Before the outbreak of war, the new industries in the 
east were created merely to supplement and not to supplant the 
old industrial areas ; only in exceptional cases were existing factories 
removed from the western part of the Union to the Urals and 
Siberia. Since the German invasion, however, the industries in the 
east have had to make good the losses suffered in the course of the 
war, and this has been done largely by speeding up industrial 
development in the Urals and in Soviet Asia and by removing 
factories which might have fallen into enemy hands. Some evacuat- 
ed plants were moved into ready-made buildings, available because 
of the fact that when the war began entirely new plants were in 
process of construction, some of them being merely empty buildings 
awaiting the installation of machinery. This accounts in part for 
the speed with which the plants were put into operation in the new 

1 The opinion that industry was intentionally removed from the danger zone 
is commonly accepted. Cf. A. YUGOW: Russia's Economic Front for War and 
Peace (New York, 1942), pp. 150-151; John SCOTT: Behind the Urals (New York, 
1942), p. 262; Report on the Development of Soviet Asia, presented by Andrew 
J. STEIGER to the Conference of the Russian Economic Institute, New York, 
Oct. 1942 (U.S.S.R. Economy and the War, New York, 1943, pp. 82-83); and 
Robert J. KERNER: The Present World Position of the U.S.S.R., in California 
Monthly, Nov. 1942. A contrary view is expressed in Socialistichesky Vestnyk 
(New York), 31 July 1942. 


locations. In many other cases new buildings were erected with 
astonishing speed. 1 

Long before the war, the industrialisation of the immense eastern 
territories of the Soviet Union gave rise to a great migratory move- 
ment towards the east. In the period between the two censuses 
of 1926 and 1939, over three million persons migrated into the 
Urals, Siberia and the eastern areas of the Union, while 1,700,000 
went to Russian Central Asia, making a total of nearly five million 
immigrants to the Urals and the Asiatic part of the Soviet Union 
from European Russia. 

In the years immediately before the war, there was some diver- 
gence between the trend of industrial development and that of 
population movement. The migration of workers to the east did 
not keep pace with the rapidly growing needs of expanding industry. 
The result was a growing shortage of workers, particularly of skilled 
workers and technicians, who with their improved standard of 
living had no inducement to move into the new industrial areas. 
To ensure an adequate supply of workers for the Siberian and Far 
Eastern factories, a Decree was issued on 19 October 1940 2 providing 
for compulsory transfer of construction engineers, master mechanics, 
draughtsmen, bookkeepers, economists, planning experts and skilled 
workmen from one undertaking or office to another, ' 'irrespective 
of the geographical location of such undertaking or office". 

Wartime conditions brought with them a simultaneous growth 
of the labour force and industrial capacity of the east. Two of the 
overwhelming problems produced by the emergencies of war actu- 
ally balanced each other the evacuation of large-scale under- 
takings and the eastward migration of millions of refugees. The 
transplantation of industry facilitated the resettlement of the 
refugees, who, for their part, supplied the labour to re-install, and 
later to operate, both evacuated factories and new plants. 3 

While there was no longer any need of coercive measures to 
stimulate the immigration of people who were only too glad to 
have the opportunity of escaping the advancing enemy, the Soviet 
Government took steps to make this temporary immigration per- 
manent. In February 1942 the Council of the People's Commissars 
issued an Order requiring local authorities in the eastern regions 
to make arrangements for the permanent absorption of workers 
and employees transferred to those areas with their factories and 
undertakings. Provision was made regarding the homes and per- 
sonal property of the evacuees. Further, the local authorities were 

1 Cf. Andrew J. STEIGER: op. cit., pp. 84-85. 

2 Cf. International Labour Review, Vol. XLIII, No. 2, Feb. 1941, p. 207. 

8 Cf. Christian Science Monitor, letter from John EVANS from Kuibyshev, 
6 July 1942. 


ordered to supply them with land and building materials so that 
they could build homes for themselves. 

Opinions differ as to the precise extent of this evacuation, but 
it is generally agreed that it was on a large scale. There is no doubt 
that in the cities and other industrial areas the Soviet authorities 
carried out a far-reaching removal of factories and stocks of ma- 
terials and products, destroying all that could not be removed. 1 
Factories were removed together with their workers. Of course, 
not all the workers were evacuated, but at least all skilled workers. 
A large factory transferred from the zone of hostilities to Petro- 
pavlovsk in Kazakhstan, from which "40 per cent, of the plant's 
workers were evacuated with its equipment", is quoted by an official 
Soviet publication as a typical example. 2 

Industry was not alone affected by evacuation. German sources 
admit that agricultural machines and tools were for the most part 
removed or destroyed by the Russians and that cattle stocks were 
reduced. 3 A shortage of agricultural workers was also reported 4 , 
although, according to German sources, the gathering of the harvest 
in 1941 "showed that the problem of shortage of workers arose in a 
few regions only. Thus, remedial action was required in Latvia 
and the prairie regions of southern Ukraine, while elsewhere only 
precautionary measures were taken by approaching prisoners of 
war camps and labour recruiting offices for labour, the need for 
which never actually arose." 5 Meanwhile it was reported that wide 
tracts of land lay forsaken. 6 A high German official stated in March 
1942 that "the front had shifted considerably into a region whence 
labour had been systematically removed by the Bolsheviks". 7 

Indeed, with the progress of the campaign into inner Russia, 
the transfer was being conducted on a larger scale. 8 A general 
displacement of population, however, was not possible under the 
circumstances, nor would it have fitted in with the plans of the 
Soviet Government; first, because it would have obstructed the 
highways, and secondly, because it would have resulted in a mass 

1 This is admitted by the German authorities; cf. below, Chapter III, p. 155. 

2 EMBASSY OF THE U.S.S.R., Washington: Information Bulletin, 14 May 1942. 
8 Wirtschaftsdienst, No. 5, 30 Jan. 1942; Die Deutsche Volkswirtschaft, No. 17, 

June 1942. 

4 Die Deutsche Volkswirtschaft, No. 18, June 1942. The shortage of agricul- 
tural workers, however, might not necessarily be due to evacuation, since the 
removal or destruction of machinery inevitably increased the number of workers 
needed on the farms. 

6 Reichsarbeitsblatt, 5 Mar. 1942, No. 7, Part V, p. 130, article by Dr. RACHNER, 
Chief of the War Economy Department of the German Economic Staff Adminis- 
tration of the East. 

8 Wirtschaftsdienst, No. 5, Jan. 1942. 

7 Dr. RACHNBR, in Reichsarbeitsblatt, he. cit. 

8 Cf. the account of the evacuation of the Kuban Cossacks quoted from 
Krasnaya Zvezda, in Novoye Russkoye Slovo, 11 and 24 Aug. 1942. 



influx of people into an area which was not able to feed or house 

The data available concerning the number of evacuees are 
fragmentary. The following is a list of the population losses of 
several cities and towns in German-occupied Russia, as reported 
by various newspapers: 




Source of information 




Izvestia, 14 Oct. 1942 




Novoye Slovo (Berlin), 22 July 





Idem, 7 Jan. 1942 








Soviet War News, 7 Sept. 1942 




New York Herald Tribune, 26 

Oct. 1941 




New York Times, 27 Jan. 1942 

1 The sex and age distribution is significant. The population comprised 76,730 males and 
101,628 females, 57,963 persons being under 16 years of age. 

The people who were evacuated or fled from cities and towns 
were principally officials, employees, workers, and Jews. 

The figures quoted above show a decrease of over 50 per cent, 
in the urban population. The whole of this loss cannot, however, 
be attributed to evacuation and flight from the occupied areas. 
There was also a migration to the countryside from the urban 
centres which had been destroyed or offered no further possibility of 
employment. With regard to the figures given above, only in the 
case of Mozhaisk is it explicitly stated that 13,000 persons had been 
evacuated. As to Kiev, another source shows that part of the loss 
occurred after the Russian retreat; the first German census in 
October 1941 showed a population of 500,000, and the second in 
August 1942 only 350,000. 

With regard to the total number of evacuees and refugees, 
several estimates, differing widely from each other, have been 
given. Those quoted below refer to the whole evacuation of 1941. 
They include people evacuated not only from the former territory 
of the Soviet Union, but also from the territories occupied by the 
Soviet Union in 1939 and 1940, i.e. the Eastern Polish Provinces 
(Western Bielorussia and the Western Ukraine), the Baltic States, 
Northern Bukovina and Bessarabia. They do not include evacua- 
tion during the German offensive in 1942. 

Mr. A. Grajdanzev wrote in November 1941 that the number of 
refugees and evacuees "may be between ten and twenty millions". 1 

1 Far Eastern Survey, 17 Nov. 1941. 


Even less specific is the statement made in a Pravda editorial 
that "tens of millions of Soviet people moved to new places". 1 

An authoritative non-Russian source in Kuibyshev estimated 
the number of evacuees up to June 1942 at 20 million. 

The estimate given by Dr. Rachner, Chief of the War Economy 
Department in the German Economic Administration in the East, 
starts from the assumption that the rural areas "retained their 
human stock", and that "assuming that the entire population of 
the occupied area was 75 million before the war, 50 million may 
belong to the countryside. . . Thus 25 million remain for the urban 
population of the occupied area". Dr. Rachner goes on to say that 
all enquiries tend to the conclusion that on the average half of the 
population at the most remained in the cities and towns. The num- 
ber of those who left the occupied territory would accordingly 
amount to 12,500,000. 2 

A calculation made by one expert, Mr. H. R. Habicht, with 
the help of data which he collected in Russia in 1941, is based on an 
estimate of the transport facilities available. The total transport 
capacity of the railways is estimated as permitting the evacuation 
of 15 million, and the great majority, although not all, of the 
refugees left by rail. On the other hand the railways had to carry 
other transport also. Mr. Habicht assumes that the number of 
persons who left by other means of transport equalled those who 
might have been carried by trains which were actually used for 
other purposes, and therefore reckons the total number at a maxi- 
mum of 15 million. 

Another estimate, also based on railway transport capacity, 
has been made by Mr. Sergius A. Vassiliev, an authority on Russian 
transportation. Out of about 250,000 railway cars in the occupied 
territories, some 50,000 (20 per cent.) may be presumed to have been 
abandoned to the Germans. Assuming that half the remaining 
200,000 were used for removing the population, and taking forty 
persons to be the normal capacity of a car, four million persons 
must have been evacuated. These trains, no doubt, were over- 
crowded to the extent of 50 to 100 per cent. ; the total number of 
those who left by railway alone, therefore, must be between six and 
eight millions. 8 Twenty-five per cent, more, or between one and a half 
and two millions, may have escaped by other means of transportation, 

1 Pravda, 17 Dec. 1941. 

2 Reichsarbeitsblatt, loc. cit. 

8 Some indication of the number of evacuees might also be obtained from the 
average number of trains which could run daily on the railways utilised for the 
retreat. Assuming that the railways of the Moscow region were closed to refugees, 
the number of railways available for this purpose might be estimated at 10. If 
each railway could accommodate 10 evacuation trains daily (without interrup- 
tion for military traffic), and each train carried about 1,000 passengers, the num- 
ber of people transferred would be 100,000 daily, or 3,000,000 monthly. 


making a grand total of 7,500,000 to 10,000,000.* This estimate, 
of course, includes the evacuees from the annexed Soviet territories, 
as the railway cars could not possibly have made a second trip 
before the winter. It does not, however, include those who might 
have been evacuated at the time of the second German offensive in 
the summer of 1942, when the available cars could be utilised again. 

All these estimates refer only to the evacuation of 1941. Those 
given below also include [the evacuation of 1942. 

As to the total of evacuations in 1941 and 1942 from the former 
Soviet territory, excluding the northern Caucasus, only indirect 
data to form the basis of an estimate are available. These data are 
of two kinds: first, Dr. Rachner's statement that the rural areas 
retained their population, and that on the average half of the urban 
population at most remained 2 ; and secondly, the extent of the trans- 
portation facilities available for evacuation by rail. 

It has been seen that the number of persons evacuated in 1941 
from the Soviet-occupied part of Poland was between 1,200,000 
and 1,500,000, from the Baltic States about 200,000, and from 
Bessarabia and Bukovina over 100,000, making a total evacuation 
of between 1,500,000 and 1,800,000 from the Soviet-annexed terri- 
tories. Further, on the basis of information collected during the 
course of the evacuation, the number of evacuees from the 
northern Caucasus has been given as 1,500,OQO. 

According to the census of January 1939, the urban population 
of the whole of the former territory of the Soviet Union occupied 
by the Germans in 1941 as well as in 1942, except the northern Cau- 
casus (and excluding the territories newly occupied by the U.S.S.R.), 
amounted to about 18,000,000. Adding the natural increase of 
the population and the migratory gain of industrial cities, the result 
is an urban population of over 19,000,000, the evacuated half of 
which would amount to about 9,500,000. To this figure must 
be added the evacuations from the Soviet-annexed territories in 

1 The difference between this and Mr. Habicht's estimate is due to the different 
assumptions as to the percentage of trains utilised for carrying passengers, and 
to the different estimates of those who left by other means of transport, but the 
estimated total transport capacity in the two cases is about the same. 

2 There is no ground for contesting Dr. Rachner's statement, which is based 
on enquiries specially made for the purpose. Of course, not only the urban popula- 
tion was affected by the German advance; skilled labourers operating agricultural 
machinery were almost all evacuated, and mobilisation for the army drained the 
countryside of manpower even more than the industrial areas. On the other 
hand, however, it has to be remembered that after the occupation the rural popu- 
lation was swollen by the return of many unskilled factory workers who were 
not evacuated, and by other members of the urban population returning to their 
native villages. In view of the social structure of the Russian urban population 
the number of such people must surely have been very high. As to the urban 
evacuations, there is no means of determining the percentage of evacuees, so that 
Dr. Rachner's very rough assumption that 50 per cent, of the urban population 
was evacuated must be accepted in the absence of better data. 


1941 and those of 1942 from J:he northern Caucasus, for which 
direct information is available. This gives a total of 12,500,000 
persons evacuated in 1941 and 1942. 1 

This figure may be compared with a calculation obtained in 
quite a different way. It has been seen that a calculation based on 
transport facilities gave an estimate of 7,500,000 to 10,000,000 for 
the entire occupied area in 1941 that is, for the old and new territory 
of the Soviet Union. The evacuation of 1942 covered two areas 
the northern Caucasus, with an estimated evacuation of 1,500,000; 
and the eastern Ukraine and Don Basin, with an estimated evacua- 
tion of between 500,000 and 1,000,000 (based on Dr. Rachner r s 
assumption) ; this gives a total evacuation of between 2,000,000 and 
2,500,000 for 1942, and a grand total of between 9,500,000 and 
12,500,000 for 1941 and 1942 together. 

Finally, the results obtained may be compared with the estim- 
ates made by a competent body giving separately the number of 
mobilised men and of other evacuees. The number mobilised is 
given as 4,000,000. This includes men who had been called to the 
colours before the German invasion, numbering about a million, so 
that only the remaining 3,000,000 who were mobilised during the 
retreat, or in other words who were evacuated in order to be mobil- 
ised, have to be taken into account. The number of other evacuees 
from the old Soviet territory in 1941 and 1942 is estimated at 
6,000,000, mainly on the basis of transportation facilities. Together 
with 1,500,000 to 2,000,000 evacuees from the Soviet-annexed terri- 
tories the grand total obtained is 10,500,000 to 11,000,000. 

A comparison of all these estimates obtained in different ways 
shows that the results do not differ greatly from each other. If, 
therefore, the grand total of evacuees from both the old and 
annexed territories in 1941 and 1942 is estimated at 12,000,000, 
(i.e. over 10,000,000 from the old and over 1,500,000 from the 
annexed territories) the error on either side would probably not 
exceed 15 per cent. 

With regard to the geographical distribution of the evacuees, 
no reliable information is available 2 , apart from the previously 

1 At first glance this result seems to correspond closely to the figure of 
12,500,000 resulting from Dr. Rachner's rough calculation. There is, however, 
some difference. Dr. Rachner's figure of 12,500,000 includes only evacuation 
in 194L For 1942, 2,000,000 to 2,500,000 would have to be added, thus giving a 
grand total of between 14,500,000 and 15,000,000 for 1941 and 1942 together, 
instead of the 12,500,000 obtained by a more exact calculation. 

3 There are incidental data about care being taken of 200,000 evacuated 
children in children's homes in 24 regions of the Russian Soviet Republic alone, 
reported by Dr. KAZANTSEVA, Assistant People's Commissar for Health, m 
Soviet War News, 19 Sept. 1942. This information gives no geographical loca- 
tion, because this Republic extends from the frontiers of Bielorussia and the 
Ukraine to the Pacific, Other incidental reports refer to houses built for refugees 
(Izvestia, 25 Aug, 1942) and to "hundreds of families" established and employed 
on the collective farms of the Kuznets region (Izvestia, 4 Sept. 1942). 


quoted report on Polish refugees in inner and Asiatic Russia. The 
general tendency seems to have been to remove people far from the 
front. Factories were transferred mainly to the Urals. Further, 
"the great migration caused by the war has chiefly affected Central 
Asia and Siberia". Refugees were, however, sent even farther into 
Eastern Siberia; thus, the city and probably the entire region of 
Irkutsk, 900 miles from the border of Manchukuo, would seem to 
have been chosen as a major centre of wartime resettlement. It 
was reported in Pravda on 21 May 1942 that in this city, whose 
total population had been a quarter of a million in 1939, there were 
now 204,000 workers having their own individual or collective 
truck gardens. This would indicate a population, including 
children, of 400,000 or more 1 or, in other words, an influx of 150,000 

There can be no doubt that the war also caused a grfeat transfer 
of population from one part of unoccupied Soviet territory to 
another, but on this subject information is lacking. The only 
exception is in the case of the deportation of the Volga Germans 
about which an official declaration was made. The Volga Germans 
are descendants of the 27,000 colonists settled in 1761 at the in- 
vitation of Catherine the Great, their number having since risen 
to many hundreds of thousands. Their territory constituted the 
" Volga German Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic". An 
official statement of 28 August 1941 indicated that "according to 
reliable information received by the military authorities, thousands 
and tens of thousands of diversionists and spies among the German 
population of the Volga are prepared to cause explosions in these 
regions at a signal from Germany*'. The statement continues that, 
while no Germans from the Volga have reported the existence of 
the purportedly large numbers of dissidents who have been un- 
covered : 

If any diver sionist acts were carried out under orders from Germany by Ger- 
man dissidents or spies in the Volga German Republic or in neighbouring regions, 
and bloodshed resulted, the Soviet Government would be forced under martial 
law to adopt reprisals against the entire Volga German population. 

In order to avoid such an undesirable occurrence and to forestall serious blood- 
shed, the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the U.S.S.R. has found it necessary 
to resettle the entire German population of the Volga regions in other districts 
under the condition that the resettled peoples be allotted land and given State 
aid to settle in the new regions. The resettled Germans will be given land in the 
Novosibirsk and Omsk districts, the Altai region of the Kazakhstan Republic 
and neighbouring localities rich in land. 2 

1 William MANDEL: The Soviet Far East, Papers for the 8th Conference of the 
Institute of Pacific Relations, Dec. 1942, p. 20. 

2 New York Times, 8 Sept. 1941. 


The number of Volga Germans transferred is estimated at 
400,000^ No information is available concerning their subsequent 


"The aims of Germany's policy ", Gauleiter Greiser of the 
Warthegau has declared, "extend as far as her power." This state- 
ment explains the changes in German policy towards the Jews. 
Until the outbreak of war, emigration was ostensibly encouraged; 
Chancellor Hitler said that he would willingly give a thousand 
mark note to every Jew who would leave. In practice, however, less 
humane and more effective methods of promoting Jewish emigra- 
tion were adopted. Life in Germany was made impossible for Jews 
in order to induce them to leave, and when they left they had to 
abandon almost all their property. At the same time, a moral obli- 
gation to receive the Jews was imposed on other nations. 

With the extension of German conquests, the aims of Germany's 
Jewish policy were widened to embrace the "liberation of all Europe 
from the Jewish yoke". Not only the deportation and segregation 
of the Jews, but their extermination also was an openly proclaimed 
objective of German policy. But the main factor which changed 
the character of the anti-Jewish measures lay in the changed condi- 
tions themselves. With the progress of the war, emigration possibi- 
lities became more and more restricted. On the other hand, Ger- 
many was now able to send the Jews to non-German territories 
under German control, so that as stimulated emigration declined, 
deportation increased. The Jews were either expelled to "purge" a 
given country or city of its Jewish element, or they were concentrat- 
ed in specific regions, cities or parts of cities to "purge" the rest of 
the locality. 

It must be emphasised that the wholesale and recurrent removal 
of Jews is at the same time an effective method of securing their 
economic extermination. No regard is had to their prospects of 
earning a livelihood; on the contrary, the transfer is carried out in 
such a way as to make it impossible for the Jew to reorganise his 
economic life. His relations not only with the Gentiles but also 
with his own people are severed ; and if he succeeds in establishing 
new connections thiey are again broken by a further move. Because 
of the various methods used to secure the segregation and concentra- 
tion of the Jews, they are uprooted over and over again and prevent- 

1 Ibid. Simultaneously the Volga Germans who resided in Moscow were 
weeded out and sent to Siberia. Cf. Wallace CARROU,: We're in This with Russia, 
p. 83. 


ed from striking fresh roots anywhere. First they are sent to the 
General Government. Then the town in which they were settled is 
"purged". In their new place of residence a ghetto is established. 
But even the ghetto does not give the Jews the security of a per- 
manent residence, and they are again removed further east. 

In many cases the immediate motive for expulsion or deporta- 
tion was to make room for Germans. The first victims of expulsion 
on a grand scale were the Jews of the incorporated western Polish 
provinces, who were expelled along with the Polish inhabitants, 
in both cases to make room for the "repatriated" Germans. Later, 
Jews were deported because, according to the official statements, 
they owned apartments suitable for alien refugees from cities sub- 
ject to air-raids. 1 

At the same time, however, another factor, perceptible since the 
end of 1940 and now assuming growing importance, is strongly 
operating in a contrary direction namely, the needs of the German 
war economy. As a result, Germany's Jewish policy may be des- 
cribed as a compromise between the extermination of the Jews and 
their utilisation in the war economy. 

Early in 1941 a semi-official German article described with 
satisfaction the exclusion of the Jewish working population from 
economic life. Already in 1938 the Jews had been "released" from 
productive work on a wide scale. "But", the article continues, 
"in consequence of the incipient strain on labour resources and of 
the necessity of harnessing all the available supply of manpower, 
a trend in the opposite direction soon became noticeable." At first 
the Jews were used for unskilled jobs, but later the "more efficient" 
among them were given suitable higher grade work. 2 Jews were not, 
of course, reinstated in the professional activities from which they 
had been expelled. They were conscripted as forced labour, at first 
to "release German workers for urgent construction work for the 
Reich", but later also for direct employment in industries manu- 
facturing army supplies. In a number of cases the Jews were not 
removed because they were needed as workers; in others, they were 
deliberately sent to places where they could be put to work. To 
some extent, therefore, the character of deportation and even its 
direction were influenced' by labour requirements. 

Generally speaking, no other group of people have been sub- 
jected to compulsory removal from their homes on so great a scale. 
This forced transfer has taken the following forms: 

1 New York Times, 28 Oct. 1941. The Belgian Nazi paper De SS Man, 10 Oct. 
1942, reported with satisfaction that more housing was available in Antwerp 
owing to the expulsion of Jews. "In seven streets alone", the paper reports, 
"there are now 552 apartments'* (News from Belgium, 9 Jan. 1943). 

2 Reichsarbeitsblatt, 25 Feb. 1941, No. 6, Part V, pp. 106-110. 


(1) Mere expulsion from a territory, the Jews being taken to 
the frontier of the territory they are to leave. This was the pro- 
cedure adopted in regard to the Jews from Alsace and south- 
west Germany, who were taken to the French frontier, and also 
at times in regard to the Jews of the Incorporated Provinces, 
who were taken to the General Government and there left to 
their fate. 

(2) Mere expulsion from a city without any assignment of 
destination, as in the case of the Jews expelled from Cracow. 

(3) Expulsion from an area which is to be "purged of Jews" 
and deportation to a special region (e.g. the Lublin reservation), 
city or town, or part of such region, city or town. Since 1940 this 
has been the usual practice adopted in removing Jews from various 
German-controlled territories and deporting them to the General 
Government, or, latterly also, to the occupied area of the Soviet 

(4) Deportation within the limits of the same territory; 
thus the Jews of the General Government are deported to 
other cities and towns in the same territory, in which ghettos 
are set up. 

(5) Removal from one part of a city to another, by means of 
the setting up of ghettos or segregation in specified quarters. 

(6) Removal of Jews conscripted for forced labour to special 
Jewish labour camps. 

It is worth noting that compulsory transfer is tending more 
and more to become the sole form of Jewish migration. Thus a 
Decree of 11 December 1939 prohibited the Jews in the General 
Government from changing their residence without a special permit, 
and similar measures have been adopted throughout the whole of 
German-dominated Europe. 

Earlier Forms of Expulsion and Deportation 

There were various isolated instances of expulsion even before 
the outbreak of war. Thus, in November 1938, between 15,000 and 
16,000 Polish Jews living in Germany were seized, packed into 
freight cars and taken to the Polish border, many of them to the 
frontier town of Zbonszyn. In this case the German authorities 
could claim that they were foreigners. But this was not so in another 
case which attracted much attention because of the exceptional 
attendant circumstances. After the annexation of Austria, 400 Jewish 
families living in the province of Burgenland were expelled. Some 


escaped to Vienna and others to Czechoslovakia, but a group of 
about 70, who were packed on an old freighter, remained aboard 
for more than four months in a no-man's land between Germany, 
Czechoslovakia and Hungary. 

After the outbreak of the war the expulsion of Jews began at 
first in a somewhat unorganised fashion, its object being to place 
the Jews outside the limits of German rule. In September 1939 
Polish Jews fled in masses from the invading armies, pushing further 
and further east in an attempt to escape to Soviet-occupied territory. 
In this they succeeded, owing to the attitude of the Soviet authorities 
during the first two months of the Soviet occupation of Poland. The 
Germans often tried to encourage this flight; many cases were 
reported of Jews literally driven at the point of guns and bayonets 
to the demarcation line and into the frontier rivers. Many were 
openly admitted by the Soviet authorities; many others managed 
to cross the border secretly. The number of Jews who fled into 
the eastern Polish provinces (both before they were occupied by 
the Soviet Union and after) is estimated by the Institute of Jewish 
Affairs at 200,000 at least. 

At the end of November, the Soviet Government closed the 
frontier. In the meantime the Germans had begun to carry out 
another plan for the elimination of the Jews, that of deportation 
to the so-called Lublin " reservation". This idea of a special Jewish 
region, to which Jews from all German-ruled countries would be sent, 
is attributed to the National Socialist theorist Alfred Rosenberg, who 
proposed it in a lecture on 7 February 1939, developing his scheme 
for a reservation in contrast with the Zionist idea of a Jewish State. 
After the occupation of Poland the Lublin district, which according 
to the census of 1931 had a population of 2,465,000 and numbered 
314,000 Jewish inhabitants, was set apart for the execution of this 
plan. Before the middle of 1940, 650,000 Jews were to be settled 
there. Great publicity was given to the scheme and a press cam- 
paign was launched to convince the German people that "a solu- 
tion of the Jewish problem in Europe" had finally been found. 1 
Deportation started in the second half of October 1939 and during 
the first months large numbers of Jews, especially from Vienna and 
the Protectorate 2 and from the Old Reich, were sent to the reserva- 
tion. The deportees were given a few hours to leave. They were 
permitted to take with them up to 50 kilograms (110 Ibs.) of luggage 
and a sum of money equivalent to between $40 and $120. No 

1 Cf. S. SEGAI,: The New Order in Poland (1942), pp. 61-62. 
p On 12 Oct. 1939, 6,000 Jews were deported from Moravska-Ostrava and a 
few other cities in Moravia from a region where the Germans had begun to execute 
their plan of driving a German wedge between the Czechs and the Slovaks. Cf. 
The Jews in Nazi Europe, Czechoslovakia, p. 5. 


preparations were made to receive them, and the reservation soon 
became a hotbed of epidemics which were bound to spread to the 
German army too. The idea of a special reservation for Jews was 
accordingly given up for the time being, after some 30,000 Jews 
had already been sent there. 1 However, the actual policy of expul- 
sion and deportation was not affected, and the segregation and 
removal of Jews merely had to be carried out in somewhat different 

Countries and Territories of Expulsion and Deportation 
Western Poland. 

According to the census of 1931, the Polish provinces incorpor- 
ated into the Reich then had a Jewish population of 632,000. On 
1 September 1939, it was estimated at 670,000. As has been men- 
tioned, about 60,000 Jews from this area fled before the advancing 
German army to the General Government, and many tens of thou- 
sands of the Jews who fled abroad or to the Soviet-occupied part of 
Poland also came from the Incorporated Provinces. 

In October 1939 there began a mass expulsion of Jews from the 
Incorporated Provinces, simultaneously with that of Poles but pro- 
portionately on a larger scale. In 1939-1940, over 300,000 2 , or 
about half the Jewish population, were deported to the General 
Government. In October 1940 Gauleiter Forster claimed that the 
province of Danzig - West Prussia was entirely free of Jews. In the 
other two provinces constituted entirely or partly of Polish territory 
Wartheland, with the city of Lodz, and Upper Silesia this 
result could not be attained because of the requirements of war 
industry. The Lodz Jews, in particular, instead of being expelled, 
were segregated in the first of the ghettos and their numbers were 
even swelled by Jews deported from the Reich, the Protectorate 
and the occupied countries of western Europe. The expulsion and 
deportation of Jews from the Incorporated Provinces continued, 
however. In May 1942 Gauleiter Greiser stated that there were 
only 150,000 Jews left in the Warthegau, which contained the 
great majority of the Jews of the Incorporated Provinces. (Accord- 

1 According to a report of the American Jewish Joint Distribution Com- 
mittee, dated 17 July 1941. A Paris dispatch to the New York Times (6 Jan. 
1940) estimated the number at 25,000 S. SEGAL: op. ciL, p. 62, writes: "By 
the middle of Nov. 1939, besides the 275,000 local Jews, there were about 
50,000 to 60,000 Jews in the Lublin district who were dumped there. These came 
from all parts of German-occupied countries." 

2 This is the generally accepted figure. P. H. SERAPHIM, in Die Burg, Oct. 1940, 
estimates the "influx" into the General Government from the Incorporated 
Provinces after the end of the campaign at 330,000 (apart from the 60,000 who 
went there during the hostilities). 


ing to some sources of information the additional number deported 
in 1942 was nearly lOO^OO.) 1 


According to the census of May 1939, the Jewish population 
of Germany and Austria numbered 330,900 persons. On 1 Septem- 
ber 1939 the number was estimated at 300,000. As already stated, 
the first deportations, which started in October 1939, were directed 
to the Lublin reservation. Deportation from Germany seems to 
have slackened for some time after the failure of this experiment, 
but in February 1941 there was a revival of deportation from 
Vienna. 2 In the autumn of 1941 there was a new drive against the 
Jews, which resulted in deportations from Berlin, the Rhineland, 
and Westphalia. Continued deportation on a huge scale was also 
reported in the winter of 1941-1942 from Germany (as well as from 
Prague, where most of the Jews of the Protectorate were concen- 
trated). 8 It was rumoured that further deportations were tem- 
porarily stopped because the military authorities intervened on 
behalf of the Jews employed in essential war industries and because 
the disturbance of military transportation had to be avoided. 4 But 
at the Passover mass expulsion to ghettos in Eastern Poland was 
resumed, the new age limit for the deportees being set at 65. 5 The 
total number of Jews deported from the Old Reich from September 
1939 to December 1942 is estimated by the Institute of Jewish Affairs 

1 The Institute of Jewish Affairs estimated the total of Jews deported from 
the Incorporated Provinces up to the end of 1942 at 600,000. This figure 
appears to be exaggerated. At the outbreak of the war the Jewish population of 
the Incorporated Provinces was estimated at 670,000. Of these, 60,000 fled to 
the General Government during the hostilities, and the 240,000 Jews who escaped 
to Rumania, Hungary, the Baltic States and Soviet-occupied territory during 
this same period included at least 60,000 former residents of the Incorporated 
Provinces. If, therefore, the number of deportees is estimated at 600,000, the 
total number of Jews who left the Incorporated Provinces would exceed the pre- 
war Jewish population of the area. This would mean that the deportees from the 
Incorporated Provinces also included numbers of Jews who had been transferred 
there from the west. But the figure of 150,000, representing the Jews who remained 
in the province of Poznan in May 1942, is itself higher than the number of 
Jews transferred from Western Europe to the Incorporated Provinces, and it can 
hardly be supposed that from May to Dec. 1942 there was a large-scale removal 
of Jews from the Incorporated Provinces at a time when the Germans were being 
forced by the labour shortage to bring in Jews from France and other Western 
European countries. In Upper Silesia in particular, there is evidence of the con- 
tinuing segregation of Jews within the province itself. The establishment of a 
ghetto in Chrzanow containing 4,000 Jews was reported by the Oberschlesische 
Zeitung (Katowice), 19 Dec. 1942, while in Zarocercie the segregation of Poles 
and Jews was announced on the occasion of the establishment of a German 

* New York Times, 20 Feb. 1941. 

1 Jewish Affairs, Mar. 1942. 

4 New York Times, 2 Nov. 1941, 14 Mar. and 7 July 1942. 

1 Information received by the American Jewish Committee (Contemporary 
Jewish Record, June 1942). 


at about 120 t 000 1 v and those from Austria would be about 40,000. 2 
For the summer of 1943 the total may be estimated at 170,000. 

Protectorate of Bohemia- Moravia. 

The census of October 1939 showed 80,300 Jews by religion and 
90,100 racial Jews. Up to December 1942, 50,000 to 60,000 s had 
been compulsorily removed and confined. This is the great majority 
of the Jewish population, bearing in mind that about 10,000 Jews 
emigrated between 1 October 1939 and the middle of 1941 and that 
the excess of deaths over births for the three years October 1939 to 
December 1942 was no less than 7,000. Unlike those of other coun- 
tries, the Jews of Bohemia-Moravia were not sent abroad but mostly 
to the Terezin concentration camp. 4 


Slovakia is the only country where the expulsion (Aussiedelung) 
of Jews is expressly Regulated by law. According to the Constitu- 
tional Act of 15 June 1942, expulsion applies to persons of Jewish 
origin with the following exceptions: (1) those who before 14 March 
1939 were not of the Jewish faith, or who before that date had 
married a non-Jew; (2) those individually exempted from the 
application of the law by the President; (3) physicians, veterinary 
surgeons, chemists and engineers, except that expulsion may be 
ordered for certain individuals in this group. 

Dr. Anton Vasek, Chief of Section in the Slovakian Ministry 
of the Interior, who had been made responsible for solving the 

1 Estimate made by Jacob Lestchinsky taking into consideration the number 
of Jews in Sept. 1939 and Dec. 1942, the loss by emigration, and the excess of 
deaths over births. At the outbreak of the war the number of Jews in the Old 
Reich was 215,000. On the other hand, the most recent reports on Jews are as 
follows: In Berlin, where the German Jews were mainly concentrated, only 
28,000 were left, according to a Times dispatch from Jerusalem, 24 Nov. 1942; 
Frankfurt on Main was "clean of Jews", according to the Westdeutscher Beo- 
bachter, quoted by the Israelitisches Wochenblatt (Zurich), 17 July 1942; in Leipzig 
only a few Jews remained, according to a report received by the Morgen Journal 
(New York), 1 Aug. 1942. Therefore, a total of 50,000 Jews in the Old Reich 
in Dec. 1942 would be rather an over-estimate. 

2 This evaluation, based on an estimated number of 25,000 Jews still remain- 
ing in Austria, is rather conservative. Rabbi Stephen S. Wise, speaking for some 
American Jewish organisations, gave a figure of only 15,000 for the Jews remaining 
in Austria in Nov. 1942 (New York Times, 26 Nov. 1942). The Institute of 
Jewish Affairs estimated the total of Jews deported from Germany, including 
Austria, up to Sept. 1942, at about 150,000. 

8 A report from Geneva, dated Aug. 1942, stated that over 47,000 Jews were 
deported and 33,000 remained (Jewish Frontier, Nov. 1942, pp. 33-34). The 
Institute of Jewish Affairs estimates the number of deportees up to Sept. 1942 
at 42,000 and those remaining at 33,000 (this figure including all racial Jews). 
Rabbi Wise in Nov. 1942 gave the number of those who remained as 15,000 
(persons of Jewish religion only). Another source reported the number of deport- 
ees as 60,000 (Contemporary Jewish Record, Dec. 1942). 

4 On 25 Feb. 1943 the New York Times reported the deportation of the 
majority of the inmates of Terezin to Poland. 


Jewish problem, gave some particulars of the application of this 
law at a conference on 29 October 1942. Before 15 December 1940 
there were altogether some 100,000 Jews 1 in the country, but by 
the following December this figure had been reduced to 88,951. 
Up to the end of October 1942, in consequence of the enactment of 
the racial law, 62,444 Jews had been deported from the country 
and more than 7,000 had fled of their own accord. Of the remain- 
ing 20,000, 3,500 were in labour camps. About 6,000 had been 
baptised since 1939 and many were in possession of false baptismal 
certificates, hoping in this way to avoid banishment. About 2,300 
Jews were then employed in industry, making with their families 
a total of 8,500, and andther 1,500 were working on the land. 2 


The Jews in France at the outbreak of the war were estimated at 
about 300,000. This figure rose in May 1940 as a result of the 
influx of Belgian and Netherlands Jews (a substantial number of whom 
returned home after the armistice) and was increased in October- 
November 1940 by 9,000 Jews expelled from Baden and the Pala- 
tinate to unoccupied France and put in a concentration camp by 
the Vichy Government. 3 On the other hand, there was some Jewish 
emigration overseas. The American Jewish Joint Distribution 
Committee gave the following estimate of the Jewish population 
of France in 1940-1941: in the occupied area, 148,000 (95,000 
French nationals, 45,000 East European Jewish immigrants and 
8,000 German, Austrian and Czechoslovak refugees); in the un- 
occupied area, 195,000 (145,000 French nationals, 20,000 East 
European Jewish immigrants and 30,000 German refugees). Since 
then the figures have changed in cons'equence of infiltration from 
the occupied to the unoccupied zone, on the one hand, and of 
overseas emigration from the unoccupied zone on the other. In 
May 1942, according to the same source, the Jewish population 
numbered 180,000 in the unoccupied zone (110,000 French citizens 
and 70,000 Jewish refugees), and about 100,000 in the occupied 

In midsummer 1942 a drive against foreign Jewish refugees in 
Paris marked the beginning of mass deportation from France to 
the ghettos and concentration camps of Eastern Europe. Many 
parents preferred to part with their children, probably for ever, 

1 Probably "racial" Jews. The census of 15 Dec. 1940 showed 89,000 persons 
of Jewish religion. 

* Grenzbote (Bratislava), 6 Nov. 1942; Donauzeitung, 3 Nov. 1942. 

8 Report of the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee for 1940 and the 
first five months of 1941, p. 15. Since then 2,000 Jews living in Luxemburg have 
been deported, partly to the west and partly to the Polish ghettos. 


rather than take them with them into exile. It has been reported 
that in many cases children, even very young ones, were sent alone 
across the line of demarcation into unoccupied France. The Jewish 
organisations, the Quakers, the Young Men's Christian Associa- 
tion, Catholic churches and others were taking care of thousands 
of homeless children from the occupied zone as well as those left 
by parents deported from the unoccupied zone as early as Sep- 
tember. For in August the arrest and deportation of Jewish refugees 
began on a large scale in unoccupied France too. The first victims 
were the foreign Jews, belonging to different groups, who were 
interned in camps in the south of France: immigrants from Poland 
and other Eastern European countries; Jews from Germany, Aus- 
tria and Czechoslovakia, who before the outbreak of the war had 
found refuge in France; Jews from Baden and the Palatinate, ex- 
pelfed by the Germans in 1940. Cases of the deportation of French 
Jews, as well as of non-Jewish French nationals, have also been 
reported. But the great majority were foreign Jews who had en- 
tered France after 1936. All of these were to be deported, with the 
exception of persons over 60 years old and a few others. 1 

The total number of deportees from the occupied and unoc- 
cupied zone up to the middle of August 1942 was officially stated 
as 40,000 2 , and it was constantly increasing. 

In November 1942, after the whole of French territory had 
been occupied by Germany and Italy, the deportation of Jews 
entered on a new phase. All foreign male Jews 18 to 55 years old, 
excepting those who had served with a combatant unit, were ordered 
to report to recruiting centres for labour camp duty. Furthermore, 
4,000 Jewish children were sent to the Paris region. Some 10,000 
to 12,000 persons succeeded in escaping over the Alps to Switzerland 
and 6,000 across the Pyrenees to Spain, according to the Hias-Ica 
Emigration Association (Hicem).* The total of Jews deported from 
the entire territory of France up to the summer of 1943 has been 
estimated at 70,000. 


According to Netherlands sources, there were in the Nether- 
lands about 120,000 Jews and another 60,000 people of partly 
Jewish origin. 4 

1 Easier National Zeitung, 21 Oct. 1942. 

2 Transocean broadcast, 25 June 1943. 
8 Cf. also above, p. 45. 

4 Netherlands News, 11-25 July 1942, Vol. IV, No. 2, p. 30. The American 
Jewish Joint Distribution Committee gave the figures as 150,000 of the mative 
Jewish population and 30,000 Jewish refugees. The Institute of Jewish Affairs 
estimated the number of Jews, refugees included, at the outbreak of the war at 
150,000, of whom 5,000 fled to France in May 1940 and 2,000 emigrated. 


In spring 1942 the German authorities in the Netherlands 
began to evacuate Jews from towns and villages in the provinces, 
concentrating them in three large ghettos within Amsterdam. 
In July the deportation of all Netherlands Jews betwfeen the ages 
of 16 and 42 was ordered. According to the protest issued by the 
people of the Netherlands, some 120,000 would be affected by this 
measure. 1 It was reported that in August, of the 80,000 settled and 
20,000 refugee German Jews living in Amsterdam, about 10,000 
had already been deported and that another 12,000 taken from a 
concentration camp in the province of Drente followed by the 
middle of October 2 and 9,000 more by the middle of December. 
According to the Institute of Jewish Affairs, up to June 1943 the 
Germans had completed the deportation of some 80,000 Jews from 
the Netherlands. 3 


The Jewish population of Belgium at the outbreak of the war 
has been estimated at 110,000 (80,000 Belgian citizens and 30,000 
refugees) 4 , between 20,000 and 25,000 of them having since fled 
to England and France (in May 1940) or emigrated. 6 

The first deportation of Jews from Belgium took place in the 
winter of 1941-1942, when some Jews, mainly of Polish origin, 
were transferred from Antwerp to Lodz for work in textile factories 
providing uniforms for the German army.* 

In the summer of 1942 deportation was resumed and from 
October onward it was on a larger scale. It may be estimated that 
up to December 1942 about 25,000 foreign Jews had been depprted 
from Belgium, partly to eastern Europe and partly to France 
for fortification building. 7 By July 1943 this total was probably 

1 Netherlands News, 11-25 July 1942, pp. 30-31; 26 Nov.-lO Dec. 1942, pp. 84 
et seq. 

8 Netherlands News Digest, 1 Jan. 1943; /.AC. Digest, Dec. 1942. 

1 According to some reports (New York Times, 23 and 29 June 1943) all the 
120,000 Jews of the Netherlands have been deported, 

4 According to the Report of the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee 
for 1940 and the first five months of 1941. 

5 Cf. Arieh TARTAKOWER, op. cit., p. 312. The American Jewish Year Book, 
Vol. XLII, estimated the number of Jews on 31 July 1940 at 82,000. 

6 Jewish A/airs, Mar. 1942. 

7 The pro-Nazi paper Le Pays Riel (25 Oct. 1942) made the somewhat sur- 
prising statement that there were in Belgium 52,000 Jews, only 4,000 having 
Belgian nationality and the rest being emigrants from Germany, Poland and 
Czechoslovakia, and that nearly 50 per cent, of these had been deported. This 
report was confirmed by another Brussels newspaper (quoted by News from 
Belgium, 19 Dec. 1942). According to another source, the number of deportees 
from July to November was 20,000 to 25,000 (idem, 16 Jan. 1943). 



At the time of the German invasion the number of settled Jews 
was over 1,500; together with refugees, the total was estimated at 
2,000. Some hundreds of them escaped to Sweden; the rest were 
deported to Poland. It has been officially stated that there are no 
more Jews on Norwegian territory. 


After the territorial acquisitions of 1938-1941, Hungary had the 
largest Jewish population after the U.S.S.R. and Poland, numbering 
743, OOO. 1 About 20,000 Jews in the newly acquired territory of 
Subcarpathia were forced to cross the border into Galicia. 2 The 
annexation of north-eastern Yugoslavia (Banat, Backa and Baranja) 
was followed by a law providing for the expulsion of Yugoslav 
citizens who had settled in this area since 1 December 1918. This 
measure seems, however, to have had little effect on the local Jews, 
nearly all of whom had been settled in the country for a long time. 

The Hungarian Jews suffered economically as a result of anti- 
Jewish measures, and many of them lost their jobs; their property, 
however, was not confiscated, nor did they have to wear special 
badges. Although the Hungarian border is permanently closed, 
therefore, a number of Belgrade Jews did succeed in reaching a 
temporary haven in Hungarian territory. Many more came from 
Slovakia (some 10,000) and Croatia, in particular those whose 
original home was in the territory annexed by Hungary. 


According to the census of 30 December 1930, Rumania had a 
Jewish population of 757,000. The census of 6 April 1942, taken 
after the cession of part of Transylvania, Southern Dobruja, North- 
ern Bukovina and Bessarabia, showed that there remained in 
Rumania 302,000 Jews. The difference is, of course, mainly due 
to the difference in the census area. But even taking only the 
territory which was Rumanian in 1941 for comparison, the Jewish 
population was larger in 1930, numbering 329,000. 8 Thus the 
recorded decrease is 27,000. In fact, however, Jewish emigration 
from Rumania greatly exceeded this figure, because, apart from 
the natural increase, many Jews also immigrated between 1930 
and 1940 from Bessarabia and other adjacent regions, especially 

1 Cf . Ungarn, published by the Deutsches Auslandswissenschaftliches Institut, 
Berlin, 1941. 

2 The Jews in Nazi Europe, Hungary; and Report of the American Jewish Joint 
Distribution Committee for 1941 ana the first five months of 1942. 

8 Wirtschaft und Statistik, 1941, No. 20. 


to Bucarest. The flight of many Jews to Bessarabia and Northern 
Bukovina, after their occupation by the Soviet Union, and the 
subsequent expulsion, in July 1940, of the Jews who had come 
from the Soviet-occupied territories, have certainly contributed 
to the number of Jewish emigrants. Furthermore, the pogroms 
which in January 1941 followed the establishment of a Rumanian 
Nazi Government provoked a new flight of Jews to the Soviet area, 
reported to have numbered 72,000 persons. 1 

In June 1941, when Rumania joined Germany in invading Soviet 
territory, between 100,000 and 130,000 2 Jews fled from Bessarabia 
and Bukovina before the invaders. The Rumanians themselves also 
tried to drive the Jews under their rule eastwards. Following the 
German example, Jewish ghettos were at first established in the 
reconquered provinces; but after October 1941 the Jews were 
driven farther eastward into the Rumanian-occupied Soviet terri- 
tory renamed Transnistria. 

According to a German source, "185,000 Jews have been eva- 
cuated since October of last year (i.e. 1941) into Transnistria, 
where they were housed in large ghettos until an opportunity arose 
for their removal further east. Today there still remain 272,409 
Jews in the country. . . Both the provinces of Bessarabia and 
Bukovina can now be considered as free of Jews, excepting Czerno- 
witz, where there are still about 16,000. . . It may be assun^ed 
that even during the present year a further 80,000 Jews could be 
removed to the Eastern Territories/ 13 However, according to later 
reports, the Rumanian Government announced in October 1942 
that there would be no more "evacuations" to Transnistria. 4 


Before the German invasion, Yugoslavia had a Jewish popula- 
tion of 80,000 citizens and 6,000 refugees. With the invasion, many 
Jews fled into neighbouring countries. Thirty thousand remained 
in the new State of Croatia and 8,000 to 9,000 in Serbia, some of 
them having escaped into the mountains. In May 1942 the Grenz- 
bote (Bratislava) announced that only 6,000 Jews remained in 
Croatia. Some 3,000 succeeded in escaping to Italian-controlled 

1 This figure is given by the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee 
in its Report for 1940 and the first five months of 1941. The Krakauer Zeitung, 
13 Aug. 1942, refers to thousands of Jews having migrated to Soviet-occupied 
Bessarabia and Bukovina. 

2 The figure of 130,000 is given by a "prominent Rumanian politician" on 
the basis of the "most detailed investigation" (Aftontidningen, Stockholm, 
15 Mar. 1943). The estimate of the Institute of Jewish Affairs is 100,000. 

8 Krakauer Zeitung, 13 Aug. 1942. 
4 New York Times, 13 Feb. 1943. 


Yugoslav territory and Italy. 1 All those who remained in Serbia 
were either exterminated or deported, mostly to Poland or to the 
Pilsen district in the Protectorate. 2 

In 1943 the Bulgarian Government started deporting Jews to 
Poland from Yugoslav Macedonia 3 , as well as from Bulgarian- 
controlled Greek territory (Thrace). 4 

Territories of Destination and Methods of Confinement 

The number of Jews deported up to December 1942 from all 
European countries except Poland, i.e. from Germany, France, 
Belgium, Netherlands, Norway, Slovakia, Rumania and Yugo- 
slavia, may be estimated on the basis of the figures given above 
at about 650,000. Furthermore, 50,000 to 60,000 Jews from Bohe- 
mia-Moravia have been confined in a concentration camp within 
the country itself. 

Some of the Jews from Belgium were sent to a neighbouring 
part of Western Europe for forced labour, but generally speaking 
the tendency has been to remove the Jews to the east. Many 
Western European Jews were reported to have been sent to the 
mines of Silesia. The great majority were sent to the General 
Government and, in ever growing numbers, to the eastern area, 
that is, to the territories which had been under Soviet rule since 
September 1939 and to the other occupied areas of the Soviet 

During the early period, deportation meant removal to the 
General Government, but since 1940 the deported Jews have tended 
more and more to be sent exclusively to ghettos and labour camps. 


The first ghettos were set up in Lodz in the winter of 1939-1940. 
Since spring 1940 they have been introduced in a number of cities 
and towns in the Warthegau and the General Government. In 
the summer of 1940 the Germans segregated the district of Warsaw 
inhabited mainly by Jews under the pretext that it was a breeding- 
place of contagious diseases, and in the autumn of the same year a 
ghetto was formally established. All Jews living outside its confines 
were ordered to move into the ghetto and all Poles living inside to 
leave the ghetto area. Many Jews were also brought there from 
abroad. In the first half of 1942 about 500,000 persons were crowded 
into the Warsaw ghetto. 

1 According to information received by the Institute of Jewish Affairs. 

2 Jewish Telegraphic Agency despatch, 4 Feb. 1943. 

3 According to information received by the Institute of Jewish Affairs. 

4 Donanzeitung, 24 Mar. 1943. 


The growth of the ghettos is illustrated by the following es- 
timates. In November 1941 the Institute of Jewish Affairs estim- 
ated the number of Jews confined in the ghettos "at no less than 
1,000,000". In December 1941 figures released by Polish Jewish 
circles in London showed that about 1,300,000 Jews had been 
herded into eleven ghettos in various parts of the country. 1 For 
the early summer of 1942 the Institute of Jewish Affairs gave the 
number as 1,500,000. On 28 October and 10 November 1942 the 
Secretary of State for Security in the General Government issued 
regulations about Jewish ghettos in the five districts of the General 
Government (Warsaw, Lublin, Cracow, Radom and Galicia), 
providing that from 30 November 1942 all General Government 
Jews must live in confined areas. Jews employed in armament and 
other war industries and living in closed camps are exempted. The 
confined areas are of two kinds: ghettos inside the larger towns, 
and purely Jewish towns, cleared of their non-Jewish population. 
In the whole of the General Government there are 13 ghettos, the 
largest being the Warsaw ghetto, and 42 Jewish towns. 2 

Since the invasion of the U.SJS.R., ghettos have been established 
in Western Bielorussia, Western Ukraine and the Baltic States, 
and also in occupied Russia. 

The primary purpose of the ghettos and special Jewish towns 
is the segregation of the local Jewish population. This consists 
of the former inhabitants of the area which was turned into a 
ghetto or a Jewish town, the inhabitants of the same town who are 
removed to the ghetto, and Jews removed from other localities 
of the same country. For the second and third categories segrega- 
tion in the ghetto meant compulsory removal, and for the third 
category forced migration also. The number of persons affected 
by this internal forced migration may have numbered many hun- 
dreds of thousands in the General Government alone. 3 

The ghettos of the General Government or of the Eastern Ter- 
ritories are also the usual destination of the Jews deported from 
the west by the German authorities or by the authorities of other 
countries allied to Germany. 

Forced Labour Camps. 

Forced labour, a system whereby the Jews are used in the inter- 
ests of the German war economy, was introduced primarily for the 

1 Contemporary Jewish Record, Feb. 1942. The Polish Ministry of Labour 
gave the number of Jews in Polish ghettos in early spring 1942 as 1,200,000. 

2 Ostland (Berlin), 15 Nov. and 1 Dec. 1942. 

8 A report on the "Jewish town'* of Miedzyrzec may be quoted as showing a 
typical case. Before the war it contained 14,000 Jews, forming 90 per cent, of the 
population, to whom have now been added 5,000 Jews deported from Cracow. 
In the large ghettos the proportion of Jews from abroad is substantially higher. 


purpose of employing them in the locality, or at least in the coun- 
try, of their residence. 

In Germany, all Jewish men from 18 to 65 years of age and 
Jewish women from 20 to 55 years are liable to forced labour, with 
the exception of those permitted to hold jobs in private undertak- 
ings. They must work in segregated groups, are not entitled to 
special payments, and are not protected by the general regulations 
governing conditions of work. In October 1941, of the 75,000 Jews 
who were still in Berlin, 30,000 were engaged in forced labour, which 
for most of them was the only remaining means of livelihood. 

Forced labour for Jews has been introduced by the Germans in 
most of the occupied countries. In the Protectorate, in addition 
to the general labour service to which all inhabitants of the Pro- 
tectorate are liable, an especially hard form of compulsory labour 
has been instituted for male Jews from 18 to 60 years of age, who 
are organised in battalions for labour camps whenever the need 
arises. At first many of them were deported to labour camps in 
Poland, but owing to the spread of epidemics the authorities were 
forced to transfer thousands of others from Prague, Pilsen and 
Brno to camps in the Protectorate itself. As has been seen, between 
42,000 and 60,000 Jews were confined in the Terezin labour camp. 1 
This camp is unusual in that it is both a labour camp and a concen- 
tration camp; it contains not only working Jews but also others 
incapable of work. 

But the classic land of Jewish forced labour is Poland; it was 
here that the whole system was initiated with the Order of 28 
October 1939, supplemented by that of 12 December 1939, which 
made all Jews between the ages of 14 and 60 liable to compulsory 
labour for a two-year period. During the early days of the occupa- 
tion the Germans rounded up Jews indiscriminately to perform 
the work, which at that time consisted mainly in clearing up debris; 
later, the system was organised and the duty of providing men 
for forced labour was imposed on the Jewish community councils. 

There are different forms and degrees of forced labour. A 
"privileged" class, even though they work in overcrowded barracks 
for over 12 hours a day, is that of Jewish artisans employed in 
workshops turning out goods for the German army. Then come 
the labour battalions, which work in or near large cities; they are 
employed mostly on heavy manual work, but can at least return to 
their homes at night. Others are compelled to work on special 
construction projects, or for private contractors; they too, are 
allowed to travel home. Worst of all is the situation of those who 
are sent to labour camps which differ little, if at all, from concen- 
1 Cf. above, p. 101, n. 3, 


tration camps. Up to the summer of 1941, at least 85 Jewish labour 
camps were known to exist in the General Government. Of the 
35 camps the position of which was known, two- thirds were located 
on the eastern frontier. 

Forced labour for Jews expanded rapidly, having developed 
from a subsidiary measure into an essential feature of the treat- 
ment of Jews. In April 1941, the Gazeta Zydowska reported that 
25,000 Jews were engaged in compulsory construction work in the 
Warsaw district, and on the basis of other data given by the same 
journal, the Institute of Jewish Affairs estimated the total number 
of Jews in forced labour camps in Poland in the fall of 1941 at 
100,000. During 1942, forced labour became the common fate of 
the Jews in Poland and in German-occupied Soviet territory. The 
period for which Jews fit to work are liable for forced labour is no 
longer limited. Their removal to the east was largely motivated 
by the wish to make use of them as forced labour, and as Germany's 
need of manpower grew, deportation for adults of working age was 
tantamount to assignment to forced labour. In contrast with the 
other inhabitants of German-occupied countries, Jews are not sent 
to work in the Reich, because Jewish immigration would run counter 
to the policy of making Germany "free of Jews". The needs of the 
war economy are, of course, compelling the German authorities to 
deviate from this rule to some extent, and indeed some exceptions 
have been reported. 1 But, generally speaking, deportation to the 
east is for the Jews the equivalent of the recruitment for work 
in the Reich to which the rest of the population of German- 
controlled Europe is subject, and their removal further and further 
eastward is doubtless connected with the need for supplying the 
army's requirements near the front. 

For the Polish ghettos are not the last stage in the forced east- 
ward migration of the Jewish people. On 20 November 1941, the 
Governor General, Hans Frank, broadcast the information that 
the Polish Jews would ultimately be transferred further east. Since 
the summer of 1942 the ghettos and labour camps in the German- 
occupied Eastern Territories have become the destination of deport- 
ees both from Poland and from western and central Europe; in 
particular, a new large-scale transfer from the Warsaw ghetto has 
been reported. 2 Many of the deportees have been sent to the labour 

1 Thus, according to information of the Institute of Jewish Affairs, 200 Jewish 
saddlers were sent from Poltava (Ukraine) to Vienna. The deportation of Polish, 
French and Belgian Jews to the coal mines of Upper Silesia is also an exception 
to the general rule from the National Socialist point of view. 

2 Unser Zeit, quoted by Novy Put, 10 Jan. 1943. On 22 July 1942, the Jewish 
Council of Warsaw received an order to prepare 6,000 persons to be sent away 
daily. Deportation started the next day, and several thousand persons are said 
to have been deported every day. 


camps on the Russian front; others to work in the marshes of Pinsk, 
or to the ghettos of the Baltic countries, Bielorussia and the Uk- 
raine. It is hardly possible to distinguish how far the changes in the 
Jewish population of the General Government are due to deporta- 
tion and how far they are attributable to "ordinary" mortality 1 
and extermination. Moreover, the number of Jews remaining in the 
General Government is in any case uncertain. 2 

Total Number of Uprooted Jews 

On the basis of the data presented above, the numbers of Jews 
expelled and deported from Germany and countries under German 
occupation or control since the outbreak of war in September 1939 
may be estimated as follows : 

Germany and Austria 180,000 

France (excluding Alsace-Lorraine) 70,000 

Alsace-Lorraine 22,000 

Belgium 50,000 

Netherlands 80,000 

Luxemburg 2,000 

Norway 1,000 

Slovakia 70,000 

Subcarpathia 20,000 

Incorporated Polish Provinces 400,000 

Old Rumania, Transylvania, Bukovina and Bessarabia. 185,000 

Total 1,080,000 

1 The high mortality by non-violent death is exemplified by the death rate 
for Warsaw. During the first half of the year 1941 there were 12,900 deaths, the 
total population of the ghetto numbering about 500,000 (Survey of Central and 
Eastern Europe, No. 2, 1942). For the second half of 1941 a great increase is 
reported. For the whole of 1941 the figure is 47,000, according to the Institute 
of Jewish Affairs, and 49,000, according to Polish Government sources. The 
mortality rate was undoubtedly still higher in 1942 owing to the deterioration 
in conditions. Thus the "biological deficit" amounted to over 20 per cent, for 
1941 and 1942. 

2 According to Ostland (Berlin), 1 Dec. 1942, the Jewish population of the 
General Government numbered 2,093,000. This statement has been contested 
as incredible, the places of Jewish residence listed by the same source being 
inadequate to house so large a population, even assuming that they were over- 
crowded to the extent of 50 per cent, beyond their normal capacity. Furthermore, 
it has been pointed out that the same paper reported that on 1 Dec. 1942 the 
Warsaw ghetto still had a population of about half a million, whereas according 
to information of the Institute of Jewish Affairs at the end of 1942 it was 
only 36,000 at that time. However, the question of the number of Jews remaining 
in Warsaw is in any case dubious. Reports of the liquidation of the Warsaw 
ghetto (obtained only indirectly) seem to be corroborated by the Nazi Donau 
Zeitung, which stated that its suppression raised the serious problem of disinfect- 
ing the whole district. On the other hand, according to a message which reached 
the Polish Government in London through underground channels, there were 
still some 200,000 Jews within the confines of the Warsaw ghetto ( Congress Weekly, 
issued by the American Jewish Congress, 26 Mar. 1943). It may be noted as a 
curious coincidence that practically the same figure (2,092,000) was given for Jews 
living in the General Government in summer 1942 (Krakauer Zeitung, 15 July 
1942, quoting Europttische Revue), i.e. before the new deportations to the east 
had started. On this point, cf. J. SCHECHTMAN: "More Circumspection", in 
Zionews, 28 Feb. 1943, pp. 16-18. 


In addition, some tens of thousands have been deported from 
the Bulgarian controlled parts of Yugoslavia and Greece. This 
brings the total number of expelled and deported Jews up to some 
1,100,000.! Of this total, 9,000 Jews from Baden and the Palatinate, 
22,000 from Alsace-Lorraine, some of the 70,000 from Slovakia, 
some of the 2,000 from Luxemburg, and the first 300,000 from the 
Incorporated Provinces of Poland, were expelled; the others have 
been deported. 

Only a few thousand of these deportees were sent to western 
Europe; all the others went to the General Government, and further 
east to the German and Rumanian-occupied territories of the 
Soviet Union. It should be noted that some of the Jews of Alsace- 
Lorraine and Germany may possibly appear twice in the calculation, 
since the 70,000 Jews deported from France to the east probably 
include a number of those expelled at an earlier date from Alsace- 
Lorraine and south-western Germany. In any case, a total of 
1,050,000 would make allowance for any double counting. 

In order to estimate the total number of uprooted Jews, how- 
ever, this figure must be increased by the addition of those who 
were evacuated, fled or emigrated. According to the data given 
above, these figures are as follows: 

Refugees from Poland to and through Rumania, Hun- 
gary and Lithuania 50,000 

Refugees from the Incorporated Provinces to the 

General Government 60,000 

Refugees from German-occupied Poland to Soviet- 
occupied territory 200,000 

Refugees from Bessarabia 100,000 

Evacuees from the Baltic States 30,000 

Evacuees from Western Bielorussia and Western Ukraine. 500,000 

Evacuees from the pre-1939 territory of the Soviet Union 1 ,100,000 

Emigrants to overseas and neutral European countries . . 1 60,000 

Total 2,200,000 

This number again includes some refugees who have been count- 
ed twice, among the following groups: (1) 50,000 refugees from 
Poland who went to European countries ; many of these emigrated 
later, while others were afterwards deported; (2) 200,000 Jews 
who went from German-occupied Poland to Soviet-occupied ter- 
ritory in 1939; some of them were afterwards removed to the east, 
and therefore figure in the total of 500,000 Jews removed from 
Western Bielorussia and the Western Ukraine. To avoid the possi- 
bility of double counting, half of both these groups may be deducted, 
thus giving a total of 2,100,000. 

1 Many Jews, transferred from Western Bielorussia and the Western Ukraine 
to Asiatic Russia shortly after the occupation of these territories by the Soviet 
Union, should also be added to the number of those forcibly removed from their 
country of residence. They are included in the total of 500,000 evacuees from 
Western Bielorussia and the Western Ukraine, given in the second table. 


Summing up both sets of figures, i.e. figures relating to Jews 
deported and expelled and to those otherwise displaced, a total of 
3,150,000 is obtained. 

This figure does not include: (a) the hundreds of thousands of 
Polish Jews deported eastward from the General Government, 
and (b) hundreds of thousands of Jews transferred by compulsion 
within the limits of the same country or territory to be segregated 
in ghettos and special Jewish towns, in particular in the General 
Government and in the German-occupied Eastern Territories. 
Assuming that only a third of the resident Jews who remained in 
these territories were affected by (a) and (6), nearly 1,000,000 
Jews must have been compulsorily removed eastward or from one 
town to another. Accordingly, the number of Jews compulsorily 
removed from their homes would be about 2,100,000, or in any case 
over 2,000,000, and the total of all uprooted Jews 4,150,000, or in 
any case over 4,000,000. 


It is difficult, for several reasons, to present the population 
movements described in the foregoing chapter in the form of a sys- 
tematic table. 

One difficulty lies in the frontier changes which have taken 
place and in the transfer of whole territories from one national 
sovereignty to another. In the case of Rumania, for instance, some 
of the figures relate to the whole of the country before its dismem- 
berment in 1940; others to Rumania after the loss of Northern 
Transylvania, Southern Dobruja, Bessarabia, and Northern Buko- 
vina; others again to Rumanian territory after the re-annexation 
of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina. In Poland the partition of 
the whole country and the various changes which have since been 
made in the frontiers of the Incorporated Provinces and the General 
Government often make it impossible to determine precisely which 
territories are concerned in the comings and goings of migrants 
even when the total volume of migration is more or less accurately 

Another difficulty arises out of the fact that in some territories 
there have been successive incoming and outgoing movements 
and that it is impossible to tell how far the same people were in- 
volved. For instance, the evacuations from Bielorussia and the 
Western Ukraine just before or at the time of the German invasion 
in June 1941 doubtless affected many people who had come to 
these provinces earlier from the Polish territory under German 





Number of persons 


Germany (including Aus- 

170,000 Jews 

General Government 


50,000 " 


Germany (Baden and 

9,000 " 

Unoccupied France 



10,000 " 



130,000 Czechs 

Bohemia- Moravia 


60,000 Jews 

Eastern Galicia 


10,000 Jews 


Hungarian-annexed Slo- 

60,000-80,000 Slovaks 

Remaining part of 

vak territory 


Hungarian-annexed Sub- 

20,000-30,000 Czechs and 


car path ia 


and Slovakia 

20,000 Jews 


German-occupied Poland 

40,000 (including 

France, America, 

(frontiers of 1940) 


Palestine and other 

countries through 

Rumania and Hun- 


9,000 (including 


3,000 Jews) 

4,000 (including 


1,600 Jews) 

50,000 (including 

Baltic States 


300,000 (including 


200,000 Jews) 

Western Bielorussia 

and Western Ukraine 

Incorporated Provinces 

1,660,000 (including 

General Government 

460,000 Jews) 

General Government 

30,000-40,000 Bielorussians 

Soviet-occu pied 

and Ukrainians 

Western Bielorussia 

and Western Ukraine 

Western Bielorussia and 

1,500,000 (including 

Eastern U.S.S.R. 

Western Ukraine (fron- 

500,000 Jews) 

(113,000 beyond to 

tiers of 1940) 

Iran, India and 



20,000 children 


Soviet-annexed Karelia 


Inner Finland 




66,000 (including 

10,000 Jews) 


60,000 (including 
15,000 Jews) 

Eastern U.S.S.R. 


61,000 (including 

5,000 Jews) 


21,000 Lithuanians 

! .ithuania 

and Russians 




Soviet territory 




Soviet territory 

1,000 Jews 

General Government 









Incorporated Polish 




Soviet territory 

80,000 Jews 








Number of persons 







Soviet area 

1,000 Jews 

Northern France 

50,000 " 



15,000 (including 

France and over- 


270,000 (including 


22,000 Jews) 

Unoccupied France 



Other parts of France 

70,000 Jews 

Incorporated Polish 

Provinces and Gen- 

eral Government 

24,000 (including 

Spain and Switzer- 



50,000 (including 

North Africa, Englanc 


and overseas 

Coastal areas of France, 



Belgium and Nether- 


Hungarian Transylvania 

202,000 Rumanians 


Austrian Carinthia 

10,000 Slovenes 


German-annexed Slovenia 


I talian-an nexed 





Old Serbia 



Italian-annexed Slovenia 



Italian-annexed Dalmatia 

57,000 Yugoslavs 

Southern Italy 

and the Croatian coastal 


Northern Macedonia 

120,000 Serbs 

Old Serbia 

( Bulgarian-occupied ) 

Northern Macedonia, 



Bosnia and Rumanian 

Yugoslav territory 



250,000 Serbs and 

Old Serbia and 



Serbia and Macedonia 

70,000 Croats 


Old Bulgaria 

80,000 Bulgarians 

Western Thrace 

South Dobruja 

110,000 Rumanians 


Western Thrace (Bulga- 

80,000 Greeks 

Remaining territory 
of Greece 

25,000 " 

Old Bulgaria 



Middle East and 


Old Rumania, Transyl- 

80,000 Jews 

Bessarabia and North 

vania and Dobruja 


Bessarabia and North 

185,000 " 



Soviet territory 


Bessarabia and North 

100,000 Jews 

Eastern U.S.S.R. 


North Dobruja (Ruma- 

62,000 Bulgarians 

South Dobruja 


Leningrad region 

10,000 Ingermanlanders 



German- and Rumanian- 

10,000,000 (including 

Eastern U.S.S.R. 

occupied old Soviet 





A third difficulty is due to the variety of the population classes 
transferred. In many cases certain national or ethnical groups 
were specifically affected, as for instance the Jews in all the coun- 
tries under Axis control, and certain national minorities trans- 
ferred or exchanged by several of the countries of south-eastern 
Europe. In others, and in particular in the case of the flight of war 
refugees and evacuation, every class of the population was involved 
in the movement. 

In these circumstances it has proved impossible to classify the 
available figures in a methodical table. It seemed useful how- 
ever, in closing the present chapter, to summarise all the movements 
which have been described in it. 

The movements shown in the table are obviously very varied 
in character. In some cases the people concerned left their homes 
of their own accord at the approach of the enemy armies and found 
refuge either in another part of their own country or abroad. Others 
were transferred by the authorities, either to remove them from 
the range of enemy action or to facilitate military operations, 
or again to ensure that they remained in the service of their own 
Government to play their part in national defence by serving in 
the armed forces or working in industry. In other cases population 
transfers were organised methodically; the Bulgarian, Hungarian, 
and Rumanian minorities from other countries who were repatriated 
were usually resettled by their own Governments and provided 
with a new home to replace the one they had left. The position 
of the populations of the whole of Europe under Axis occupation 
who have been deported and expelled is very different, however. 
Driven from their homes to make room for newcomers, concen- 
trated at given places or scattered far and wide, deprived of every 
possibility of carrying on their usual occupation and making a new 
home, these uprooted people are living a precarious life under the 
constant threat of further transfers. Unlike the majority of the 
workers individually recruited or conscripted, as described in the 
following chapter, they have left behind no home or family which 
awaits their return. All their moorings have been cut, and they 
can rely on no-one to protect them. This uprooting of populations 
is one of the most tragic features of the present situation in Europe, 
and will be one of the gravest problems calling for solution in the 



NOTE: the arrows Indicate the area of origin of 
the main groups of refugees, evacuees, deported, 
expelled or otherwise transferred non-German 
people who were living away from their homes 
towards the end of 1942. They do not indicate the 
actual location of the people concerned but only 
the general direction in which they moved or were 
removed when leaving their homes. Transfers 
over short distances, or affecting groups of less 
than 10,000, concentrations in camps or ghettos, 
transfers of workers and most evacuations from 
bombed cities inside each country are not shown. 
For fuller explanations and for sources of the 
figures, see chapter II. 




The use of foreign labour, especially in rural employment, is tra- 
ditional in Germany. Before 1914 it formed one of the links in the 
migratory chain which crossed the country from east to west. 
Between 1871 and 1910, the number of Russian and Austro-Hun- 
garian nationals in Germany (largely Poles in both cases) increased 
from 90,000 to 805,000, that of Italians from 4,000 to 104,000, 
and that of Netherlanders from 22,000 to 144,000. In addition to 
these large numbers of permanent migrants, there were also hun- 
dreds of thousands of seasonal workers. The rural exodus was 
especially marked in the east of Germany, and the vacuum 
created by the migration of German country boys and girls to the 
towns was filled by Polish seasonal workers from Russian Poland 
and Galicia. 1 Numerous workers from Italy, Serbia and the Austro- 
Hungarian Empire were also employed in agriculture, building and 
construction, and mining. On the eve of the war of 1914-1918 there 
were in all more than one million foreign workers in Germany, 
about evenly distributed between agriculture and industry. During 
the war itself the compulsory or semi-compulsory labour of enemy 
aliens made a very important contribution to the German war 
effort. The campaigns on the eastern front, in particular, provided 
Germany with a valuable source of manpower which was drawn 
upon mainly for agricultural work. 

From 1914 to 1918, 2,500,000 prisoners of war, of whom nearly 
1,500,000 were Russian, entered German prison camps. Towards 
the end of the war, on 10 October 1918, there were in Germany 
over two million (2,072,000) prisoners, this total including 1,200,000 
Russians whom the Germans had not yet freed despite the treaty 
of Brest-Li to vsk, signed in the previous March. 2 Nearly a million 

1 A. and E. KULISCHER: op. cit., pp. 195-196 and 159-160. 

2 W. DOEGBN: Kriegsgefangene VQlker (published by the German Ministry 
of War, Berlin, 1919), pp. 26-29. Up to 10 Oct. 1918, 219,000 prisoners had been 
freed or exchanged and 107,000 had escaped. According to the Reichszentralstelle 
fur Kriegsgefangene. the precise number of prisoners held in Oct. 1918 was 


were employed in agriculture. In addition, the German authorities 
organised the impressment of men and young women in the occupied 
countries, while other workers volunteered for work in Germany 
when they became unemployed in their own countries, where the 
Germans had carried off plant and raw materials and obstructed 
the organisation of relief. 1 The majority of the workers recruited, 
forcibly or otherwise, were employed in the occupied countries 
themselves, but a number of them were sent to Germany. From 
Belgium, 107,000 workers went to Germany voluntarily and 60,000 
were forcibly deported. It was intended that they should replace 
German workers called up from war industry for the forces, but 
owing to Belgian resistance the results of the scheme wer6 meagre. 
In 1917 most of the deportees were sent back to Belgium; there 
were, however, still 90,000 Belgian volunteers and 12,000 deportees 
in Germany in January 1918. 2 On a far greater 3cale was the influx 
of workers from the east. At least 350,000 workers were forcibly 
transferred to Germany from Russian Poland alone 3 , and workers 
in other parts of Russia conquered by the Germans were similarly 
rounded up and deported, especially for agricultural work. This 
process continued even after the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and 
right on until the end of the German occupation. 4 

After 1918, although the current of migration into Germany 
continued to flow mainly from the east, its composition changed. 
Henceforward, the migrants were mainly of German extraction; 
special permits and registration cards were introduced to restrict 
the number of immigrant seasonal workers to a minimum (28,000 
on the average during the years 1920-1924). "During the years 
1925-1927 the shortage of German agricultural workers involved 
a steady increase in the annual quota of immigrants and the average 
number of immigrants rose to 57,000 in 1925-1927. The alien 
workers who thus immigrated to Germany came mostly from 
Poland, but in certain years there were also a number from Czecho- 
slovakia." 5 The number of foreign agricultural workers employed 
in the Reich was 374,000 in 1918; it varied from 138,000 to 151,000 

1 F. PASSELECQ: Deportation et travail forcS des ouvriers de la population 
civile de la Belgique occupSe (published by the Carnegie Endowment for Inter- 
national Peace, Division of Economics and History, New York, 1927), p. 11, and 
J. van der HOEVEN LEONARD: Les deportations beiges (1931), p. 34. 

2 F. PASSELECQ: op. cit. t pp. 323, 349-350, 378-390, 395-399. 

8 S. T. RUZIEWICZ: Le problbme de I 1 emigration polonaise en Allemagne (Paris, 
1930), pp. 26, 91-92. 

4 For an account of the deportations from the region of Pskov, cf . the memoirs 
of P. SAYANOV, in Zvezda, Aug. 1937, p. 71. 

8 INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE, Studies and Reports, Series O, No. 4: 
Migration Movements 1925-1927 (Geneva, 1929), pp. 33-34. The introduction 
of Hungarians was an experiment of short duration. In industry, only Austrian 
unemployed were admitted as an exceptional measure. 


in the years 1919-1922, fell to 110,000-119,000 in 1923-1924, and 
rose again to 133,000-146,000 in 1925-1930. After the latter date 
the entry of foreign workers was completely stopped. In 1931 
there were only 30,000 still employed in the Reich and in 1932, 
43,000. Those who remained were workers holding permanent 
work permits granted to a few foreign residents in Germany and 
to aliens covered by the special reciprocity agreements. 1 

In 1937, however, in view of the growing labour shortage created 
by the rearmament programme, the German Government decided 
not only to reopen the frontiers to seasonal workers from abroad, 
but also to recruit a certain number. As a result, immigration from 
Poland brought 17,000 agricultural workers into Germany in that 
year and 60,000 in 1938. In the following spring Poland refused 
to put Polish agricultural workers at Germany's disposal in view 
of the tense political situation, but the German authorities "did 
not interfere with the large-scale illegal immigration of Polish 
workers". 2 A new and important source of seasonal agricultural 
labour was found in Italy, whence some 30,000 workers went to 
Germany both in 1938 and 1939. During the harvest season, from 
1937 onwards, immigration was also organised from Austria and 
Czechoslovakia. 3 

The expansion of the Reich with the annexation of Austria in 
March 1938 and of the Sudetenland in the following October, the 
submission of Bohemia and Moravia in March 1939, and the crea- 
tion of the vassal state of Slovakia, opened up abundant sources 
of manpower for German agriculture and industry. These bloodless 
conquests were the prelude to the German drive to the east and 
south-east after the outbreak of war in September 1939, with the 
defeat of Poland and Yugoslavia and the invasion of Russia. Ac- 
cording to one of the favourite theories of National Socialism, this 
Drang nach Osten was intended to enlarge the "living space" of the 
German nation. But the victories of German diplomacy and Ger- 
man arms did not change the traditional pattern of population 
movements. On the contrary, the removal of the frontier barriers 
opened the door still wider to immigration from the countries 
falling under German domination. 

The immigration of workers from the east and south-east began 
with the annexation of Austria, which gave the Austrian unem- 
ployed access to the German labour market. From 1934 to 1939 
Austria lost 140,000 of its population through migration. German 

1 Statistik des Deutschen Reiches, Vol. 441, p. 81. 

Reichsarbeitsblatt, 5 Jan. 1941, No. 1, Part V, p. 2. 

8 P. WAKLBROBCK and I.BESSLING: "Some Aspects of German Social Policy 
under the National Socialist Regime", in International Labour Review, Vol. XLIII, 
No. 2, Feb. 1941, p. 135. 


statisticians attribute this to two important migration movements 
which took place after the annexation: the flight of the Jews and 
the migration of Austrian workers into the Reich to find work. 1 
During the same period Bavaria, which borders on Austria on the 
west and north-west, and where huge building schemes were being 
carried out at the time, gained 95,000 migrants. Thus the current 
of Austrian migration, which had flowed internally but always 
from east to west since the war of 1914-1918, gained with the an- 
nexation of Austria a broad outlet into Germany. 

In Czechoslovakia, the international crisis provoked by the 
Sudeten question led to the same result; the Sudeten Germans 
obtained access to the Reich. Germany could not refuse to take in 
those whom German propaganda had represented as persecuted 
brothers; they were not only admitted, but were supported at the 
expense of the German Government. The number of these so-called 
refugees registered in Germany was stated by Chancellor Hitler 
to be 200,000. 

While, at the time, the exodus of the Sudeten was attributed 
to political persecution, its real nature was explained differently 
later. In 1941, the official publication of the German Ministry of 
Labour, dealing with the movement of the Sudeten Germans to 
Germany just before the annexation of the country, made no 
mention of any political motives. The movement was attributed 
solely to the unemployment which had been rife in the country 
since the crisis of 1929, and which had reached a figure of 250,000 
by October 1938. Attracted by the vast employment opportunities 
which the German armaments programme had opened up on the 
other side of the frontier, the Sudeten Germans "crossed the green 
frontier 2 in their thousands and tens of thousands and found a 
warm welcome in the Old Reich, where the labour shortage was 
already acute". 3 

An immediate result of the annexation was to aggravate the 
situation in the Sudetenland by severing its economic ties with 
Bohemia. In December 1938 a million people nearly a quarter of the 
total population of the Sudetenland received relief from the Ger- 
man "Winter Help" fund. This still further stimulated immigration 
into the Reich, which was no longer barred by a frontier. The 
recruitment of workers for Germany was organised by the em- 
ployment offices. 4 The results were seen in the census returns of 
17 May 1939, which show a migratory loss of 317,000 since the 

1 Wirtschaft und Statistik, 1940, No. 2, and 1941, No. 20. 

2 A German phrase used for illegal emigration. 

3 Reichsarbeitsblatt, 5 May 1941, No. 13, Part V, p. 223. 


previous census of 1 December 1930. Before 1938, emigration from 
the Sudetenland to Germany was insignificant; this tremendous 
loss of nearly 9 per cent, of the population must therefore be at- 
tributed to the exodus which took place just before and after the 
annexation. To some extent this movement was directed towards 
the interior, of Bohemia so far, that is, as concerns the flight of 
the Jews before and after the Germans obtained control of the 
Sudetenland 1 , the flight of Czechoslovak officials after the an- 
nexation, and the expulsion of 40,000 Czdch peasants. But the 
overwhelming majority of the migrants were Sudeten Germans 
moving into the Reich. This is confirmed by the German statis- 
ticians, who state that "the political events of 1938 led to the emi- 
gration of non-German inhabitants, but workers mainly flowed 
into the Old Reich in an urgent search for work and bread". 2 

The occupation of Bohemia and Moravia in March 1939 provid- 
ed Germany with a new source of manpower. Even before, there 
had been a steady movement of migration from Czechoslovakia 
to Germany. 3 After taking over Bohemia and Moravia, however, 
the German Government encouraged Czech emigration. Some 
Czech factories were dismantled and part of their equipment was 
transferred to Germany. Direct encouragement was also given; 
in the first four months following the annexation (March to June 
1939), 52,000 Czechs were engaged in the Reich, including Austria. 4 

Germany's political expansion facilitated the migratory move- 
ment not only of the Czechs but of the Slovaks. One of the results 
of the creation of the vassal state of Slovakia was the movement 
of 40,000 Slovak workers into the Reich. 6 The census of 17 May 
1939 showed 56,600 seasonal workers from Slovakia. 6 

Up to 1938, the foreign workers entering Germany had been 
mostly agricultural labourers. In 1938 there were in all 120,000 
foreign agricultural workers in the Reich. In the spring of 1939, 
however, the annexation of Bohemia and Moravia brought to 
Germany, for the first time, a large body of industrial immigrants. 
On the eve of the present war the total number of foreign workers 

1 Comparing the figures of the last Czechoslovak census in 1930 and the 
German census in 1939, the Jewish population of the Sudetenland fell from 27,400 
to 2,600 between these two dates. 

2 Wirtschaft und Statistik, 1940, No. 2. 

8 This is shown by a comparison between the figures for aliens in the censuses 
of 1933 and 1939. The returns for 1933 show 28,000 Czechoslovaks and those 
for 1939, 86,000 Czechs and 40,000 Slovaks, apart from a further 59,000 seasonal 
workers (Wirtschaft und Statistik, 1940, No. 11). Concerning Czechoslovak 
movements before 1933, cf. INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE: Migration Move- 
ments 1925-1927, pp. 34 and 66. 

4 Reichsarbeitsblatt, 15 Oct. 1940, No. 29, Part V, p. 511. By Nov. 1939 this 
figure had risen to 85,000. 

6 Idem, 5 Jan. 1941, No. 1, Part V, p. 6. 

6 Wirtschaft und Statistik, 1941, No. 12. 


in Germany exceeded half a million 1 , this figure excluding the Sude- 
ten and Austrians who had gone to work in the Old Reich. 

It was not until the outbreak of war in the autumn of 1939, 
however, followed by Germany's military conquests, that a flood 
of foreign labour began to pour into the country and the number 
of foreign workers employed in Germany rose from some hundreds 
of thousands to several millions. 


Several phases may be distinguished in Germany's progressive 
mobilisation of foreign labour since the beginning of the war. These 
phases correspond to the development of military operations, which 
at first gave Germany access to vast reserves of labour, but also 
caused ever-growing losses of manpower which had to be made good 
while maintaining the labour force at the highest possible level. 

On the eve of the war, 24,461,000 wage-earning and salaried 
workers were employed in Germany, including 16,331,000 men and 
8,130,000 women. 2 Even at that time the country's labour reserves 
were already at a low ebb, and the effects of mobilisation were felt 
immediately in a shortage of labour, especially in agriculture. When, 
therefore, the rapid termination of the Polish campaign opened 
up a new and abundant source of manpower, it was immediately 
utilised to the full. Prisoners of war were the first source tapped, 
but all kinds of methods were adopted to recruit civilian Polish 
workers as well. Propaganda, indirect pressure and compulsion 
were all employed to maintain a steady stream of Polish manpower. 

One of the first acts of the German civil administration in the 
General Government was the introduction of compulsory labour 
service for Poles and forced labour for Jews. All unemployed Poles 
from 18 to 60 years of age were subject to labour service. Compul- 
sory registration for work in Germany was introduced by a procla- 
mation of the Governor General issued on 24 April 1940, requiring 
the inhabitants of the General Government, at the invitation of 
their local authorities, to register for agricultural work in Germany. 
This requirement applied especially to men and women born in the 
years 1915 to 1924. Failure to register entailed severe penalties 
and those who did not comply with the requirement were liable to 
prosecution by the police. 3 

1 Reichsarbeitsblatt, 5 Dec. 1941, No. 34, Part V, p. 609. 

8 Idem, 25 Aug. 1940, No. 24, Part V, p. 405. 

8 Cf. S. SEGAV. The New Order in Poland (published by the Research Institute 
on Peace and Post- War Problems of the American Jewish Committee, New York, 
1942), pp. 162 et seq. Forced labour for Jews is dealt with in Chapter II, above. 


In addition to this orderly, if compulsory, form of recruiting, 
Polish labour for Germany was also secured by means of round-ups, 
both in the Polish Provinces annexed by Germany and in the 
General Government. These round-ups, followed by mass arrests 
and deportations, began as early as October 1939. Their object 
was, of course, not merely to provide labour for Germany; those 
arrested included politicians, members of the clergy and of the 
bourgeoisie, and intellectuals, who were sent to concentration 
camps. In Western Poland the main purpose of the wholesale 
arrests and deportations was to clean up the provinces incorporated 
in the Reich and destined to be completely germanised. The great 
majority of the Poles rounded up there in their homes or in the 
streets were deported to the General Government, but those capable 
of physical labour were separated from the women and children, 
the aged and the unfit, and were deported directly from Western 
Poland to Germany. Apart from these political transfers, however, 
the main objective of the coercive methods employed by the German 
authorities was to supply Germany with labour. 

In this way the agricultural labour Germany so urgently needed 
was procured without delay. Train after train brought thousands 
of Poles to replace the mobilised German peasants. 

Having thus strengthened its economic basis, Germany occupied 
Denmark and Norway and then undertook the great offensive in 
the west. The months which followed the collapse of France marked 
the climax of Germany's economic as well as military successes. 
An enormous booty of arms, munitions and other materials had 
fallen into German hands. The food situation was greatly relieved 
by drawing on stocks which had been piled up in the occupied coun- 
tries before the invasion. A million and a half German soldiers 
were living on the rich resources of France. The satisfactory de- 
velopment of the military situation and the temporary lull in land 
operations enabled leave to be granted to a great many peasants 
and industrial workers. 

At the same time as the pressure on Germany's domestic labour 
supply was relieved, further apparently inexhaustible reserves of 
foreign manpower were opened up. Nearly 2,000,000 prisoners of 
war had been taken. Another 2,000,000 workers had been thrown 
out of employment in the countries of Western Europe as a result 
of the destruction and economic dislocation due to their defeat. 
Demobilised soldiers and returning refugees swelled the masses of 
the unemployed, while the shortage of food and rising prices made 
living conditions difficult. Moderate pressure was sufficient to 
provide German industry and agriculture with the workers they 
required. Where necessary, the withholding of relief from the 


unemployed who refused to go to Germany acted as an effective 
stimulus. 1 

The political control of the countries of South-Eastern Europe 
secured by the Reich during the summer and autumn of 1940 
further increased the labour supply available. Indeed, during this 
second stage of the war, extending from the time of the Compi^gne 
Armistice to the opening of the Russian campaign, Germany could 
afford to pick and choose. "We are in a position to-day ", said 
Chancellor Hitler, "to mobilise the manpower of almost the whole 
of Europe, and that I shall do so industrially you may well believe. " 
Germany could obtain from prisoners-of-war camps, from the 
occupied countries, and from its allies, all the workers that were 
needed; the only problem was to regulate and distribute the stream 
of labour. During the closing months of 1940, German labour 
requirements were so amply satisfied that recruitment was tem- 
porarily suspended in certain territories and surplus workers were 
sent home. No serious effort was made at that time to mobilise the 
manpower reserves of France, where there was considerable unem- 
ployment; French prisoners of war provided all the labour that was 

During this period it was still agriculture that benefited most 
from the foreign labour supply. According to a survey issued by 
the German Ministry of Labour, the employment of prisoners of 
war and foreign civilian workers proved to be of decisive importance 
in harvesting the grain and root crops of the Reich in the summer 
and fall of 1940 and in maintaining plantings and agricultural pro- 
duction generally at or close to peacetime levels. 2 After the occupa- 
tion of the industrial countries of the west however, foreign workers 
were employed in increasing numbers in non-agricultural work. 
At the same time, the prisoners of war who had first been sent into 
agriculture were carefully sifted and redistributed with due regard 
to their special skills. 3 Although the total number of foreign workers 
employed in agriculture was constantly rising, the proportion of 

1 The following press controversy between the Polish and German Govern- 
ments is characteristic. On 4 Apr. 1940, the Polish Government in exile (then in 
France) produced a copy of a confidential circular letter issued by Dr. Frank 
to show that the devastation of Poland and deportation of Polish workers was 
carried out according to a plan worked out by Field-Marshal Goering. In reply, 
the German Embassy in Washington stated that: "If such a letter, referring to 
measures taken concerning the Polish working population, exists, it must concern 
the following facts: the Governor General has given orders to the sub-delegate 
authorities to suspend relief payments to those workmen who refuse to accept 
the kind of work offered them in the General Government or in the Reich." (New 
York Times, 4 and 13 Apr. 1940.) 

2 Foreign Commerce Weekly (published by the United States Department of 
Commerce), 26 Apr. 1941, Vol. Ill, No. 4, p. 175. 

* Cf. "The Employment of Prisoners of War in Germany' 1 , in International 
Labour Review, Vol. XLVIII, No. 3, Sept. 1943, p. 316. 


agricultural to industrial workers was falling throughout 1940, 
and this trend became more pronounced from the spring of 1941 
onward, when the call-up of fresh men for the forces in preparation 
for the war against the U.S.S.R. made gaps in the ranks of German 
labour which had to be filled up. In spite of the seasonal require- 
ments of agriculture, which the Reich usually meets by shifting 
prisoners of war between agriculture and industry, the proportion 
of prisoners employed in agriculture was lower in the summer of 
1941 than during the preceding winter. 

The following figures illustrate the change in the employment 
distribution of prisoners of war in Germany during this period 1 : 

of 1940 

of 1940 

of 1941 


Per cent. 

Per cent. 

Per cent. 

Per cent. 

Agriculture and forestry . . 





Mining, transport, indus- 
try, public administration 





For civilian workers, the following figures are available 2 : 

Autumn 1940 

1 April 1941 

Agricultural workers 

Per cent. 

Per cent. 

Industrial workers, employees, domestic 
service. . . 




These figures do not show a very pronounced rise in the per- 
centage of non-agricultural employment. There was, however, an 
important change in the nature of this employment. At the end 
of 1940, half the workers classified as industrial were employed in 
building and construction, whereas the newcomers were chiefly fac- 
tory workers. Unskilled and agricultural workers were recruited 
in eastern and later in south-eastern Europe, while western 
Europe had to supply skilled workers for German industry, and 
in particular for the armament factories. 

1 Reichsarbeitsblatt, 25 May 1941, No. 15, Part V. p. 257. The figures for Sept. 
1941 are taken from // Sole (Milan), 9 Jan. 1942. 

2 The percentages for autumn 1940 are calculated on the basis of absolute 
numbers given by the Official German News Agency (D.N.B.) and cited in Europe 
under Hitler (edited by the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1941), 
p. 22. The figures for 1 Apr. 1941 are taken from Reichsarbeitsblatt, 15 July 1941, 
No. 20, Part V, p. 339. 


With the opening of the campaign against the U.S.S.R. and the 
gradual realisation that this time a long war, costly in manpower, 
was involved, German labour mobilisation entered on a new phase. 

At the beginning of 1941 the position of the labour force in 
Germany was approximately as follows. The number of workers 
and salaried employees in employment, which had been 24,500,000 
at the beginning of the hostilities, was still about 24,000,000. * To 
fill up the gaps in the ranks of male workers left by men drafted 
into the forces, 1,500,000 older workers and boys had been recruited, 
so that the number of male workers, which had been 16,400,000 2 on 
the eve of the war, was still 13,200,000. 3 Furthermore, the number 
of women employed, which had at first fallen from 8,100,000 to 
7,600,000 as a result of the economic dislocation which followed 
mobilisation for the armed forces, had steadily risen until it exceeded 
the pre-war figure by 300,000. 4 To these 21,600,000 German work- 
ers, 1,100,000 foreign civilians and over 1,000,000 prisoners of war 
had been added. 5 

To make good the growing shortage of male German labour 
caused by the demands of the war in Russia, Germany had recourse 
to the further recruitment of women and of foreign labour. In a 
speech delivered on 4 May 1941, Chancellor Hitler announced an 
expansion of the industrial mobilisation of women. The number of 
wage-earning women rose by 1,000,000 between 1 January and the 
end of September 1941; at the end of 1941 it had reached 9,400,000 6 
and in September 1942 it was 9,700,000. 7 But this increased contri- 
bution of woman-power could not in itself replace all the male 
workers called to the forces. To satisfy its economic needs, Ger- 
many turned both to allied countries and to the occupied territories 
for fresh supplies of labour. 

An increasingly prolific source of foreign labour was provided 
by Germany's allies. It has already been noted that Germany had 
begun to recruit workers from Italy and south-eastern Europe 
before the war under special arrangements concluded for the pur- 
pose. This system was developed after the outbreak of the war 

1 The German Ministry of Labour indicates that at the turn of the year 1940- 
1941 the number of occupied workers and employees was 22,670,000 (14,250,000 
men and 8,420,000 women). This number includes foreign civilian workers, but 
not prisoners of war (Wirtschaft und Statistik, 1941, No. 5). The corresponding 
figures in May 1941 were 23,083,000 and in Feb. 1942, 24,084,000 (Reichsarbeits- 
blatt, 25 May 1942, No. 15, Part V, p. 284), and about the same in July (Die 
Deutsche Volkswirtschaft, No. 20, July 1942). 

2 Reichsarbeitsblatt, 15 Aug. 1940, No. 23, Part V, p. 395. 

8 Wirtschaft und Statistik, 1941, No. 5. The total figure given is 14,250,000 
including "over one million foreigners". 

* Reichsarbeitsblatt, 15 Feb. 1941, No. 5, Part V, pp. 85-93. 

6 Statement by Dr. SYRUP (Frankfurter Zeitung, 29 Oct. 1940). 

6 Der Vierjahresplan, 1942, No. 1. 

7 Statement made by State-Secretary KORNER at a German labour conference, 
reported by the Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, 14 Sept. 1942. 


for the recruitment both of seasonal workers and of permanent 
agricultural and industrial workers, the recruitment being so organ- 
ised as to make the Government of the workers* country of origin 
responsible for recruiting the contingents specified in the agree- 
ments and for applying any compulsion that might be necessary. 
Some 250,000 additional workers were acquired in this way during 
the first nine months of 1941. But the bulk of the foreign workers 
needed were sought in the occupied areas. The total of foreign 
civilians employed in the Reich increased from 1 million at the end 
of 1940 to 2,140,000 in September 1941. Not only men, but women 
too were now flocking in from abroad. In 1940, the number of 
women was insignificant; on 1 April 1941 there were 250,000 1 , 
representing one-sixth of all foreign civilian workers, and on 25 
September 1941, 470,000, or about one-fourth of the total. 2 

Between the end of 1940 and September 1941, the number of 
all foreign workers (prisoners of war and civilians together) increased 
by nearly 1,500,000 to a total of over 3,700,000. This number 
did not vary in the course of the autumn or throughout the winter 
of 1941-1942. The figure for foreign civilian workers for 30 January 
1942 was given as 2,138,000. 3 But with the preparation of the new 
spring offensive against Russia the manpower problem became 
particularly acute. The Russian campaign had become a bloody 
war demanding the constant call-up of fresh men to the forces and 
an endless supply of armaments. The age groups newly available 
for military service, youths of 17 and 18 years old, could not satisfy 
the ever-growing demands of the army. Older classes were also 
called to the colours, and the comb-out in the civil service affected 
even the central Government departments. Meanwhile, the results 
of the American war effort were also beginning to be seriously felt. 

To increase industrial production, Germany took three kinds 
of measures. First, a further contraction of non-essential industries, 
such as house building and textile factories, was ordered so as to 
release labour for the production of war supplies. Secondly, an 
effort was made to increase the efficiency of labour, partly by 
developing the piecework system. Thirdly, intensive mobilisation 
of all the manpower reserves of Europe was decided upon, and to 
organise this, Gauleiter Fritz Sauckel was appointed General Con- 
troller of Labour on 21 March 1942. In the Reich itself, all reserves 
of manpower had to be utilised. In the spring of 1942, school- 
children down to 10 years of age and women not already engaged 
in war work were called in to help farmers with their sowing. Even 
tubercular workers, formerly on sickness allowances, were drawn 

1 Reichsarbeitsblatt, 15 July 1941, No. 20, Part V, p. 339. 

2 Idem, 5 Dec. 1941, No. 34, Part V, p. 610. 

' Idem, 25 May 1942, No. 15, Part V, p. 284. 


into employment, and the blind were specially trained for certain 
unskilled jobs. But the mainstay of Germany's war effort had to be 
found in the conquered or allied countries. 

To justify this general mobilisation of European labour it was 
represented as the duty of all European countries to help Germany 
in the struggle against Bolshevism. One form of this help was 
military. The Italians, Rumanians, Hungarians, Croats and Slo- 
vaks sent fresh auxiliary forces to the eastern front, while token 
legions of volunteers were formed in France, Belgium, the Nether- 
lands, Denmark, Norway, the Baltic States and Spain. But by far 
the major part of the assistance required by Germany from her 
allies and from the conquered countries was in the form of their 
agricultural and industrial production and their working population. 

Recruitment facilities, however, no longer corresponded to 
German needs. Unemployment had to a large extent been eliminat- 
ed. 1 This was due in part to the German war orders placed in the 
occupied countries and to the increasing number of workers em- 
ployed by the Todt Organisation in building defence works along 
the coast. But an important part had also been played during the 
first two years of occupation by the action taken by national and 
local authorities in these countries to reduce the number of unem- 
ployed to a minimum by spreading available employment among 
the greatest possible number of workers and by organising recon- 
struction or relief works. These measures were encouraged at first 
by the occupation authorities, who relied on the propaganda effect 
of a rapid abolition of unemployment. By the beginning of 1942, 
however, they were no longer compatible with the satisfaction of 
the greatly increased demands of Germany's war economy for 
labour. As there were no more high-grade workers to be found 
among those who were still unemployed, Germany began to 
squeeze out the required workers from the undertakings of the 
occupied countries. 

To this end, uniform measures were adopted, although at 
different dates, throughout Europe. Complete control over the 
distribution of war materials and fuel enabled all industries which 
were not working for Germany to be restricted or closed down. 
Public works and reconstruction work regarded as unnecessary 
for war purposes were suspended. Hours of work were compulsorily 
extended, industries were concentrated to save labour, employers 
were forced to dismiss their surplus workers, to make regular re- 
turns of their staffs to the German authorities, and to provide the 
latter with any workers they demanded. All unemployed persons 

1 Idem, 25 Aug. 1941, No. 24, Part V, pp. 413-417. Cf. also INTERNATIONAL 
LABOUR OFFICE: Year-Book of Labour Statistics, 1942, pp. 53-59. 


were obliged to register, and compulsory labour service, which 
had been established in Poland immediately after the occupation, 
was now introduced in all the countries of western Europe. Restricted 
at first to employment in the occupied countries, it was soon extend- 
ed to include employment in Germany or in any other territory. 
In the Netherlands, this extension took place as early as March 
1942; in Belgium, in October. On 22 August 1942, Dr. Sauckel issued 
an Order establishing a general order of priority for the employ- 
ment of labour in all the occupied territories, in which first priority 
was given to the requirements of the civilian and military occupa- 
tion authorities and of all undertakings working for the German 
armament industries. 1 At the same time strong pressure was brought 
to bear on the French Government, which after trying in vain to 
recruit the workers demanded by Germany by methods of persua- 
sion, in turn introduced compulsory labour in September 1942. 2 

The countries allied to Germany were also required to comb out 
their labour in order to be able to provide Germany with a larger 
supply. In Italy, new decrees concerning the mobilisation of civilian 
labour were published on 26 February and 7 December. In Slovakia, 
compulsory labour was introduced in March 1942 on the German 
model. But it was mainly to the occupied territory of the U.S.S.R. 
that recourse was had from the spring of 1942 onward to make 
good the growing labour shortage in the German war economy. 
After the opening of the Russian campaign, some objections and 
difficulties had been raised to the importation of Russian workers, 
but these were overcome, and an endless stream of Russian labour 
also began to flow into Germany. 

During the spring of 1942, the number of foreign civilians 
employed in Germany was 2,500,000, the total of all foreign 
labour being about 4,000,000. 3 This total increased to approxi- 
mately 5,000,000 in August 1942 4 and to 6,000,000 by the end of 
October. 5 The estimate for the beginning of 1943 was 6,500,000 and 
the increase during the later months has been considerable. 6 

1 Reichsarbeitsblatt, 5 Sept. 1942, No. 25, Part I, p. 382, quoted in International 
Labour Review, Vol. XLVI, No. 6, Dec. 1942, pp. 732-733. 

2 Cf. "The Recruitment of French Labour for Germany ", in International 
Labour Review, Vol. XLVII, No. 3, Mar. 1943, pp. 312-343. 

8 Frankfurter Zeitung, 4 Aug. 1942. 

4 Ibid., In July 1942 it was estimated that since Dr. Sauckel's appointment 
in March, the number of foreign workers had increased by 900,000 (Der Deut- 
sche Volkswirt, 17 July 1942). 

6 The Brusseler Zeitung, 9 Oct. 1942, gave the figure of 6,000,000. The same 
number was quoted in Izvestia, 29 Oct. 1942, on the basis of "official German data' 1 . 

6 A Moscow radio broadcast by Ilya Ehrenburg on 3 Jan. 1943 spoke of 
"7,000,000 foreign slaves in Germany". The Vichy radio, on 6 Jan. 1943, reported 
authorised circles in Berlin as stating that between 6,000,000 and 8,000,000 
foreign workers were employed in industry and agriculture in the Reich. Accord- 
ing to one German source (Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, 30 June 1943), the 
total of all foreign labour employed in Germany on 31 May 1943 would have 
reached 12 million. 


This huge mass of workers was employed in the most varied 
occupations. A large proportion of them naturally continued to 
be absorbed by agriculture. According to a statement made by Dr. 
Sauckel, more labour was employed in agriculture in Greater 
Germany in June 1942 than in 1938, and Germany's labour prob- 
lems were practically solved in the field of food production. 1 
During the first two years of the war, the employment of foreign 
labour in the engineering and metal industries was held up to some 
extent by German reluctance to give foreigners access to the secrets 
of armament production. By the end of 1942, however, 17 per cent, 
of all industrial workers in Germany were foreign, either civilians 
or prisoners of war, and according to the statement by Dr. Sauckel 
quoted above, in September a large number of foreign workers 
were employed in armament production. 2 The difficulty of provid- 
ing these industries with skilled workers has become particularly 
acute since the Russians, in 1942 still more than in 1941, system- 
atically transferred such workers to the east before retreating. As 
a result, skilled workers have been particularly sought in the Western 
European countries and definite quotas have been demanded from 
France since the summer of 1942. Training for skilled industrial 
work has now become the watchword, not only for Germans, but 
also for foreign workers. All objections to training foreign workers, 
according to Dr. Sauckel, must give way before the need to obtain 
maximum production in the highly skilled armament industries. 3 
As a leading German paper puts it 4 , "a continued supply of foreign 
labour remains the only means whereby Germany's war effort 
can be still further expanded 1 '. 

Agriculture and industry, moreover, are not the only fields to 
which foreign workers have been admitted. They are to be found 
in every occupation. "The Reich capital", wrote a foreign corres- 
pondent in January 1942, "is rapidly becoming cosmopolitan, in 
that foreign workers whom circumstances have made a vital factor 
in Germany's war effort, together with war prisoners of many 
nations, especially Polish and French, with pick-and-shovel tasks, 
have forced themselves on the streets to the extent that in some 
sections of the city they seem to be crowding off the natives". 5 
In restaurants, the Italian or French waiter is a customary figure. 
Even a sleeping-car conductor may be a Frenchman. 6 

Lastly, Germany is not the sole destination of the foreign work- 
ers, who are transferred from one occupied territory to another as 

1 Svenska Dag bladet, 26 Sept. 1942. 


*Der Deutsche Volkswirt, 17 July 1942. 

4 Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, 15 Sept. 1942. 

8 New York Times, 19 Jan. 1942. 

* Howard SMITH: Last Train from Berlin (NewJYork, 1942), p. 355. 


need arises. Danes, Belgians and Netherlanders have been sent to 
reinforce the army of 100,000 Norwegian workers engaged in build- 
ing fortifications along the coast. Skilled workers and farmers from 
the west have been transferred to Poland and Russia, to direct the 
work of the local inhabitants or to manage farms, while increasing 
numbers of Russians, Czechs and Poles are reported to be working 
in the countries of Western Europe. 

Great care is taken to prevent any of the undesirable consequen- 
ces which might be expected to arise from this mixture of nation- 
alities. The different national groups of workers are housed in 
separate barracks and employed as far as possible in different work- 
shops. An Italian press correspondent has described a huge factory 
built near Linz for the production of aircraft, motor vehicles and 
other armaments which employs workers from all over Europe. 
Italians in particular are very numerous, especially building and 
metal workers. Finland is the only country which is not represented 
in the working population of this region, which includes many 
Russian prisoners, and even some British prisoners who, in the 
writer's words, "also have to lay their stone in building the new 
Europe in order to earn the right to eat their daily bread". 1 Another 
description of these concentrations of humdnity was given recently 
by a German press correspondent: 

Thousands of foreigners live in the barrack towns in the valley of the Erzberg 
and in the surroundings of the great foundries. The long winter cuts them off 
for by far the greater part of the year from the rest of the world while they per- 
form the very hard labour of surface mining, and for good or ill they are pressed 
into the traditional ways of the mining community. Europeans of all tongues, 
men and women from the Stakhanov factories of the Rostov district inflate the 
old manageable mining communities and represent, apart from the dominating 
economic questions, a new social problem, the solution of which strongly influences 
the functioning of production. 2 

But Germany's opportunities for obtaining foreign labour are 
no longer so unlimited as they appeared to be during the first three 
years of the war. The manpower reserves of Western Europe are 
nearing exhaustion. In south-eastern Europe, some of Germany's 
allies have even recalled their workers, whom they needed urgently 
for their own purposes 3 , and the recruitment of labour from the 
Eastern Territories is increasingly impeded by the latters' own 
pressing economic needs, bound up with Germany's war effort, 
and by the demands of the army. "The predominance of eastern 
workers", writes a German economic review, "will increase still 
further in the near future, but it must not lead to the erroneous 

1 Popolo d* Italia, 28 Feb. 1943, despatch from the Berlin correspondent. 
8 Vdlkischer Beobachter (Vienna edition), 21 Jan. 1943. 
* Cf. also below, under Italy, p. 157. 


belief that this source of labour is inexhaustible. There is a limit 
to the number of workers who can be withdrawn from eastern 
Europe." 1 

In spite of all these difficulties, Germany is persevering with the 
total mobilisation of all the labour resources of Europe, and is 
resorting more and more to coercion to overcome the growing 
resistance in the occupied countries. Recruitment is now taking 
the form of mass deportation. In preparation for future military 
operations, a supreme effort to make use of all available resources 
has been undertaken since February 1943. Two Decrees of 27 and 
29 January 1943 prescribed further drastic measures to comb out 
the last reserves of labour in Germany itself, and similar measures 
have been imposed on the occupied territories. It may be expected 
that during the coming months maximum pressure will be exerted, 
without consideration for the requirements of the countries con- 
cerned, to squeeze out the extra supply of labour necessary to main- 
tain Germany's war production at the highest possible level. In a 
speech delivered at Amsterdam in January 1943, Dr. Sauckel 
proclaimed "the conqueror's right to use all the power he needs 
for his own preservation" 2 , and the Fiihrer himself declared, in a 
proclamation of 24 February 1943, that: "We shall not hesitate a 
single second to call upon the countries which are responsible for 
the outbreak of this war to do their bit in the fatal struggle. We 
shall not scruple about foreign lives at a time when such hard 
sacrifices are expected from our own lives. 1 ' 

In the following pages a brief description is given of the pro- 
gressive development of the recruitment of labour in each of the 
countries under German domination. 



The migration into the Reich of some 200,000 Sudeten Germans, 
including tens of thousands of workers, has already been mentioned; 
this took place just before the annexation of the Sudetenland as 
well as afterwards. After the annexation, this great movement of 
voluntary migration was swelled by the forced transfer of Czech 
workers. The incorporation of the Sudetenland into Germany gave 
the German authorities the power to employ workers from that 
region in any part of the Reich. The German Government wanted 

* Der Deutsche Volkswirt, 20 Nov. 1942. 

* Deutsche Zeitung in den Niederlanden, 21 Jan. 1943. 


to rid the Sudetenland of the Czechoslovak minority, which had 
already been severely reduced by the flight of Czechoslovak officials 
and the expulsion of the peasants, and after the outbreak of war 
almost all Czech workers (in particular those from Teschen and 
Tropau) were forced to leave their homes and go into Germany. 

In the meantime, the scarcity of skilled labour, due mainly 
to the departure of the Sudeten Germans, became more and more 
acute and began to alarm the German authorities. On 5 December 
1940 a Decree was issued to promote the return of Sudeten Germans 
to the Sudetenland. Nevertheless, the shortage of labour continued, 
especially in the metal industries and in mining, while there was 
also a great lack of building workers. To fill the gap, migration of 
frontier workers from the Protectorate was permitted on a wider 
scale, but the reserve of manpower mobilised in this way was soon 
exhausted. 1 

Information supplied by the Czechoslovak Ministry of Recon- 
struction in London suggests that the labour supply position in the 
Sudetenland is now worse than ever. Communications from econo- 
mic experts in this region, all of which have passed the censor- 
ship, complain of a terrible scarcity of skilled labour in industry 
and state quite frankly that this is due solely to emigration to 

Figures for the total number of workers who moved into Ger- 
many from the Sudetenland are not available, as this region has 
been entirely incorporated into the German Reich and no separate 
statistics of Sudeten Germans working in Germany are published. 
So far as can be ascertained, workers from the Sudetenland are 
employed in all parts of the Old Reich. 

Bohemia and Moravia. 

As already stated, the recruiting of Czech workers for Germany 
had begun before the war. From March to June 1939, 52,000 Czechs 
were engaged for work in Germany; 55,000 more were recruited 
between July 1939 and March 1940, and another 23,000 from March 
1940 up to the end of 1940. In the spring of 1941, 150,000 Czechs 
were employed in the Reich. On 25 September 1941 the number 
was given as 140,000, of whom 28,200 were women. 2 This figure 
does not include 24,000 Czechs living on the frontiers within the 
Protectorate but working in the industries of the Sudetenland, Silesia 

1 Reichsarbeitsblatt, 5 May 1941, No. 13, Part V, pp. 223-224. 

2 Idem, 15 Oct. 1940, No. 29, Part V, p. 512; 15 July 1941, No. 20, Part V, 
p. 339; and 5 Dec. 1941, No. 34, Part V, p. 610; Wirtschaft und Statistik, 
1941, No. 5. It should be remembered that in some cases the statistics give the 
gross total number of workers recruited, some of whom naturally returned home, 
and in others the number of workers who were present at a given date. 


and Austria, nor the 35,000 Czech seasonal workers employed in 
the beet and hop fields in the adjacent German districts. 1 It seems 
that throughout this entire period the Protectorate was not drained 
of its labour as ruthlessly as other countries because the Czech 
workers were needed for the highly developed metallurgical industry 
on the spot. But according to newspaper and other reports, a new 
and more powerful drive for labour for Germany was launched in 
the Protectorate in the spring of 1942. Only the armament-producing 
metallurgical plants still continued to operate at full capacity. 
Others were closed or cut down their production to release workers 
for employment in the Reich. It is true that the increasingly heavy 
British air raids led to the removal to the Protectorate of many war 
factories from Germany, in particular from the Ruhr, but these 
were transferred along with their own workers. Many Czech work- 
ers were also sent-to Austria and to the old Reich at the same time 2 , 
so that an estimate of 200,000 Czechs employed in Greater Germany 
by August-September 1942 is probably not exaggerated. 3 

Most of the Czech workers are employed in the metallurgical 
industry and in building. The largest colony is apparently at Linz 
in Upper Austria, where there was a labour shortage due to the 
emigration of Austrians who had gone to look for work in Germany 
after the annexation. 4 Many others were employed in Brunswick 
andfBerlin. 5 Czech building workers are also reported to have 
been sent to north-western France and Norway, where they were 
employed in 'building 'fortifications. 


In Slovakia, with its relatively dense population and undeve- 
loped industry, the rural population used to migrate for seasonal work 
to the Sudetenland and other neighbouring parts of Bohemia and 
Moravia as well as to Austria. After the secession of Slovakia this 
movement was organised in Germany's interests, and an agreement 
was concluded between Germany and Slovakia under which Slova- 
kia undertook to provide from 50,000 to 60,000 workers yearly for 
the Reich. According to German sources, the total number of 

* Reichsarbeitsblatt, 5 Jan. 1942, No. 1, Part V, p. 6. 

8 Christian Science Monitor, 11 June 1942. 

New York Times, 5 Aug. 1942. 

4 Reichsarbeitsblatt, 15 May 1941, No. 14, Part V, p. 241. 

8 Eug. V. ERDBI^EY: op. cit., p. 191. Some conclusions concerning the loca- 
tion of the Czech workers may be drawn from the distribution of Bohemian- 
Moravian local liaison offices. They have been established: (1) in Linz for 
Oberdonau, Salzburg and Tyrol; (2) in Vienna for Vienna, Niederdonau and 
Styria; (3) in Berlin for Mark Brandenburg; (4) in Hanover for South Hanover 
and Brunswick; (5) in Breslau for Lower and Upper Silesia. 


Slovak workers in Germany had reached 80,000, of whom 25,000 
were women, by 25 September 1941. l This figure does not, however, 
reflect the real volume of Slovak labour employed in Germany. 
Statistics published in Slovakia give the number of 120,000. 2 As a 
result of the intensive recruitment of labour for Germany, a shortage 
of labour began to be felt in Slovakia itself, especially in agriculture, 
but in industry as well, and many public and private building 
schemes had to be postponed or abandoned for this reason. 3 


On 1 September 1939 Germany invaded Poland. On 27 Septem- 
ber Warsaw surrendered, and on 28 September the German and 
Soviet Governments fixed the frontiers in Poland, proclaiming the 
end of the Polish State. 

After the conquest of Poland the German authorities " hastened 
to draw on the labour reserves made available by the Polish cam- 
paign". 4 These possibilities were twofold: first, prisoners of war, 
and secondly, workers recruited in Poland. At first, the rapidly 
growing number of Poles who were brought to Germany after the 
fall of Poland were chiefly prisoners of war, but during the course 
of 1940 the proportion of prisoners to civilian workers changed. 
While the number of Polish prisoners of war employed in Germany 
diminished, that of other Polish workers rose steadily. 

Prisoners of War. 

According to German statements, the total number of prisoners 
of war captured during the hostilities in Poland was 694,000 includ- 
ing the Polish divisions which were surrounded by the Germans 
in the last stages of the campaign. Of this number, at least 10,000 
died after their capture, and about 140,000 were later released and 
sent home. The remainder, some 540,000, were finally transferred 
to Germany, where many of them were employed in agriculture 
as well as on road building and other public works. During the 
course of 1940, large numbers of Polish prisoners, in particular 
those who were unfit for work owing to their state of health, were 
sent back to Poland. Others were technically released, but detained 
as civilian workers. According to an official German source, 180,000 
former Polish prisoners of war were employed as free labourers in 
German agriculture at the end of 1940. 5 In May 1941 the German 

1 Reichsarbeitsblatt, 5 Dec. 1941, No. 34, Part V, p. 610. 

2 Stidost Echo, 15 Jan. 1942. 

Idem, 17 July 1942; Hospodarsky Dennik, 22 Oct. 1942. 
4 Reichsarbeitsblatt, 5 Jan. 1941, No. 1, Part V, p. 7. 
6 Wirtschaft und Statistik, 1941, No. 5. 


authorities stated that only a comparatively small number of Poles 
still remained in captivity. 1 According to a well-informed source, 
the number was 77,400 in August 1942 and 56,000 in March 1943. 
f By this time the compulsory labour of Polish prisoners of war 
had been adequately replaced by civilian labour. Some of these 
workers were freed prisoners, but the majority were civilians trans- 
ferred from Poland, described by the German authorities as "free 

Civilian Workers. 

The occupation of Poland ' 'opened up the possibility of recruit- 
ing free civilian workers in the regions which traditionally supplied 
Polish agricultural labour". 2 Indeed, as has already been noted, 
emigration to Germany was a route which had long been followed 
by migrant labour. 

Some six months before the outbreak of war, on 17 January 
1939, Mr. Koscialkowski, Polish Minister of Social Welfare, made 
a statement to the Committee on Estimates of the Diet on national 
social policy, in which he declared that the question of seasonal 
emigration was of special importance to the Polish Government. 
This problem, he added, was linked up with that of the impossibility 
of absorbing all available national labour in the national labour 
market. 3 As already noted, the policy of promoting seasonal emigra- 
tion at that time did not materialise, and legal immigration to 
Germany came to a halt in the following spring on account of the 
political tension between Germany and Poland. The resumption 
of the movement after the invasion of Poland may therefore be 
considered to some extent as a reopening of traditional channels. 
To some observers, the recruiting of Polish labour has appeared 
in this light from the very beginning. The correspondent of the 
New York Times cabled as follows in his first despatch concerning 
the recruiting of Polish workers: " Among their number are seasonal 
workers who came each year from Poland for harvesting work, 
but were forbidden to come this year. These have been sent to the 
Reich now by provisional employment bureaux set up in Poland by 
the German authorities." 4 

However, the scale on which the movement now developed, 
and the methods used to develop it, soon entirely transformed its 
character. Whereas in the past it had been a normal overflow from 
certain overcrowded regions, what now took place was a systematic 

l Reichsarbeitsttatt, 25 May 1941, No. 15, Part V, p. 258. 

8 Idem, 5 Jan. 1941, No. 1, Part V, p. 7. 

1 Industrial and Labour Information, Vol. LXIX, No. 8, 20 Feb. 1939, p. 228. 

* New York Times, 13 Oct. 1939. 


draining away of all the resources which could be useful to a foreign 
economy, the needs of which were becoming increasingly insatiable. 

Polish civilians were recruited for work in Germany throughout 
the length and breadth of the occupied territory. Even when the 
campaign was still in full swing, Germany began to establish em- 
ployment offices in the occupied districts. These offices were sub- 
sequently set up in other parts of the country in order to obtain 
the labour required for reconstruction and current agricultural work 
in Poland, as well as for work in German agriculture. By the end 
of 1941, there were in the General Government alone (not including 
the former Soviet-occupied districts of Lvov and Bialystok) 20 main 
employment offices with 63 branches. 1 

By the middle ot October 1939, several trainloads of Polish 
workers had proceeded to Germany. Before the end of the year, 
agricultural undertakings in the Reich had been supplied with 
80,000 civilian workers from the Incorporated Provinces and the 
General Government. From January 1940 recruitment became 
more intense. From the end of the Polish campaign to 31 December 
1940, some 469,000 civilians were recruited in the Incorporated 
Provinces and the General Government and sent to Germany for 
farm work. 2 According to a German official statistical report, the 
number of Poles (besides war prisoners) occupied in Germany, 
including both industrial and agricultural workers, amounted to 
873,000 on 1 April 1941, and on 25 September 1941 it was 1,007,000.' 
In July 1942, a reliable source reported the number as 1,095, 000. 4 
The estimated number for the beginning of 1943 would be about 
1,300,000. 6 

Besides being employed in the Reich, Polish workers are re- 
ported to have been conscripted in great numbers as labour troops 
for the German army on the Russian front. 8 

1 Reichsarbeitsblatt, 5 Jan. 1942, No. 1, Part V, p. 6. 

2 Idem, 5 Jan. 1941, No. 1, Part V, p. 8, and Wirtschaft und Statistik, 1941, 
No. 5. 

8 Reichsarbeitsblatt, 15 July 1941, No. 20, Part V, p. 339, and 5 Dec. 1941, 
No. 34, Part V, p. 610. 

4 This figure is corroborated by the following calculation. The Krakauer 
Zeitung reported that 830,000 Polish workers were sent to Germany by the 
General Government only; 400,000 were sent by the Incorporated Provinces 
(cf. below, p. 138) and 180,000 were transferred Polish prisoners of war (Wirt- 
schaft und Statistik, 1941, No. 5). This gives a total of 1,400,000 Poles sent to the 
Reich. Assuming that 15 per cent. Returned home, this gives a figure of 1,200,000 
employed in the Reich in Aug. 1942. The number of workers sent in Aug. was 
reported as 90,700. 

5 The total number of workers sent to Germany from the General Government 
up to the end of 1942 was about 940,000 (about 380,000 having been sent in the 
course of 1942). It has been announced that the train carrying workers to Ger- 
many which left Cracow on 13 Mar. 1943 conveyed the millionth Polish worker 
(Krakauer Zeitung, 14 Mar. 1943). 

6 New York Times, 16 June 1942, mentioned among other reports the con- 
scription of 100,000 from Silesia and about 70,000 from Poznan "during the past 
fourteen days". 


The number of Polish women working in Germany is given as 
262,700, or 25 per cent, of the, total of Polish workers, by German 
official statistics of 25 September 1941. One-fourth of these women 
are reported to have worked on farms. 

According to a reliable source, 700,000 civilian Polish workers 
were employed in agriculture on 1 June 1942. The Polish Govern- 
ment in London gave the following information about the employ- 
ment of Poles in Germany at the beginning of 1942: "About 70 
per cent, of them are used for agriculture; the rest are employed in 
building, manufacturing, etc. The Germans avoid employing Polish 
deportees in important war industry, where sabotage is feared. " 
The proportion of industrial workers, however, has been steadily 
on the increase. While the first contingents transferred in 1940 
were recruited almost entirely for agricultural work, information 
from a German source indicates that from January to August 1942, 
288,400 industrial Polish workers were sent to work in Germany. 1 
Later figures, though fragmentary, suggest that newly recruited 
workers have nearly all been placed in industry. In December 
1942, the number of workers enlisted in the General Government 
for work in the Reich was 31,595. Of these only 600 were for agri- 
culture; the rest were for industry. 2 

According to information supplied by the Polish Ministry of 
Labour in London concerning the geographical origin of the Polish 
workers in Germany, of 1,000,000 Polish civilian workers employed 
at the beginning of 1942, 400,000 had been brought from the terri- 
tory annexed by the Reich. The detailed figures are 250,000 from 
Poznan and Lodz (the area known as the Warthegau), and 150,000 
from Pomerania and Silesia. The deportees from Silesia were mostly 
agricultural workers, as all others were needed for local factories 
and coal mines. 

Norway and Denmark 
Prisoners of War. 

On 9 April 1940 Germany occupied Denmark and invaded 
Norway. According to an unofficial estimate, 50, 000 prisoners of war 
were taken in the Norwegian campaign 8 , but an official German 
source states that none were transferred from Norway to Germany.* 

Civilian Workers. 

With Denmark, "negotiations for the engagement of workers 

1 A D.N.B. report of 9 Oct. 1942, quoted in Survey of Central and Eastern 
Europe, Nov.-Dec. 1942. 

1 Krakauer Zeitung, 28 Jan. 1943. 

New York Times, 8 July 1940. 

4 Reichsarbeitsblatt, 25 May 1941, No. 15, Part V, p. 258. 


were opened immediately after the occupation of the country, in 
connection with the supply of coal and raw materials to Denmark. 
It was pointed out on the German side that the employment of 
Danish labour in Germany would enable that country to give the 
labour needed for extracting the coal wanted by Denmark/' 1 On 1 
April 1941 there were 31,000 Danes and 1,400 Norwegians employed 
in Germany, and on 25 September 1941 the number of Danes was 
28,900. 2 According to press reports they were employed as factory 
hands and in construction work, mainly in ports in the north-west 
of Germany. A report from Sweden states that in August 1942 
there were 40,000 Danish workers in Germany 3 , while 5,000 were 
sent to German fortification works in Norway. In spring 1943 this 
number had risen to 10,000. 4 

The situation in the latter country is described by the official 
German Reichsarbeitsblatt as follows: "The unemployment which 
prevailed at first in the Norwegian war sector was soon transformed 
by military construction works into a labour shortage. General 
compulsory labour was therefore introduced by an Order of 11 July 
1941. This measure was necessary to supply agriculture, for ex- 
ample, with the necessary manpower/' 5 But other information 
suggests that labour conscription in Norway was applied primarily 
for the purposes of military construction. 6 The number of Nor- 
wegians employed in Germany was unofficially reported to be still 
only 2,000 in the autumn of 1942. 

The Netherlands 
Prisoners of War. 

On 10 May 1940 Germany invaded the Netherlands, and on 14 
May the Netherlands Army laid clown its arms. 

During this brief campaign, according to an unofficial estimate 

1 P. WAELBROECK and I. BESvSLiNG: loc. eit., p. 136. In Aug. 1942 it was 
reported from a Swedish source that the Germans had not delivered more than 
30 to 40 per cent, of the promised quantity of fuel. 

2 Wirtschaft und Statistik, 1941, No. 5; Reichsarbeitsblatt, 15 July 1941, No. 
20, Part V, p. 339, and 5 Dec. 1941, No. 34, Part V, p. 610. 

3 The figure of 48,000 was given by Faedrelandet on 22 Nov. 1942. 

4 Vestkysten (Esbjerg, Denmark), 12 Apr. 1943. 

5 Reichsarbeitsblatt, 25 Mar. 1942, No. 9, Part V, p. 179. 

6 On 9 July 1942 Folketoiljan reported that most of the 75,000 Norwegians 
conscripted for employment would be employed in Norway on various defence 
schemes. According to Afton-Tidningen, 20 July 1942, between 14,000 and 20,000 
men were conscripted from Oslo and other parts of Oestlandet and sent to fortifica- 
tion works and aerodromes in Soerlandet, Vestlandet and Troendelag. It is 
estimated that, as a whole, the number of Norwegian workers directly engaged 
in German building activities and fortification works in the autumn of 1942 was 
slightly above 100,000, i.e. one-third of the number of workers engaged in Norwe- 
gian manufacturing industries before the war. This figure, it is pointed out, 
accounts for the fact that no large-scale transfer of Norwegian workers to Germany 
has taken place. On the contrary, a considerable number of foreign workers have 
been transferred to Norway. 


by a source already quoted, 331,000 men were captured, but on 1 
June 1940 Chancellor Hitler announced that the Netherlands 
prisoners would be released. Half of them were set free immediately 
and the rest demobilised by degrees. Only a small number, mostly 
officers, were kept in captivity. 1 

Civilian Workers. 

While the Germans thus deprived themselves of the services of 
some 330,000 prisoners whom they might have used as workers, 
they began immediately after the occupation to recruit the 
workers they needed directly from the Netherlands labour market. 
As a result of economic dislocation, the release of prisoners of war 
and the demobilisation of the army, the number of registered un- 
employed had risen at that time to 400,000, and invisible unem- 
ployment probably accounted for a further 100, 000. 2 Before the 
war a number of workers from the Netherlands were more or less 
regularly employed in Germany, mostly as frontier and seasonal 
workers. After the occupation this movement was revived and 
systematically encouraged. Workers who declined employment 
offered in Germany were refused all unemployment relief. 

Between 20 June and 30 December 1940, nearly 100,000 workers 
were placed in employment in Germany, including over 31,000 as 
frontier workers. Recruitment was suspended during the winter, 
bjt in January 1941 big groups of workers were being prepared 
for departure in the spring. The employment offered was mainly 
agricultural work and skilled work in the building industry. 3 

During 1941 the number of workers recruited for Germany rose 
steadily. From 20 June 1940 it rose to 130,634 (45,478 frontier work- 
ers and 85,156 others) at 26 April 1941 and 157,033 (55,239 frontier 
workers and 10 1,7 94 others) at 2 August 1941. 4 By 28 December 1941 

1 According to a Stockholm report, more than 2,000 former army officers and 
cadets released on parole were rounded up on 15 May 1942 and sent to prisoner- 
of-war camps in the Reich. A later report indicates that they were subsequently 
transferred to a prisoners' camp at Stanislawow in Polish Galicia (Netherlands 
News, 15 Dec. 1942). It has recently been announced that all Dutch prisoners 
of war who had been .released in 1940 were called to report in order to be interned 
and transferred to Germany, as a reprisal measure for sabotage action in the 
Netherlands. However, the official D.N.B. agency stated, on 29 Apr. 1943, that 
at that time officers and non-commissioned officers of the former army were 
merely required to report, and that nothing was yet known about the actual 
time of their return to German prisoner-of-war camps. 

2 Reichsarbeitsblatt, 5 Mar. 1941, No. 7, Part V, p. 128. 

3 The information given , unless otherwise st atecl, is taken from De A rbeidsmarkt, 
organ of the Netherlands National Unemployment Council, Dec. 1940- Dec. 1941, 
and Arbeidsbesiel, organ of the Netherlands National Labour Council, Jan. 1942 - 
May 1943, 

4 According to the Rcichsarbeitsblatt (see table, p. 160), the number of civilian 
Netherlands workers employed in the Reich on 1 Apr. and 25 Sept. 1941 respect- 
ively was 90,000 and 93,000, the difference doubtless being due to the inclusion 
of frontier workers in the Netherlands figures. 


the figure was 199,655 (67,040 frontier workers and 132,615 others) 
and by March 1942, it was 235,793 (74,215 frontier workers and 
161,578 others). During the same period, however, there was a 
steady return movement of workers whose contracts had expired. 
The total number of returns recorded was 61,000 at 28 February 
1942, but it was admitted that an unknown number of workers had 
also broken their contracts and returned secretly. The total number 
of workers employed in Germany at the end of March 1942 may 
therefore be estimated at between 160,000 and 170,000. In addi- 
tion, 29,472 workers had also been recruited in the Netherlands 
since June 1940 for work in France and Belgium. Most of those 
recruited for Germany were industrial workers. According to in- 
formation published by the Netherlands Central Statistical Bureau 
in March 1942 1 , out of 227,000 workers recruited up to the end of 
February, 17,000 were employed in farming, 5,000 in domestic 
service, 24,000 in transportation and commerce, while 130,000 
belonged to various groups of skilled industrial labour, 48,000 were 
registered as unskilled and 3,000 were unclassified. 

The proportion of industrial labour, and more particularly of 
skilled labour, rose still higher during the following months. In the 
Netherlands, as in France and in Germany itself, the mobilisation 
of labour for Germany was intensified under the direction of Dr. 
Fritz Sauckel, who was appointed General Controller of Labour in 
Berlin on 21 March 1942. A three-months campaign was set on 
foot, directed mainly to the recruitment of metal workers, which 
resulted in providing about 30,000 metal workers for German in- 
dustry. Special commissions were set up by the German authorities 
to comb out the labour force of the metal-working undertakings 
in the Netherlands and to send those regarded as surplus to require- 
ments to Germanyif necessary, by having recourse to the com- 
pulsory labour service which had been introduced for work within 
the country in March 1941 and extended to cover work in Germany 
a year later. 

At the beginning of July the commissions had finished their 
work and were disbanded and the second stage of the programme 
was put in hand, namely the expansion of output with a view to 
economising labour and releasing further workers for employment 
in the German armament industries. Measures were taken to pro- 
mote the retraining of workers in other occupations for the German 
metal-working industries at the rate of 2,330 a month. And lastly, 
the transfer of whole undertakings together with their staffs, which 
had been begun some time earlier, was methodically organised. 

1 Quoted in Netherlands News (New York), 11-25 Sept. 1942. 



The following figures show the expansion of recruitment, espe- 
cially during the months of May, June and October. 

Workers in other parts of the Reich 












30 March-25 April 1942 







27 April-31 May 1942 







June 1942 







July 1942 







August 1942 







September 1942 







October 1942 







November 1942 







December 1942 







* No published data 

At the end of December 1942, the total number of workers 
recruited for Germany since 20 June 1940 had risen from 226,921 
at 28 March to 362,956, including 87,514 frontier workers. The 
number of workers recorded as having returned was 100,084 so that, 
making allowance for secret returns, the number of workers then 
employed in Germany was probably between 255,000 and 260, OOO. 1 
The number of workers from the Netherlands working in France 
and Belgium, which had remained stable for several months, was 
then 36,500. 

At the beginning of 1943 a fresh effort was made to mobilise the 
remaining labour reserves in the Netherlands. General civilian 
mobilisation was ordered on 22 February on the same system as 
had been introduced in Germany in the same month. There was a 
drastic combing out of labour from banks, insurance companies, 
export and wholesale firms, while all places of amusement, restau- 
rants and luxury shops had to be closed. In commenting on this 
measure, the Deutsche -Zeitung in den Niederlanden noted on 6 
March 1943 that the country still had larger untapped labour 
resources than Germany. It was added that the mobilisation Order 
would affect a great many of the better-off people in the Netherlands 
who had never worked or had worked only occasionally before. 
More labour would be released by closing non-essential establish- 
ments, but women would be left in the country to work in agri- 
culture. 2 A special German commission was set up in January to 
carry out the programme. As a result 41,969 more Dutch workers 

1 These workers were not necessarily all employed in the Reich. The employ- 
ment of workers from the Netherlands on fortification work in Norway has been 
reported, and some workers were also sent to the Eastern Provinces. See Chap- 
ter II, pp. 65-67. 

2 Netherlands News (New York), Vol. VI, No. 2, 11-25 Mar. 1943, pp. 34-35. 


were recruited during the first three months of 1943, bringing the 
total of workers recruited since 20 June 1940 to 404,725. Taking 
into account the return of 109,178 workers, the number of workers 
employed in Germany at the end of March 1943 was nearly 300,000. 


Prisoners of War. 

Belgium was invaded on 10 May 1940 at the same time as the 
Netherlands and Luxemburg. On 28 May the Belgian army capitu- 
lated. During those eighteen days, 545,000 Belgians were captured, 
but only some of them were retained as prisoners and transferred 
to Germany. According to a German source 1 , all the Flemish 
soldiers were included among those who were released. In February 
1942, according to a Belgian report, the total number of Belgian 
officers and soldiers in German prison camps was 80,000. 2 For 
August 1942, a well-informed source gives the number as 77,000. 
There is no indication that this number has since been reduced. 
Most of the prisoners have been put to work. 3 

Civilian Workers. 

The recruiting of civilians for work in Germany developed 
gradually in Belgium after the occupation. At that time about 
600,000 workers were unemployed 4 as a result of the mass return 
of refugees who had fled to France before the invasion and of the 
complete disruption of industry and the transportation system due 
to destruction and military operations. The enrolment of workers 
for Germany was officially announced in June. In August and 
September, the number of workers who left for Germany averaged 
1,500 to 2,000 a week. The weekly average then fell to 500 or 600, 
and on 15 December the movement was interrupted owing to a 
seasonal decline in the demand for labour in Germany. By the end 
of 1940 the number of Belgian civilians employed in the Reich 
totalled 70,000. It was 87,000 on 1 April 1941. 5 Then came a rapid 
rise in connection with preparations for the Russian campaign. 
On 25 September 1941 the number of Belgian workers in Germany 
had reached 121, 500. 6 In March 1942 it was announced from Ger- 

1 Reichsarbeitsblatt, 25 May 1941, No. 15, Part V, p. 257. 

2 News from Belgium (New York), 7 Mar. 1942. 

8 Recently the Briisseler Zeitung forecast that the Belgian prisoners of war 
would soon be put on the same footing as the Belgian civilian workers in Germany 
(Nya Dagligt Allehanda, Stockholm, 15 Apr. 1943). 

4 Reichsarbeitsblatt, 25 Aug. 1941, No. 24, Part V, p. 416. 

8 Idem, 15 July 1941, No. 20, Part V, p. 339. 

6 Idem, 5 Dec. 1941, No. 34, Part V, p. 610. 


man sources that the 250,000th Belgian worker had left for Ger- 
many 1 and at the end of May the total number of recruited workers 
was given as 300,000 2 , but these figures do not indicate how many 
Belgian workers were actually employed at those dates in Germany. 
The fact that the total number of recruited workers up to the middle 
of July 1941 was given as 175, OOO 3 while the number of those actu- 
ally working in Germany on 25 September of the same year was 
only 121,500 indicates that there had been an important return 
movement. In the Netherlands, as stated above, the number 
of registered returns amounted to over 83,000 at the end of 
August 1942 against a total number of 298,000 recruitments at the 
same date. Assuming that the proportion of returning workers 
was the same in Belgium as in the Netherlands, the number of 
Belgian civilian workers employed in Germany at the end of May 
1942 may be estimated at 215,000. 

The workers recruited were almost all industrial workers, and 
in particular skilled workers. Large numbers of Belgians were 
reported to have been sent to the industrial centres of Brunswick 
and to various other factories in different parts of Germany. Some 
of the Belgian women sent to the Reich were employed on domestic 
work, but the majority worked in factories. 

The movement slackened during the summer months. As early as 
April the organ of the Belgian National Employment Office 
announced that the country's manpower reserves were nearly drained 
dry, and that recruitment for work abroad was meeting with growing 
difficulties, due largely to the fact that the Todt Organisation was 
employing a large number of workers in the coastal area of Belgium 
itself, while of the remaining 47,000 unemployed 65 per cent, were 
over 50, and 20 per cent, between 40 and 50 years of age. 4 

There was a fresh increase in the number of departures in the 
autumn as a result of the Order of 6 October 1942 5 extending lia- 
bility to compulsory labour service to cover employment anywhere 
outside Belgium. According to Belgian sources, in the last three 
months of 1942 over 50,000 Belgians were sent to the Reich. At 
the end of the year the rate of departure exceeded 20,000 a month. 6 
On 4 March 1943, a German broadcast, describing the recent mass 
call-up of Belgian labour under the compulsory legislation, stated 
that 110,000 Belgian workers had been recruited since the Order 

1 Wirtschaftsdienst, 27 Mar. 1942. According to the same source, some Bel- 
gians were also employed in occupied France. 

2 Volkischer Beobachter, 6 Sept. 1942. 

3 Reichsarbeitsblatt, 25 Aug. 1941, No. 24, Part V, p. 417. 

4 Article analysed in Arbeidsbestel, organ of the Netherlands National Employ- 
ment Office, June 1942, p. 125. 

6 Cf. International Labour Review, Vol. XLVII, No. 3, Mar. 1943, p. 372. 
6 News from Belgium (New York), 9 Jan. 1943. 


of 6 October 1942, bringing the total of workers sent to Germany 
to about -436, 000. Taking into account the probable number of 
returning workers, it may be estimated that the number of civilian 
workers employed in Germany at the beginning of March was 
about 300,000. Including the prisoners of war, the Belgian labour 
force employed in Germany at that time amounted to some 370,000 

The mobilisation of labour, however, had not yet come to an 
end. Belgian handicrafts, according to the same source, were to 
release many workers for the Reich and the remainder for the 
Belgian armament industry. Only the most vital artisans were to 
continue their trade. The textile industry, too, was to be combed 
out again. There would be a considerable reduction in the number 
of luxury shops and places of entertainment. 

While more Belgian labour was still being sought for Gerrtiany, 
the scarcity of workers in some industries, particularly in coal 
mines, had become so acute that foreign labour was being imported. 
According to a Belgian source, more than 7,000 Russian prisoners 
had been deported to Belgium by the end of 1942 to work in the 

Prisoners of War. 

On 17 May 1940 German troops began their invasion of France. 
On 13 June they marched into Paris, and on 22 June the armistice 
was signed in the Forest of Compi&gne. The number of French 
prisoners captured during this whirlwind march through France 
was estimated at about 1,800,000. A number of them have been 
liberated since the armistice. Ill-health rendering them unfit for 
work, or advancing age, were the most frequent grounds for release. 
Some others were temporarily released en congt de captivite because 
they were indispensable for the restoration of normal life in occupied 
France; for instance, a baker might be released if he were the only 
baker in the town. It has been assumed, on the basis of the high 
figures for releases published at intervals by the press and radio, 
that the total of prisoners released by the autumn of 1941 amounted 
to 800, OOO. 2 But, according to the official statistics of the Vichy 
Government, 1,426,000 French prisoners were still in German 
camps in January 1942. These camps were first situated not only 
in Germany but in occupied France as well, and the prisoners were 
put to work, mainly at clearing debris. At the beginning of 1941 

1 La Belgique Independante (London), 11 Feb. 1943. 

2 "Foreign Labour in Germany", loc. cit. t pp. 1263-1269. 


French prisoners who had formerly been working in France were 
removed to Germany, but some remained in occupied France, in 
particular the Senegalese and all other coloured French troops. 
In the spring of 1941, "far more than one and a half million prisoners 
from the west", most of them French, were said to be employed 
by the Germans, and probably the majority were already working 
in the Reich. 1 

In June 1942, the Head of the French Government, Mr. Laval, 
obtained a promise from the German Government that in exchange 
for the sending of trained workers to Germany some of the French 
prisoners of war would be released. This release was conditional, 
however, since the prisoners were to be given temporary leave 
subject to renewal. It was first provided that 50,000 prisoners of 
war would be repatriated if 150,000 trained workers went to work 
in Germany. Further negotiations led to the adoption of the ratio 
which was ultimately applied that is, the repatriation of 1,000 
prisoners for every 5,000 trained workers. 2 

In August 1942 the total of French prisoners, as given by a 
trustworthy source, was 1,353,000. This number has only slowly 
been reduced since. As will be seen below, only 115,000 trained 
workers signed contracts for Germany between 1 June and 
16 December 1942, so that the proportion of prisoners of war who 
were released up to the end of the year under the agreement con- 
cluded by Mr. Laval was small. Radio Lyons announced on 29 
November 1942 that the first contingent of 25,000 prisoners freed 
under the scheme had returned to their homes. 

A certain number of prisoners, however, appear to have been 
released on condition that they went on working in Germany as 
civilian workers. At a press conference held in Vichy on 9 February 
1943, Mr. Laval declared that there were about 1,150,000 prisoners 
actually working for Germany. 3 The German Government had 
promised to free 50,000 prisoners if 250,000 new workers were 
sent to Germany. 4 It had also consented to use in a civilian capacity 
in German factories nearly 250,000 other prisoners. 5 This informa- 

1 The total of prisoners of war, both from the west and the east, working in 
Germany at the end of April 1941 was given as 1,300,000 (Reichsarbeitsblatt, 
25 May 1941, No. 15, Part V, p. 258), of whom 100,000 were working for military 
authorities and 1,200,000 in industry and agriculture. In addition, 135,000 were 
at work in the soldiers' camps. After deducting the Polish, Belgian and British 
prisoners, it may be estimated that out of the total number of French prisoners 
of war in Germany some 1,150,000 had been put to work. 

2 "The Recruitment of French Labour for Germany", in International Labour 
Review, Vol. XLVII, No. 3, Mar. 1943, p. 325. 

8 Free France (Free French Press Information Service, New York), Vol. 3, 
No. 5, p. 176. 

4 The releases appear to have started only after 1 Apr., when the full contin- 
gent of 250,000 workers had been recruited. 

6 Official communique* of 22 Feb. 1943. 


tion suggests that there may in the future be a decrease in the 
number of prisoners of war in Germany as a result not of their 
return to France, but of their conversion into civilian workers 
forcibly employed in Germany. 

Civilian Workers. 

The first batch of French civilians employed in the Reich came 
from Alsace-Lorraine. Their number was officially given as 24,500 
for the months July to November 1940. 1 As these provinces were 
then incorporated into the Reich, however, Alsatians do not figure 
in the later statistics of foreign workers employed in Germany. 

In the rest of occupied France recruitment did not begin until 
about a year after the armistice, and made little progress. During 
the winter of 1940, the number of workers who accepted the offer 
of employment in Germany was insignificant. The few who did 
so were mainly foreigners 2 , who were told by the French authorities 
that they would be deprived of relief if they did not accept the 
German offer. The official statistics show that in April 1941 there 
were only 25,000 workers from France in the Reich. 3 In September 
1941 the number was 48,600. 4 

Later, the lack of raw materials and fuel and other factors 
compelled many French factories to close clown, and this, together 
with food restrictions, acted as an incentive to workers to agree 
to go to Germany or to accept work in the ports and arsenals of the 
Channel area. But notwithstanding the constantly worsening con- 
ditions of life in France the further progress of recruitment for 
Germany was far from rapid. The departure of the hundred- 
thousandth French worker for Germany was celebrated in Decem- 
ber 1941, but the number of workers actually working in Germany 
at that date was far below this figure, as many of those who had 
left earlier had since returned to France. 

It was in the spring of 1942 that Germany began to press the 
French Government and succeeded in obtaining its full co-operation 
in supplying an increasing number of workers, in particular 
of trained workers, for German factories. At the end of March 1942 
the German Government lodged a demand with the French Govern- 
ment for a further 350,000 workers, including 150,000 trained work- 
ers, for work in Germany, and in the course of the following months 
Mr. Laval negotiated an agreement under which he undertook 
to supply the required quota before 15 September, obtaining in 

1 Reichsarbeitsblatt, 20 Dec. 1940, Nos. 35-36, Part V, p. 616. 

2 Idem, 25 Aug. 1941, No. 24, Part V, p. 414. 

3 Idem, 15 July 1941, No. 20, Part V, p. 339. 

4 Idem, 5 Dec. 1941, No. 34, Part V, p. 610. 


return the promise of the temporary release of some of the French 
prisoners. 1 A series of measures was then taken to stimulate the 
recruitment of volunteers for factory work in Germany by putting 
indirect pressure both on employers and workers; these included 
a reorganisation of French industry involving the concentration 
of production and the extension of hours of work, with the object 
of releasing labour which it was expected would then volunteer for 
Germany, and the opening of German employment offices in the 
unoccupied as well as in the occupied zone. 

As a result of these measures, the rate of departure of French 
workers to Germany appears to have risen to a few thousand each 
week during the summer months. But the results remained far 
below the German demands. Before these demands were presented 
at the end of March 1942, between 140,000 and 150,000 workers, 
skilled and unskilled, had been recruited in France, women forming 
20 per cent, of the total. This figure included not only French 
workers but 22 to 23 per cent, of colonial or foreign workers living 
in France. 2 Moreover, thousands of these workers had returned 
to France under various pretexts, so that the number of civilian 
workers actually employed in Germany about that time was prob- 
ably not much higher than 100,000. 3 

From the end of March up to 30 June 1942 some 20,000 to 30,000 
new workers signed contracts. On 20 June 1942 Mr. Laval broad- 
cast an urgent appeal to the French people to provide the quotas 
of workers he had promised the German Government at the end of 
March. In spite of this appeal the movement was still inadequate. 
From the end of June up to 7 September, according to a statement 
of the Secretary of State for Industry, some 40,000 more French 
workers, including 10,800 trained workers, were transferred to 
Germany. 4 But there had been a steady flow of workers returning 
at the end of their contract and the total number of French workers 
actually employed in Germany had only risen to 140, OOO 5 , which 
represented an increase of not more than 40,000 since the end of 
the previous year. 

As a consequence of the measures taken by the French Govern- 
ment under the Act of 4 September 1942 concerning the employ- 

1 See above, p. 146. 

2 "The Recruitment of French Labour for Germany", in International Labour 
Review, Vol. XLVII, No. 3, Mar. 1943, p. 342. 

8 The New York Times, 8 Feb. 1942, referring to an announcement by the 
German authorities in Paris, gives the figure of 100,000. Cf. also Le Temps, 
9 Feb. 1942, and // Sole (Milan), 18 Dec. 1941. 

4 The number of trained workers having offered their services between 1 June 
and 1 Sept. has been given as 17,000 (cf. International Labour Review, loc. cit., 
p. 329). 

6 II Sole (Milan), 9-10 Sept. 1942. 


ment and direction of labour, recruitment was accelerated during 
the autumn of 1942. A press release of the French Information Office 
announced on 16 December 1942 that according to official statis- 
tics, 205,000 workers had left for Germany since the appeal made 
by Mr. Laval (probably the speech broadcast on 20 June 1942). 
This number included 115,000 trained workers. 

On the basis of these figures the total number of workers recruit- 
ed for work in Germany from the armistice up to the end of 1942 
may be estimated at about 370,000. Taking into account the number 
of returning workers 1 , the number of workers from France employed 
in Germany at the end of the year 1942 was probably about 300,000. 

In January 1943, press reports mentioned that the French 
Government had consented to place 60 per cent, of French special- 
ised workers at the disposal of Germany, involving the despatch 
of a further 250,000 French workers to Germany beyond those 
already there. 2 The total number of workers having left for Ger- 
many up to 23 February 1943 has been given as 348,000 s , but it is 
not clear from what date this figure is counted. If it refers, as is 
probably the case, to those who left after the appeal made by Mr. 
Laval at the end of June, it would mean that 143,000 workers were 
recruited between 16 December 1942 and 23 February 1943, bring- 
ing the total number of civilian workers from France employed in 
Germany at that date to well over 400,000. 

This number has increased still further in recent months. On 
22 February 1943 it was officially announced that 250,000 more 
workers were to be recruited for Germany, and on 11 April Mr. 
Laval stated that this recruitment had been completed on 31 
March. It was later reported that a third contingent of 220,000 
had been promised and was to be sent to Germany before 30 June. 4 

From German sources it was stated that on 21 April 600,000 
French workers were employed in Germany. 6 With the addition of 
the 220,000 workers who were to be recruited before 30 June 6 the 
number of French workers in Germany would therefore exceed 
800,000, and the total labour force from France employed in Ger- 
many, including the prisoners of war, can be estimated at about 

1 According to a statement made by the French Secretary of State and already 
quoted, between 50,000 and 60,000 workers who had been employed in Germany 
had returned to France by 7 Sept. 1942. 

2 Neue Zurcher Zeitung, 24 Jan. 1943. 

3 Le Soir (Brussels), 2 Mar. 1943. 

4 Frankfurter Zeitung, 7 May 1943; La Suisse (Geneva), 13 May 1943. 
6 Pariser Zeitung, 21 Apr. 1943. 

6 The recruitment of this last quota seems to have met with some difficulty. 
According to the official D.N.B. (25 June 1943), only 100,085 workers had been 
sent up to 23 June. 


Yugoslavia and Greece 

The Balkan campaign began on 28 October 1940 when Italy 
invaded Greece, but this invasion was unsuccessful until the German 
army entered Yugoslavia and Greece on 6 April 1941, and occupied 
Yugoslavia within a few days. On 27 April the German army 
entered Athens, and on 1 June, with the occupation of Crete, the 
Balkan campaign came to an end. 

The main objective of German policy towards Yugoslavia was 
its dismemberment. Some parts of Yugoslav territory were given 
to the neighbouring countries allied to Germany, while Croatia 
was separated from Serbia. In Greece, the situation was complica- 
ted by the fact that not only Germany but Italy and Bulgaria had 
hand in the administration of the country. 

This political background also affected the employment of 
a prisoners of war and labour recruitment. 

Prisoners of War. 

The total number of prisoners of war captured by the Germans 
in the Balkans was 589,000, including both officers and men. Of the 
Yugoslav prisoners, however, all those of German, Macedonian, 
Hungarian and Albanian origin and all Croats were released, so 
that only the Serbs, numbering not more than 200,000, remained 
for transfer to Germany. 1 According to the Royal Yugoslav Govern- 
ment Information Centre, at the end of 1941 180,000 Yugoslav 
prisoners of war were held in Germany and about 40,000 in Italy. 
These numbers have decreased since then, as some categories of 
prisoners, in particular those who are natives of the Yugoslav terri- 
tories annexed by the Axis Powers, have been released. Releases 
more particularly affected the prisoners in Italy, whose numbers 
had decreased by half towards the end of 1941, while the number 
of prisoners in Germany was still at that time not much below 
180,000. In August 1942, according to a well-informed source, the 
figure for Germany was 149,000. At the beginning of 1943 it was 
about 133,200, while in Italy the figure had dropped to 6,500. 

According to the Royal Yugoslav Government Information 
Centre, all Yugoslav prisoner-of-war camps are located in Germany 
and Italy. One or two of them seem, however, to be situated on 
Yugoslav territory which Germany claims to have incorporated 
into the Reich, i.e. near Maribor in Slovenia. No exact data are 
available about the number of Yugoslav prisoners employed as 
workers, but it may be assumed that the great majority are so 

1 Reichsarbeitsblatt, 25 May 1941, No. 15, Part V, p. 259. 


employed, the number varying with the seasons, since Yugoslav 
prisoners, the great majority of whom are peasants, are employed 
mainly for agricultural work. The only information available about 
the employment of prisoners on work in mines and quarries (where 
the work is very hard) relates to the punishment of refractory 

With regard to the Greeks, only the 5,000 prisoners taken by 
the Italians were held for some considerable time in Italy or in 
Italian camps on the Adriatic. The Germans, on the other hand, 
who took more than 200,000 Greek prisoners, liberated all the men, 
and probably the officers as well, immediately the war was over. 

Civilian Workers. 

The recruiting of workers in Yugoslavia began before the country 
was invaded. At the end of 1940, Germany employed 4,400 Yugo- 
slavs, and by April 1941, on the eve of the German invasion, this 
figure had risen to 48,000. A small number of Greeks, about 500, 
were also employed. Immediately after the campaign, the recruit- 
ing of workers in the new Kingdom of Croatia was begun. Official 
German statistics show 108,800 workers from all Yugoslavia in 
September 1941, 26,000 of them being women. 1 According to the 
Royal Yugoslav Government Information Centre, 100,000 more 
workers were sent to Germany between then and the summer 
of 1942, and the total (including Croats) exceeded 200,000, em- 
ployed mainly in agriculture. 2 In spring 1943 it was over 250,000. 8 
A further 50,000 Yugoslav workers are employed in German- 
occupied countries. 4 

The Greeks were at first mostly employed as sailors on German 
ships, 5 It was only in March 1942 that the first group of Greeks 
was sent to Germany for agricultural and industrial work. 6 Re- 
cruitment was stimulated by the situation in the Greek labour 
market. According to the Greek Office of Information, many 
factories had been obliged to cease work since the beginning of the 
occupation for lack of the necessary raw materials or power, which 

1 Idem, 5 Dec. 1941, No. 34, Part V, p. 610. 

2 According to information published by the Survey of Central and Eastern 
Europe(Apr. 1943), 70,000 Serb workers and 120,000 Croat workers were employed 
in Germany by the end of 1942. A number of Slovenes who had been deported 
to Germany to make room for the Ljubljana Germans were also recruited for work. 
Cf. above, Chapter II, p. 80. 

8 Sixty-six thousand from Serbia according to the Deutsche Stimme (Munich), 
Feb. 1943, and 200,000 Croats, according to the Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, 
13 Apr. 1943, the latter figure including some Croats from France and Belgium. 

4 Survey of Central and Eastern Europe, Oct. 1942. 

8 Reichsarbeitsblatt, 5 Dec. 1941, No. 34, Part V, p. 610. 

6 Neue Zilrcher Zeitung, 12 Mar. 1942. 

152 *H6 f>lSPI,AC$MENt 0# pOPtftATtON IN 

depended mainly on imported coal. Only certain kinds of activities 
were kept going, such as munition factories and industries producing 
materials needed for fortifications. The closing of factories in- 
tensified the unemployment problem, while inflation made any 
wages earned almost valueless. On 7 September 1942 it was an- 
nounced in a broadcast from Rome that 26,000 persons had been 
recruited from Northern Greece 'for work in German factories. 1 
With regard to workers from Central and Southern Greece, jointly 
occupied by the Germans and Italians, a German source quoted by 
the Greek Office of Information gives a figure of 8,000 employed in 
Germany on 1 1 September 1942. Many thousands of Greek labourers 
were also working in the beet fields of Czechoslovakia, while others 
were employed in the steel industry of occupied France, according 
to information received by the same Office in September 1942. 


Prisoners of War. 

German information concerning the number of Russian prisoners 
of war is contradictory. On 3 October 1941, only three and a half 
months after the invasion of Russia, Chancellor Hitler stated that 
the number of Russian prisoners had risen to 2,500,000, and on 11 
December 1941, in declaring war on the United States, that Russian 
prisoners up to 1 December totalled exactly 3,806,865. But on the 
anniversary of the invasion of Russia, the official German news 
agency (D.N.B.) stated that in one year Russia had lost more than 
two million men captured, and on 12 August 1942 the German High 
Command announced that 1,044,741 Russian soldiers had been 
captured since the resumption of fighting in the spring. The latter 
figure caused some surprise, for whereas in the campaign of 1941 
whole regiments and even divisions were reported to have been 
surrounded by the German armoured troops which pierced the 
Russian lines, nothing similar had been announced in the campaign 
of 1942, and there seems to be no explanation for such great losses 
in prisoners by an army showing stubborn resistance and retiring 
in good order. 

The explanation given for this contradiction is that the German 
figures include not only Russian soldiers captured on the battle- 
field, but also civilians who are regarded as prisoners of war and 
treated accordingly. A communiqu6 of the Soviet Government 
Information Bureau accused Germany of treating every male able 

1 It is not clear whether this figure relates to workers who actually left for 
Germany or to all those who registered for work in Germany. 


to bear arms as a prisoner of war and supported this assertion by 
the publication of some Orders of the Day found in the possession 
of German detachments. 1 

With regard to the territorial distribution of Russian prisoners 
of war, the following figures, which give a rough picture of the 
situation in February 1942, are derived from a well-informed source. 
The total number of persons regarded as prisoners of war was 
between two and three million. Of this number, 300,000 were in 
camps and labour detachments in Germany and 180,000 in the 
General Government. The transfer of Russian prisoners of war 
to the we3t was then in full swing, but there is no doubt that the 
bulk of the prisoners were still in the area between the fighting 
front and the line from which the German offensive started in June 
1941. Many of this vast number of prisoners remaining in occupied 
Soviet territory were confined in temporary or more permanent 
prison camps in different districts, but a constantly increasing 
number were brought to work in the Ukraine and in other parts 
of the Soviet Union. Thousands of Russian prisoners were reported 
to have been sent to German-occupied or German-controlled 
countries; for instance, 32,000 to build railways and fortifications 
in Norway 2 and 7,000, as already mentioned, to Belgian mines. 3 
Thirty-five thousand Russian prisoners in Rumanian hands have 
been put to work on farms in Rumania. 4 

Civilian Workers. 

The system of treating all civilians capable of bearing arms as 
prisoners of war may have been primarily intended to put down 
guerilla warfare, but it was also a special method of recruiting 
labour. In addition, by September 1942, the German authorities 
had also set up 238 employment offices in occupied Russia 5 , 
excluding the Bialystok region, which was incorporated into the 

1 The following Order issued on 21 Jan. 1941 by the 9th German Tank Divi- 
sion was published in Pravda on 9 Feb. 1942: "According to the Secret Order 
of the High Command, No. 2974/41 of 6 Dec. 1941, all men liable for military 
service from occupied localities must be sent to prisoner-of-war camps". 

2 Norsk Tidend, 6 May 1942. 

8 According to Ny Dag (Stockholm), 20 Mar. 1943, Swedish sailors who had 
been to Danzig stated that only Russian prisoners were working in the docks. 
Another report refers to Russian prisoners sent to work on fortifications along 
the Aegean coast (Folkviljan, Stockholm, 30 Mar. 1943). According to an Order 
issued in the autumn of 1942, Soviet prisoners of war of Ukrainian stock who came 
from the Galician district of Lvov were to be released for war work in Germany. 

4 Reported on 5 Jan. 1942 from a reliable source. 

6 Berliner B or sen- Zeitung, 11 Sept. 1942. Another paper gives this figure as 
"about 288" for the whole of the Ostraum, besides a number of labour offices set 
UD by the military authorities in the south (Deutsche Bergwerks-Zeitung, 4 Sept, 


Reich, and Galicia, which became part of the General Government. 1 
Nevertheless, in the first months of the German occupation, the 
labour supply from Russia was very meagre. The German author- 
ities explained this partly by the opposition to the employment of 
Russian workers in the Reich on grounds of principle, and partly 
by the great shortage of manpower in occupied Russia itself, a 
shortage which was caused by the flight of the population before 
the advancing German armies and which made it necessary for all 
available agricultural labour to be used on the spot. 2 Even in 1942, 
for the spring ploughing, 400,000 agricultural workers were requisi- 
tioned "from the northern regions of the Eastern Territories for 
the Ukraine to remedy the lack of manpower there". 3 For the same 
reasons the great majority of the Russian prisoners of war had to be 
left in the occupied regions to work in local agriculture and thus to 
ensure at least the supply of food necessary for the German army. 

During the course of 1942, however, the situation changed 
considerably. Measures were taken to isolate the Russians from 
other workers. Recruiting was extended to regions more remote 
from the main lines of communication. In the summer of 1942 it 
was announced that between 14,000 and 20,000 Russian workers 
had been brought daily to Germany. 4 These were not only agricul- 
tural workers, but also industrial workers in steadily increasing 
numbers. The German authorities admitted that in occupied 
Russia "the labour supply possibilities in the cities have fallen 
to a negligible level owing to the destruction wrought almost 
everywhere". B The great majority of skilled workers had of course 
been evacuated by the Russians before their retreat. So far as those 
who remained were concerned, the German authorities realised that 
"it would be unreasonable to employ them for rural labour". The 
proper sphere of activity for these skilled industrial workers would 
be the armament industry in the Greater German Reich. 6 Great 
successes were announced in the recruitment of miners, metal and 
other workers. Ukrainian women are reported to have been sent 

1 Reichsarbeitsblatt, 25 Mar. 1942, No. 9, Part V, p. 168. 

2 Ibid. 

3 Die Deutsche Volkswirtschaft, No. 17, June 1942, p. 554. 

4 Der Deutsche Volkswirt, 17 July 1942. 

6 Reichsarbeitsblatt, 5 Mar. 1942, No. 7, Part V, p. 131. The scale of the des- 
truction is suggested by the German claim to have achieved the clearing of some 
dozens of pits in the Donetz region and to have resumed production in a few of 
them, so that "many hundreds of men could be put to work in each pit and were 
again getting wages and bread " (Die Deutsche Volkswirtschaft, No. 18, June 1942, 
p. 594). 

*Die Deutsche Volkswirtschaft, No. 17, June 1942, p. 555. Already in 1941 
the German employment offices had been advised to employ the skilled workers 
among the Russian prisoners of war in their own trades. Cf. Reichsarbeitsblatt, 
5 Dec. 1941, No. 34, Part V, p. 629. 


as far away as the Westmark, a new province including Lorraine 
and the adjacent districts of western Germany; they were found 
to be suitable for certain work usually performed by men, such as 
transport work, the operation of large machines, and mining. 1 In 
some regions wholesale recruitment was carried out and all available 
labour taken. In August 1942 it was reported that an acute shortage 
of agricultural labour in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania had been 
caused in this way, so that the German labour authorities permitted 
about 400 Estonian "volunteers working in Germany at the time 
to return to their homes for three weeks for harvesting. 2 

The result of all these recruitment measures was a huge influx 
of Russian workers into Germany. 3 The Russian press speaks of 
millions of deported Russian workers, these including, of course, 
recruited workers as well as those whom the Germans classified as 
prisoners of war. "Eastern" workers from the Ukraine, the former 
Baltic States and the other territories occupied by the German 
army constituted the main supply of foreign labour at that time. 
In September 1942 it was stated that 1,200,000 Eastern workers 
had already been employed in the Reich for some time, and that 
this number was still growing. 4 

In all, about 2,000,000 eastern workers were reported to have 
been sent to Germany in 1942 5 a figure which was confirmed by 
a press release of 13 January 1943 issued by the official German 
news agency. 6 Of this number, according to information given by 
the German General Commissioner for the Ukraine, 710,000 came 
from the Ukraine. 7 There is no reliable information to show where 
the remainder came from. It should be remembered that the expres- 
sion " Eastern workers" is used in two different ways in Germany. 
In connection with regulating working conditions, an Order of 30 
June 1942 limited the definition of "Eastern workers" to "all non- 
German workers recruited within the German Commissariat of the 
Ukraine, the General Commissariat of White Russia and the territo- 
ries to the east of these regions and bordering the former free States 
of Latvia and Estonia". But in every-day language, the expression 
often includes all workers recruited east of the frontier of the 
Greater Reich (including territories incorporated into the Reich) 

1 Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, 21 July 1942. 

2 Deutsche Zeitung im Ostland, 18 Aug. 1942. 

8 For a more detailed study of the methods of recruitment and conditions of 
employment of Eastern workers in Germany, see "Soviet Workers in Germany", 
in International Labour Review, Vol. XLVII, No. 5, May 1943, pp. 576-590. 

4 Deutsche Bergwerks-Zeitung, 4 Sept. 1942. 

6 Monatshefte fur N.S.-Sozialpolitik, Nos. 23-24, Dec. 1942. 

6 Neue Zurcher Zeitung, 14 Jan. 1943. 

7 Deutsche Ukraine Zeitung, quoted by National Zeitung (Basle), 8 Jan, 1943. 


and thus applies, in addition, to the workers recruited in the territ- 
ory of the General Government (including Galicia) and in the 
German Commissariat of the East that is, in Lithuania, Latvia 
and Estonia. Probably the figure of 2,000,000 published by the 
German news agency should be taken to include all workers from 
the east in the wider sense of the term. The communiqu6 of the 
German Labour Front, already noted above 1 , speaks of "two mil- 
lion Poles and Russians who came to the Reich in 1942 for work". 
If this is correct, it may be estimated, by subtracting the number 
of Polish and Baltic workers and returning seasonal workers, that 
1,500,000 workers from the Soviet Union were employed in Ger- 
many at the beginning of 1943 and that nearly half of them had 
come from the Ukraine. 


Among the allied and neutral countries which have provided 
Germany with manpower Italy takes first place. Workers came to 
Germany from Italy not only far earlier than from the other countries, 
but also in far greater numbers. Before the war Germany employed 
30,000 Italian seasonal workers and since the outbreak of war the 
number of Italians has risen constantly. Before Italy entered the 
war, the supply of agricultural workers even exceeded the demand. 
When the surplus labour in Italy had been absorbed by mobilisa- 
tion, recruiting naturally became more difficult, although the field 
was extended over central and southern Italian provinces with a 
large agrarian population. According to official German statistics, 
47,000 agricultural and 70,000 industrial workers were brought 
to Germany by the end of 1940. At the beginning of February 1941 
agreements were concluded at Rome between the German and 
Italian authorities providing for the expansion of the employment 
of Italians in German industrial undertakings, under which the 
quota of Italian workers was to be increased by about 200,000. 
Furthermore, earlier agreements concerning the seasonal employ- 
ment of agricultural workers were renewed and widened in scope, 
so that the quota for 1941 was somewhat larger than that for the 
previous year. 2 In pursuance of these agreements, especially in so 
far as they concerned Italian metal workers, special committees 
were set up in Italy to make adjustments in the organisation of 
work, and in particular in hours of work, so that workers might be 
made available for employment in Germany. 3 

On 1 April 1941 there were altogether 130,000 Italian workers 

1 Cf. above, p. 132, footnote 1. 

2 International Labour Review, Vol. XLIII, No. 5, May 1941, p. 584. 
8 Idem, Vol. XLIV, No. 4, Oct. 1941, p. 439. 


in Germany, and on 25 September 1941, 271,000, of whom 21,700 
were women. 1 In the spring of 1942 it was stated that Italy had 
provided Germany with 300,000 workers (8 per cent, being women), 
and that this number would soon reach 350,000. 2 According to a 
German broadcast, Italian workers were also sent to occupied Rus- 
sia. As to the occupations of the Italian workers in Germany, 
according to a reliable source, 100,000 of them were engaged in the 
metal industry and 25,000 in mining in May-June 1942. 

It should be noted that the Italian contribution to Germany's 
labour reserves was limited by Italy's own needs, especially in res- 
pect of skilled metal workers. Already in May 1941 reports received 
from the corporative inspection authorities indicated that the num- 
ber of workers released for work in Germany was less than the 
number demanded. 3 Another indication of the scarcity of skilled 
labour in the Italian metal industry came from Italy in August 
1942, when it was reported that out of 100,000 metal workers in the 
province of Turin 27,000 were women, an unusual feature in Italy. 4 


The employment of Hungarians in German agriculture began in 
1937. An agreement concerning the recruitment of industrial work- 
ers was made in July 1941. On 25 September 1941 there were in 
Germany 35,000 Hungarian workers, of whom 9,600 were women, 
the latter being employed mainly in agriculture. At the end of 
September 1942 the number was 29,000. 6 This figure is lower than 
in the summer, and represents the number of permanent workers 
who remained after the return of the seasonal workers recruited 
for harvesting. The majority of these permanent Hungarian immi- 
grants were skilled and semi-skilled workers, but some industrial 
apprentices are also included. 

At the end of November 1942 all Hungarian agricultural and 

1 Reichsarbeitsblatt, 15 July 1941, No. 20, Part V, p. 339; 5 Dec. 1941, No. 34, 
Part V, p. 611 ; and 5 Jan. 1942, No. 1, Part V, p. 9. Italian official sources give 
a figure of 140,000 for 1939-1940. For 1941 the figure is identical with the German 
statistics. Cf. Problemi e informazioni sociali, Jan.-Feb. 1942. 

2 Stefani Agency, 5 June 1942; New York Times, 6 Apr. and 9 June 1942. 

3 Cf. International Labour Review, Vol. XLIV, No. 4, Oct. 1941, p. 439. 

4 Gazzetta del Popolo (Turin), Aug. 1942. Recently rumours have filtered 
out of Italy that a large number of the Italians employed in Germany had been 
ordered home and that many had already left. It was explained that the workers 
were urgently needed in Italy, in particular for fortification building. On the 
other hand, in April a German broadcast announced the impending transfer of 
new contingents of skilled Italian workers to the Reich. Cf. the article by Edgar 
R. ROSEN in the Christian Science Monitor, 14 May 1943. According to a Stock- 
holm despatch to the New York Times, 26 May 1943, the Kieler Zeitung announced 
that the first contingent of Italians had left the city under a general scheme to 
send back all Italian workers from German war industries "so that they can 
make their contribution on their own home front". 

* Magyar Nemzet, 19 Oct. 1942. 


forestry workers in Germany were informed that they would have 
to return to Hungary by the end of December. 1 The Hungarian 
News Agency reported at the end of the year that all Hungarian 
workers were being recalled from abroad to relieve the labour short- 
age at home. 2 


On 25 September 1941 there were 14,500 Bulgarian workers, 
including 2,000 women, in Germany, and approximately the same 
number in the spring of 1942. 

In addition to industrial workers Germany also recruits garden- 
ers from Bulgaria. Bulgarian gardening specialists used to farm 
garden lands in Greater Germany for many years, in particular in 
the vicinity of large cities, which they cultivated at their own 
expense and under their own management with the aid of Bulgarian 
assistants. In 1941, under an agreement between Germany and 
Bulgaria, 1,000 of these independent gardeners were permitted to 
enter Germany, the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia and the 
General Government of Poland, after the Bulgarian Government 
had authorised the recruitment of an equal number of gardeners 
for employment in German undertakings. 8 In this particular case, 
therefore, the promotion of foreign colonisation is combined with 
arrangements for recruiting workers. 

On 9 February 1943, a new agreement was signed between 
Germany and Bulgaria concerning the recruiting of Bulgarian 
workers for Germany 4 , but no information is yet available about 
its results. 


Under an agreement concluded between the Rumanian Ministry 
of Labour and the competent German authorities at the end of 
1941, 16,000 Rumanians of 18 and 19 years of age were to be sent as 
apprentices into German industries for a period of 3 years. 5 Accord- 
ing to a reliable source, however, only 4,500 actually went. From 
the same source it is reported that there are no Rumanian agricul- 
tural workers in Germany as they are all needed at home, especially 
since the army call-up. The number of 17,000 agricultural workers 
published by the foreign press is probably an exaggeration. 

1 Magyar Nemzet, 30 Nov. 1942. 

2 New York Times, 3 Jan. 1943. 

3 Reichsarbeitsblatt, 5 Jan. 1942, No. 1, Part V, p. 13. 

4 Zora, 10 Feb. 1943. 

5 Reichsarbeitsblatt, 5 Jan. 1942, No. 1, Part V, p. 47. Cf. also International 
Labour Review, Vol. XLVI, No. 3, Sept. 1942, p. 349. 



As a result of arrangements made by the Spanish National 
Trade Union Office in the spring of 1941, the German Labour Front 
invited 100,000 Spanish workers to go to work in Germany. 1 Follow- 
ing an agreement concluded between the two Governments on 22 
August 1941, a recruiting campaign, in which German agents 
participated, was launched in September 1941. 2 The campaign is 
reported to have had some success among the miners of the Rio 
Tinto and the building workers of Madrid, but in the industrial 
region of Catalonia the number of registrants was negligible in spite 
of the very heavy unemployment prevailing there. The first con- 
tingent of recruits left Spain late in November 1941. In August 
1942 the official German news agency reported that 9,000 Spanish 
workers were employed in the Reich. 


The table printed below gives the numbers of foreign workers, 
both war prisoners and civilians, employed in Germany at various 
dates. It shows how the influx of foreign labour into the Reich has 
steadily increased, in spite of seasonal fluctuations in agriculture. 

There have been constant changes in the occupational distribu- 
tion of the foreign labour employed in Germany. At the beginning 
it was used mainly for agriculture. It was next claimed for building 
and construction work, and later a constantly growing proportion 
was employed in factories. Now the utilisation of foreign labour 
for skilled work is the main problem of Germany's war economy. 

The geographical origin of foreign workers has also varied con- 
tinuously during the course of the war. The first contingent con- 
sisted of Poles. In October 1940, when there were already a great 
many prisoners of war from the west, workers from the east still 
constituted the majority. In September 1941 workers from the 
west approximately equalled those from the east and south-east. 
After the influx of the Russian prisoners of war and civilian workers, 
however, the proportion from the east again rose sharply. Accord- 
ing to data for the autumn of 1942, the foreign workers and em- 
ployed prisoners in Germany then included over 3,500,000 from 
the Slav countries of eastern and south-eastern Europe and about 
two million from western European countries. Since then continuous 
recruitment from west and east has kept the proportion nearly 
the same. 

1 La Vanguardia Espanola (Barcelona), 18 June 1941; International Labour 
Review, Vol. XLIV, No. 5, Nov. 1941, p. 580. 

2 ReichsarbeitsUatt, 15 Jan. 1942, No. 2, Part V, p. 31. 





(in thousands) 




1 April 

25 Sept. 











POLAND: Civilian workers 








War prisoners 








DENMARK: Civilian workers 







NORWAY: Civilian workers 






NETHERLANDS: Civilian workers 








BELGIUM: Civilian workers 







War prisoners 






FRANCE: Civilian workers 


48. 6/ 




Employed war prisoners 







YUGOSLAVIA: Civilian workers 






War prisoners 





GREECE: Civilian workers 






U.S.S.R.: Civilian workers 






Employed war prisoners 






Civilian workers 








SLOVAKIA: Civilian workers 








ITALY: Civilian workers 








HUNGARY: Civilian workers 





BULGARIA: Civilian workers 






RUMANIA: Civilian workers 




SPAIN: Civilian workers 





SWITZERLAND: Civilian workers 





SWEDEN: Civilian workers 





FINLAND: Civilian workers 





PORTUGAL: Civilian workers 


TOTAL: Civilian workers 








Employed war prisoners 


l t !OOP 















The figures for civilian workers in Oct. 1940 are taken from Europe under Hitler (ed. Royal Institute of 
International Affairs, London, 1941), p. 22; they are based mostly on German press reports. The numbers of 
civilian workers on 1 Apr. and 25 Sept. 1941 are taken from Reichsarbeitsblatt, 15 July, No. 20, Part V, p. 339, and 
5 Dec. 1941, No. 34, Part V, p. 610. The following notes give sources and some explanations for other figures, 
insofar as the sources are not already given in the text. 

a Reichsarbeitsblatt, 5 Jan. 1941 , No. 1 , Part V, p. 7. 

b Estimate based on information about the release of Polish prisoners of war in the course of 1940, and on 
the figure given for 1942. 

c According to a press report from London, New York Times, 3 May 1942. 

d Included in the total of 189,000 given under the denomination pf "others". 

e Estimate based on the figure for Sept. 1941. 

/ AJsace-Lorrainers not included. At the end of June 1943 the figure had risen to 800,000. 

g Estimate based on the difference between the total of prisoners of war employed and the number of 
Polish prisoners employed. 

h Estimate based on reports of the total of French war prisoners, of the total of all employed war prisoners 
in Germany, and of the number of French war prisoners released in 1941 and 1942. 

* Estimate based on the figures for Sept. 1941 and Aug. 1942. 

k Deutsche Bergwerks Zeitung, 4 Sept. 1942. 

/ Figure for August 1942. 

m Figure for spring 1942. 

n Statement made by Dr. Syrup (Frankfurter Zeitung, 29 Oct. 1940). 

o The Frankfurter Zeitung, 4 Aug. 1 942, states that in the spring of 1942 the number of foreign civilians reached 
2,500,000, the total of foreign labour being about four million. Der Angrif, 28 Apr. 1942, mentions nearly 
2,500,000 foreign workers. 

p This figure is given for the end of 1940 by Reichsminister Seldte in Reichsarbeitsblatt, 5 Jan. 1941, No. 1, 
PartV, p. 1. 

q Estimate. The Bulletin of the Chamber of Commerce of Berlin, quoted by 11 Sole, 9 Jan. 1942, gives the 
figure of 1 ,600,000 "war prisoners occupied as workers" in Germany. This number probably includes some Russian 
war prisoners. 

r Frankfurter Zeitung, 4 Aug. 1942: total of foreign labour. 


The information available concerning the geographical distribu- 
tion of foreign labour in Germany is meagre. All that is known about 
the workers employed outside agriculture is that they are con- 
centrated mainly in the ports on the North Sea and the Baltic, in 
the industrial and mining areas of the Ruhr, Upper Silesia and 
Westphalia, and in central Germany and Austria. 

The problem of prisoners of war and foreign civilian workers is 
mainly a manpower problem, but by putting them to work Germany 
has set in motion a great migratory movement towards the Reich. 
Nevertheless, the demographic changes produced by the employ- 
ment of prisoners of war and other foreign workers do not exactly 
coincide in extent with the use of foreign labour. There are some 
prisoners of war who are not used as workers partly because, as 
officers, they are exempted from compulsory labour duty, and 
partly because they are not fit for work or because appropriate 
work has not yet been organised for them. Thus the total 
number of prisoners of war held in Germany is somewhat higher 
than the number employed in the German economy. 1 On the 
other hand, not all the prisoners captured by the Germans 
were sent to Germany, and there is likewise a great difference 
between the number of foreign civilians employed by the Germans 
and the number employed in Germany. The working population 
of the occupied countries is in the first place employed, voluntarily 
or under compulsion, in those countries themselves. Millions are 
engaged in repairing and constructing roads, railways and water- 
ways to connect Germany with its armies throughout the entire 
continent from the Atlantic Coast to the Russian steppes; in pro- 
ducing grain and meat on the confiscated Polish estates to feed the 
German troops; in operating German-managed mines and factories 
to provide the German army with armaments; and in building 
German fortifications and naval bases. Those of them who are 
civilians are mostly employed within their own districts, but many 
hundreds of thousands of others have been sent away from their 
homes. Thus, throughout German-occupied Europe, a tremendous 
internal migration, partly voluntary and partly enforced, has been 
set in motion by German rule. 

As has been seen, foreign workers have also been transferred 
from one part of Europe to another. Information about the German- 
occupied territories is very scanty but it has been estimated that 
100,000 Czechs, 50,000 Belgians, and 50,000 Yugoslavs are em- 
ployed there. Labour appears to have been transferred mainly for 

1 The official figures for the spring of 1941 are 1,300,000 prisoners at work 
and 135,000 not at work in Stalags (soldiers' camps). The number of prisoners in 
Offlags (officers' camps) is not given. Cf. Reichsarbeitsblatt, 25 May 1941, No. 15, 
Part V, p. 258. 


two purposes. The first is to work on naval bases and fortifications 
along the Atlantic and Channel coasts. In March 1942, Czech 
building labourers and Netherlanders are reported to have been 
employed in the coastal districts of France and Belgium and Belgian 
workers on the Channel Islands. 1 Danes (10,000), Czechs, Poles, 
Serbs, Netherlanders (36,500), Belgians, and in particular Russian 
prisoners of war (32,000), are working in Norway. Secondly, labour 
has been requisitioned to supply the needs of Germany's armies in 
Russia and to reconstruct the Eastern Territories under German 
occupation. The number of Polish workers thus employed was 
particularly large. 2 The Netherlands, Danish and Belgian farmers 
who have left for eastern Europe are generally classified as colonists. 
Sometimes however they are referred to as "agricultural overseers" 
or managers, and there are also reports of the removal of artisans 
and industrial workers to Poland 3 and the occupied parts of Russia. 4 
But the main and ever-growing stream of foreign workers flows 
into the Reich, providing the economic and technical basis of the 
German armies. Today a host of foreigners unprecedented in num- 
ber and unparalleled in character is living and working in Germany; 
like a gigantic pump, the new German Reich is sucking in all the 
resources of Europe and masses of Europe's working population. 
The total number of foreign workers in Germany, including prisoners 
of war and the foreign civilian workers officially recognised as 
foreigners, but excluding those workers from Alsace-Lorraine and 
the Sudetenland who do not appear in the statistics of foreign 
workers, exceeds six and a half million. More than one worker out 
of every four employed in Germany is a foreigner. All these workers 
have been recruited to operate the vast war machine which has 
been built up from the resources of the whole of Europe to support 
the German armies. 

* O.N.A. despatch, 13 Oct. 1942. 

1 E.g., 170,000 Polish workers from Silesia and Poznan employed as labour 
troops for the German army (New York Times, 16 June 1942); 12,000 Polish 
workers engaged in road building in the Ukraine, being the first group of 50,000 
requested by Governor Koch (Novy Swiat, 15 Aug. 1942, reporting a despatch 
from Ankara). 

8 E.g., Netherlands artisans and workers transferred to Poznan. Cf. Kolnische 
Zeitung, 10 Nov. 1941; Ostdeutscher Beobachter, 11 July 1942. 

4 E.g., more than 2,000 Belgian workers employed in the Ukraine ( Vooruit, 
Ghent, 27 Jan. 1942); 800 Netherlands artisans in Kharkov (New York Times, 
25 Apr. 1942). A German broadcast has also referred to Italian workers employed 
in occupied Russia. 


NOTE: The arrows show the area off origin and the 
number off civilian workers and war prisoners who 
were employed in Germany towards the end off 
1942 or at the beginning of 1943. For fuller explan- 
ations and for sources off figures, see chapter III. 


Taking into account all the information assembled in the forego- 
ing chapters, it may be estimated that more than thirty million of 
the inhabitants of the continent of Europe have been transplanted 
or torn from their homes since the beginning of the war. 

This total may possibly include some persons who have been 
counted twice over, in spite of every effort made to avoid double 
counting. On the other hand, however, the figure of 30,000,000 is 
far from including all the people in Europe who are living away 
from their pre-war homes to-day. In particular, it takes no account 
of the millions of men in the armed forces of the Axis countries 
who are stationed abroad or who have been taken prisoner and 
scattered over the five continents. The transfers of workers within 
the frontiers of individual countries, sometimes to great distances 
from their homes, have also been very imperfectly covered. 
Both in Germany itself and in the other Axis countries, labour 
conscription has snatched hundreds of thousands, perhaps even 
millions of workers away from their families. In each of the occupied 
territories, enormous transfers have likewise taken place about 
which no figures are available. In Norway, in Poland, in the oc- 
cupied parts of the U.S.S.R., in the countries of south-eastern 
Europe, as in France, Belgium and the Netherlands, the Todt 
Organisation and the army services are employing vast levies of 
the country 's own workers on the construction of defence or military 
works, herded together in labour camps which are often far from 
their homes. 

Furthermore, the above total does not include the additional 
millions of German and Italian refugees who since 1943 have fled 
or been evacuated from heavily bombed cities in increasing numbers. 
Even the transfers from one country to another have doubtless been 
on a larger scale than is assumed in this estimate. Germany has not 
only transferred workers from all over Europe to the Reich, but 
has redistributed labour on a growing scale between the various 
occupied territories, and the extent of this redistribution probably 
largely exceeds the figure of some 500,000 quoted in this study 
on the basis of fragmentary data. 


If all these movements could be properly taken into account, 
the result would certainly be a grand total of over forty million. 

This total has piled up progressively. Each phase of the war 
has contributed its separate quota. From September 1939 to May 
1940, the population movements began with the flight of Polish 
war refugees to the Baltic countries, Rumania and Hungary, and 
thence to the countries of western Europe, followed immediately 
by the movements in opposite directions to which the division of 
Poland into a German and a Soviet sphere of influence gave rise; 
deportation and expulsion from the Incorporated Provinces to the 
General Government; the transfer of hundreds of thousands of 
war prisoners and workers to Germany; the transfer to eastern 
Russia of further hundreds of thousands of the population of the 
provinces occupied by the U.S.S.R. ; and finally, the entry into the 
Incorporated Provinces of the Germans "repatriated" from the 
Baltic countries and the Eastern Provinces. At the same time, 
the policy of germanisation initiated before the war was being 
continued in Czechoslovakia, while in the north of Europe the war 
between the U.S.S.R. and Finland led to the transfer of 420,000 
Finns from the regions annexed by the U.S.S.R. to other parts of 
the country and the flight of many war refugees to the Scandinavian 
countries. In all, nearly 3,800,000 persons were uprooted from 
their homes within eight months. 

In May 1940, there arose the next great wave of refugees, 
sweeping a few people as far abroad as America and Africa 
and leaving in unoccupied France, as it receded, several tens of 
thousands of Belgians, Netherlanders, and former German and 
Austrian refugees, and over half a million French people from the 
occupied zone, including 70,000 Alsatians who were soon joined 
by other inhabitants of Alsace and Lorraine driven from their 
homes by the annexation of their homeland to Germany, and by 
the Jews expelled from Baden and the Palatinate. At this time 
there began also the progressive transfer to Germany of French 
and Belgian prisoners of war and of the first groups of civilian 
workers recruited in France, Belgium and the Netherlands. At the 
other end of Europe, new population movements were set in motion 
by the incorporation of the Baltic countries, Bessarabia and North- 
ern Bukovina into the U.S.S.R., by the frontier changes between 
Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania, by the further repatriation 
treaties made between these countries and Germany, and by the 
invasion of Greece and Yugoslavia and the subsequent dismem- 
berment of their territory. When this second stage of the war was 
terminated on 22 June 1941 by the opening of the campaign against 
the U.S.S.R. , nearly four million persons had been added to those 


who had already lost or been transplanted from their homes during 
the first stage. 

From that time onwards, the population movements in Europe 
exceeded all previous bounds. From the Eastern Provinces of 
Poland, from the Baltic countries, Bessarabia, and the territories 
of the U.S.S.R. invaded by the German armies, a surging tide of 
refugees flowed eastward, and the movement became still vaster 
when it was organised into a systematic evacuation. Ten million 
people were removed from the territories occupied by Germany 
in 1941 and another two million were evacuated when the German 
armies made their fresh advance in the summer of 1942. Behind 
the German lines, the extension of the area under German domina- 
tion enabled the Reich to extend and reshape its population policy. 
Deportation and expulsion were intensified; in all the territories 
annexed from the conquered countries, the Reich and its satellites 
pursued their policy of racialism and demographic nationalisation. 
From all the countries within its sphere of influence, Germany 
recruited an ever-growing army of workers who were used, together 
with the prisoners of war, to replace the new quotas of men who 
had to be drafted into the army. Lastly, the threat of continental 
invasion and air raids led to the evacuation of whole cities and 
regions, sometimes to far distant places. In Europe as a whole, 
nearly twenty- three million people were transplanted, deported or 
dispersed from the middle of 1941 up to the beginning of 1943. 

It is impossible to anticipate how much further these population 
movements will go during the coming months. Until 1942, their de- 
velopment was governed by two factors the advance of the 
Axis armies and the labour requirements of the German economy. 
The first factor led to the flight or evacuation of millions of people 
from the areas menaced by invasion ; it also opened up to the Reich 
fresh lands for the application of its demographic policy and the 
recruitment of its labour. To-day the German march forward is 
checked and even reversed. Not only, is Germany unable to extend 
the scope of its activities any further, but outside the ring formed 
by the German armies evacuation has come to a stop and the 
former inhabitants will gradually return to their homes. Within 
this ring, on the other hand, population movements may be ex- 
pected to become more violent than ever. Recent information 
shows that the Reich is determined to pursue its demographic 
policy towards peoples whom Nazi theory condemns as inferior. 
Moreover, the necessity of maintaining military strength at the 
maximum will create new labour requirements, and since fresh 
labour reserves will no longer be available, every effort will be made, 
in spite of resistance and difficulties, to exploit the remaining 


resources in the countries still under German occupation or alliance 
more ruthlessly than ever. The fear of invasion, or actual invasion 
itself, will still further intensify the forced migration of populations 
from the outer fringes of the continent to the interior, while con- 
tinuous bombing will hasten their removal and flight from the 
cities and industrial areas to less endangered regions. 

While the value of any general tabular assessment of the dis- 
placements of population which have taken place so far must of 
necessity be provisional at this stage, a useful purpose may yet 
be served, at the close of this study, by the table given below. 
The data analysed in the various chapters of this study concern- 
ing the number of inhabitants who have left the territory since 
the beginning of hostilities and the number of those brought into 
it have been assembled for each country in its pre-war form, and 
for each part of the country in cases where there have been terri- 
torial changes during the war. 

Analysis of the post-war problems raised by the present dis- 
persal of the peoples of Europe is beyond the scope of this study, 
but the table below clearly indicates the magnitude of the task 
involved in straightening out the population tangle caused by war 
and occupation. 

As the invaded lands are progressively set free, many evacuees 
and refugees will no doubt be able to return and begin to rebuild 
their homes even before the war is over. The retreat of the Axis 
armies will automatically be accompanied by the withdrawal to 
Germany of the officials, salaried employees and workers sent to 
direct the administration and economic activities of the occupied 
countries, of the settlers of German origin or nationality who have 
taken over property in those countries during the war, and of the 
Germans evacuated from bombed areas. At the same time, the 
Axis armies will leave in their wake uprooted masses of people of all 
nationalities. In the Reich itself, millions of prisoners of war and 
workers imported from all the countries of Europe will be deprived 
of their employment from one day to the next with the stoppage 
of the German war machine and the return of German civilians 
and servicemen. 

The permanent resettlement of all these uprooted people will 
be one of the most urgent tasks of post-war reconstruction. It is 
an undertaking which will require the greatest possible amount of 
international organisation and collaboration. 

In most cases, repatriation will be the obvious solution. The 
vast majority of the people concerned will ask nothing better. 
Their help will be needed to rebuild their countries; and the services 
of the skilled workers will be indispensable in setting industry to 


work again. Repatriation on so vast a scale will meet with tremend- 
ous difficulties, however. Transport systems, severely strained by 
the war, may be completely disorganised during the retreat of the 
Axis armies. The closest co-ordination, on an over-all basis, of 
means of communication will be essential to ensure that the best 
use is made of them, and that necessary priorities are observed 
in meeting the needs of the armies of occupation, feeding civilians, 
re-establishing economic life, and repatriating the scattered popula- 

Assistance to those being repatriated should not be restricted 
to organising transport for them. Before they can be sent 
on their way, they must be fed, clothed, and given medical aid. 
If transport facilities are not available for some time, work must 
be found for them locally, wherever possible. A special effort should 
be made to reunite, at the earliest possible moment, families separ- 
ated by flight, expulsion or deportation. Unless there is an organisa- 
tion to provide these people with means of subsistence, and to give 
them confidence that they have not been forgotten, the highways 
of Europe will be blocked by long processions of destitute exiles, 
enduring every kind of privation in an effort to return unaided to 
their homes. 

Even when these people have returned to their countries, help 
will still be needed. Many will find nothing but charred walls, 
bomb craters and shell holes on the site of their former homes. 
Others will find their fields laid waste and their cattle scattered. 
Still others will find the factories where they formerly worked 
destroyed, stripped of their equipment, or converted to serve the 
needs of German war industry. Here their problem merges into 
the general problem of the rehabilitation of the liberated countries, 
which comprises not only the reconstruction of the devastated areas, 
the re-equipment of industry, and restocking with cattle, seed, 
fertilisers and raw materials, but the reorientation of economic 
life as a whole. Freed from the bonds which tied it to the German 
war economy, each national economy will once again have to find 
its place in the world economic order. This problem does not 
affect the repatriated exiles alone. It affects the provision of work 
for the whole population of the liberated countries. In the last 
analysis, its solution will depend on the extent of the international co- 
operation offered to the countries set free. All the same, the returned 
exiles will meet with special difficulties. Their ties with their country 
will have been broken for years in many cases; many will have 
become strangers to their usual occupations; and many others will 
have had their property confiscated. Special measures will therefore 
be needed to help them back into economic life. 


In spite of all endeavours, it can hardly be expected that econo- 
mic life will be resumed at the same pace in every country. Some 
countries will probably be unable for some time to provide employ- 
ment for all those of their inhabitants who were away during the 
war. On the other hand, other countries will lack sufficient labour 
for their reconstruction. Return to their own countries will there- 
fore not be the only choice open to those removed from their homes 
by the war. After the last world war, France gave employment to 
a large number of foreign workers. After the present war, the coun- 
tries which have taken in refugees on a temporary basis may find 
need for their services and may offer them an opportunity of settle- 
ment. Other countries may be glad to use the services of workers 
awaiting repatriation in order to acquire additional labour for their 
reconstruction programmes. In other words, labour requirements 
in post-war Europe will not necessarily correspond to the pre-war 
distribution of the European population. Redistribution of labour 
may be necessary if full employment is to exist. Thus, instead of 
seeking to solve the whole problem of the scattered populations 
by repatriation, it may be wiser to encourage and assist the persons 
concerned to remain where they now are or to transfer to other 
regions where the prospects of employment and settlement are 
better than in their country of origin. This kind of geographical 
redistribution of labour, like repatriation, would call for action 
on an international scale. It would call for nothing less than the 
organisation of an international employment service. 

The resettlement of individuals in their country of origin, 
permanent settlement in their present location, or transfer to other 
liberated countries of Europe will go a long way towards solving 
the problem of wartime dispersions of population; but they can 
not wholly solve it. The problem is not merely continental. It 
must be considered in a world-wide context. 

The dispersal of the European populations as a result of the 
war has already affected other continents. Many of the refugees 
admitted as permanent immigrants to the United States and to 
other American countries have settled there and have no intention 
of returning. Many others, however, have merely been granted a 
temporary refuge; and all of these will not want to return to their 
own countries. Clearly the problem of resettling the dispersed 
populations of Europe will be simplified if this group of refugees 
is allowed to settle overseas. It may be hoped that overseas coun- 
tries who have taken them in temporarily will give equally generous 
consideration to their requests for permanent settlement, and that 
at least they will not expel but rather help to resettle elsewhere those 
whom they are not prepared to admit as permanent immigrants. 


The problem of extra-European settlement will arise for others 
as well as for those already outside Europe. Among the people 
who have been scattered over the continent of Europe during the 
war, many will look towards emigration away from Europe as a 
means of building up a new life. 

First of all, there will be the refugees. It may be hoped that after 
this war the problem of refugees as such may disappear. In the 
coming international order there should be no place for the enforced 
migration, political and racial discrimination, expropriation, expul- 
sion and mass denationalisation which have been among the most 
tragic features of the international anarchy caused by the racial 
and nationalistic theoiies of totalitarianism. Nevertheless, it would 
be Utopian to hope that after the upheavals of war the whole of 
Europe will return to a peaceful way of life from one day to the 
next and that obstacles to the repatriation of refugees will disappear 
as by the wave of a magic wand. In most cases, it is true, the col- 
lapse of the totalitarian r6gimes will reopen to the refugees the 
frontiers of their former country; they will therefore cease to be 
refugees in the proper sense of the term. In some countries, however, 
the political situation may be stormy for some time, and many 
refugees may hesitate to risk returning even if the legal obstacles 
to their re-entry are removed. There will also undoubtedly be many 
refugees who will be unwilling to return to an environment in which 
they had suffered racial and religious persecution. Only the resump- 
tion of inter-continental migration will enable most of these refugees 
or ex-refugees to find permanent homes after the war. 

Refugees will not be the only candidates for overseas settlement, 
although they are the group most often mentioned in connection 
with a resumption of migration. Many other people who have been 
uprooted from their old homes will, if they have the opportunity, 
prefer to try their luck in an overseas country rather than face the 
difficulties of readjustment in their country of origin. Instead of 
rebuilding their old homes, they will want to make new ones. After 
the vicissitudes of war and deportation, they will look upon emigra- 
tion as a means of embarking on a new life and protecting their 
children from the insecurity and suffering which they themselves 
have endured and which they still fear may return once again. 
This will also be the feeling of many who have been forced to suffer 
the horrors of war and persecution in their native homes. 

Moreover, while the effect of the war on population pressure 
in Europe cannot now be forecast, it is possible that, in some 
regions at least, the destruction of economic equipment and of the 
means of production will have been so extensive that, despite the 
probable shrinkage of the population, the need for emigration 


during the early years may be even greater than before the war. 
The possible influence of political factors must also be taken into 
account changes in systems of government carried out with 
violence, for example, or the redrawing of frontiers, which, even 
if no force is used, may lead to a movement of population. 

The political, economic and moral reconstruction of Europe 
depends partly on whether these centrifugal forces can find an 
outlet. The suspension of migration movements was a serious 
handicap to pre-war Europe. Unless these movements are resumed 
in an ordered manner, it will not be possible to solve the problem 
of war and pre-war refugees, and this problem may be further 
aggravated by a fresh wave of enforced migration. 

The refugee problem is thus an integral part of the general 
problem of migration. In the last analysis, it can be solved only 
within this context. The migration problem will therefore have 
to be tackled as a whole after the war, with a view to re-establishing 
continuous and normal migration movements embracing all classes 
of migrants without distinction, whether their motives for seeking 
new homes are economic, social, religious or political. 

The general question of the resumption of migration after the 
war is outside the scope of this study. Like the problem of resettling 
dispersed populations, however, its solution will depend on inter- 
national co-operation. It has already been pointed out that the 
international co-operation which the liberated countries of Europe 
can count upon for assistance in reconstruction will largely condition 
their ability to reabsorb and re-employ their scattered populations. 
Failing this co-operation, the need for emigration after the war is 
likely to reach proportions which will make the problem insoluble. 
Moreover, international co-operation will also condition economic 
expansion and prosperity in the world as a whole and therefore 
determine the development of natural resources and of industrialisa- 
tion which will create new employment opportunities in countries 
of immigration. 

Whatever the coming need for emigration and immigration, 
however, the resumption of migration movements will certainly 
not be achieved by a mere return to the unregulated migration 
which prevailed before the war of 1914-1918. The attempts made 
before the present war to revive migration have shown that its 
revival will depend in future on the existence of an international 
organisation capable of co-ordinating the interests of the countries 
of emigration and immigration and of making available the capital 
necessary to enable the labour of the former countries to be used 
to develop the natural resources of the latter. The age of immense, 
free and accessible spaces, of the ultra-rapid growth of resources 


of food and raw materials, and of open doors for international 
migration this age, unique in the history of the world, is no more. 
No Government which is concerned with ensuring full employment 
and raising standards of living can neglect immigration and emigra- 
tion. In the contracting world economy before the war, Govern- 
ment policy necessarily tended to be restrictive. If an expansionist 
economy is created after the war through international co-operation, 
the organisation canalising this collaboration will have to deal with 
movements of men as well as with movements of capital and goods. 
In short, the resettlement of millions of people uprooted from 
their homes and countries during the war will call for immense 
effort in a variety of co-ordinated directions. However the problem 
is tackled whether by repatriation, resettlement or emigration 
its solution is beyond the powers of any single country. Millions 
of people have been victimised by a narrow nationalism which 
has had a total disregard for human beings. They can be helped 
only by international co-operation and organisation. 

Publications of the International Labour Office 

Some Wartime Studies 

Studies in War Economics 

Six essays on war finance, wages, housing, food prices, etc. 

11 ... Its wealth of examples taken from the experience of many countries, 
both in the last and in the present war, renders this book extremely valu- 
able . . . " Journal of the Royal Statistical Society. 

Montreal, 1942 199 pp. Price: $1 ; 4s. 

Labour Conditions in War Contracts 

Second Edition 

An analysis of the labour clauses and similar regulations apply- 
ing to war work in Canada, the U.S., and Great Britain, and a 
brief discussion of some of the problems involved. 

"As an introduction to the study of labour legislation in wartime, the book 
is admirable . . . " Industrial Canada. 

Montreal, 1943 74 pp. Price: 25 cents; Is. 

Wartime Transference of Labour in Great Britain 

Describes in detail the methods adopted for the transfer of 
labour to war work up to July 1942. 

"... will be most helpful to all who appreciate how much the conquest of 
peace-time unemployment must depend on the willingness of workers to move 
on to new and different jobs." Manchester Guardian. 

Montreal, 1942 163 pp. Price: paper $1 ; 4s. 

cloth $1.50; 5s. 

Food Control in Great Britain 

An analysis of the problems of production, distribution and 
consumption of food in Great Britain during the present war, and 
an account of the measures taken to solve them. 

"... does much to illuminate the road towards a positive nutrition policy 
and a knowledgeable programme for the post-war reconstruction of agriculture." 
Manchester Guardian. 

Montreal, 1942 272 pp. Price: paper $1.25; 5s. 

cloth $2; 7s. 6d. 

Year Book of Labour Statistics 1942 

(Seventh Year) 

This annual publication, now issued in a trilingual edition 
(English, French and Spanish), presents in tabular form the most 
complete data obtainable in the principal countries of the world, 
including, so far as available, the Latin American countries, 
relating to: 

Gainfully Occupied Population Family Budgets 

Employment and Unemployment Migration 

Hours of Work Industrial Accidents 

Wages Production and wholesale price 

Cost of Living and Retail Prices indices, exchange rates 

The tables cover the last thirteen years. They are compiled 
from the official statistics of more than 50 countries in all parts of 
the world, supplemented in some cases by data obtained from 
private sources. Special care has been taken to include the relevant 
series, so far as available, for Latin American countries. Recent 
enquiries of the LL.O. on wages, hours of work and cost of living 
in various countries are reproduced in full. 

An introductory note to each chapter calls attention to the 
principal questions of method to be borne in mind in interpreting 
the data, especially when utilising them for international com- 
parisons. The statistics are presented in a systematic way with 
this object in view. 

"Indispensable to statisticians of all countries . . . Illustrates the wealth 
and complexity of the knowledge collected for experts to interpret . . . Through 
the co-ordination, and so far as possible, comparison of the official figures publish- 
ed by different countries it is possible to gauge world economic trends in a way 
which was out of the question twenty years ago." The Times, London. 

". . . a surprising array of international statistics has been made available 
in a readily assimilable form." South African Journal of Economics. 

"... a valuable work for everybody concerned with social policy . . . The 
statistics provided tell not only the story of the great world depression, 1929 to 
1935, but cover also the year 1941, a great performance, because wartime diffi- 
culties most likely hamper every statistical service." The Standard, Wellington, 
N.Z. (referring to the 1941 edition). 

xii + 222 pp. Price: paper $2; 8s. 

cloth $3;10s.6d. 

International Labour Review 

(Monthly, English, French, and Spanish editions) 

The International Labour Review has been published monthly 
by the International Labour Office for over twenty years. Recent 
issues printed in Montreal include the following articles: 

The United Nations Conference on Food and 

Agriculture . Aug. 1943 

Proposals for International Exchange Stabilis- ' 
ation: Analysis of British, Canadian, French 
and United States Plans, by L. B. JACK Aug. 1943 

The Reorganisation of Apprenticeship in the 
Building Industry of Great Britain, 
by G. D. H. COLE Aug. 1943 

Principles of Employment Supervision in War 

and Peace, by Elizabeth M. JOHNSTON^ Sept. 1943 

Industrial and Labour Information, formerly published weekly, 
is now included in the monthly Review. It contains up-to-date and 
comprehensive news under the headings International Labour 
Organisation, Social and Economic Policy, Industrial Relations, 
Employment, Conditions of Work, Social Insurance and Assis- 
tance, Co-operation, Workers' and Employers' Organisations. This 
is drawn from official and unofficial publications in every country, 
the International Labour Office's own correspondents, other colla- 
borators, and direct communications from Governments. An in- 
creasing amount of space is being devoted to reconstruction policies 
in various countries. 

The section devoted to statistics of wages, unemployment, cost 
of living, hours of work, etc., constitutes a unique source of informa- 
tion, since only the Office is in a position to secure all the relevant 

" . . . one turns to its sober pages with eagerness, finding renewed hope in 
prosaic accounts of the progress of international conventions, the report of 
undramatic gains in social insurance and protective legislation in Turkey, 
Uruguay, Australia, Cuba." Survey Midmonthly, New York. 

A specimen copy of the Review and a Catalogue of recent publica- 
tions, which include studies on wartime labour and employment 
problems, food control, and recent developments in the field of 
social security, will be sent on application to the International 
Labour Office, 3480 University Street, Montreal, Canada, or to 
any Branch Office or Correspondent. (See list inside back cover.) 

The International Labour Review may also be obtained from 
the publishers in the United Kingdom, Messrs. George Allen & 
Unwin Ltd., Ruskin House, 40 Museum Street, London, W.C. 1. 

Price: 60 cents; 2s. 6d. Annual subscription: $6; 24s. 


Publications may be obtained at the following addresses: 

INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE, 3480 University Street, Mont- 
real, Canada. ("Interlab, Montreal"; Tel. Plateau 2507.) 

("Interlab/ (kn^ve"; Tel 2.62.00.) 


China: Mr. HAI-FONG CHENG, P.O. Box '264, East Szechuan Post 

Office, Chungking, ("Interlab/ Chungking"; Tel 41703.) 

France : ...... ........... _______ , . , .............. ,...,. ........ 

Great Britain : Mr. CLIFTON RoBBiNS,38 ParliamentStreet, London, 
S.W.L ("Interlab, Parl, London 91 ; Tel Whitehall 1437.) 

India: Mr. P* P. PIU.AX, International Labour Office (Indian 
Branch), New Delhi. ("Interlab, New Delhi"; TV/. 75670 

United States: Miss ETHKL M. JOHNSON, 734 Jackson Place, 
Washington, 6, D.C. ("Interlab, Washington" ; Tel District 8736.) 


Argentine Republic: Mr. Luis LAUZET, Avenida Presidente Roquft S. Pefia 
615 (9 Piso), Buenos Aires (Tel. 34 Defensa 4943) ; mailing address: calle 
San Juan 2245 (4 Piso B), Buenos Aires. ("Interlab, Buenos Aires".) 

Bolivia: Mr. RKMBJBRTO CAPRILBS Rico, Avenida Aspiazu No/340, La Paz, 

Brazil: Mr, A. BANDEIRA DB MELI.O, Ministerio do Trabalho, 11 andar, Rio. 
de Janeiro, -("Interlab/ Rio"; Tel. 42-0455.) 

Chile: Mr. M. POBLBTK TRONCOSO, Casilia 9411, Santiago de Chile ("Inter- 
lab, Santiago Chile'*; Tel 45-794.) 

Colombia: Mr, ALFREDO VAZQUKZ CARRIZOSA, Edificio de la Bolsa, Oficinas 
503 y 504, Bogota. ("Interiab-Bogota".) 

Cuba: Mr. Josfi ENRIQUE DE SANDOVAL, Edificio la MetropoHtana No. 813, 
Calle President Zayas, Havana, ("Interlab, Havana"; Tel. M, 78.13,) 

Ecuador: Mr. V. G. GARC&S, "El Dia M , Quito. 

Iraq: Mr. HASHIM JAWAD, Ministry of Social Affairs, Baghdad, 

Mexico: Mr. ENRIQUE JIMENEZ DOM|NGUEZ Venustiano Carranza 40, Mexico, 

Peru: Mr. AtSjANORO DUSMAISON, Gasilla 577, Plaza San Martin 166, Lima, 
Sweden: Mi. Sumii TnoRs^fN, SoriaMcpartmcntet, Stockholm, 

Uruguay: Mr. ROGEIJO CHKKONI SAN ROMAN, Juan Benito Blanco 

Mr. J. P^REI MACHADO, Avenida Los Mangos, Quinta "La 
VHna" (La Florida), Caracas. ( M Interlab f Caracas,") 


Publications of the International Labour Office 

Subscription Rates and Prices 


(Incorporating Industrial and Labour Information). 

Articles on economic and social topics; current events, affecting industry 

and labour; statistics of employment, wages, cost of living, etc. 

Price: per No., 60 cents, 2$. 6d.; per year, $6.00, 24s. 

2. OFFICIAL BULLETIN (At irregular intervals). 

Official information on the work of the LL.O. 

Annual subscription: $1.00, 4s, 

3. MINUTES OF THE GOVERNING BODY (At irregular intervals), 

Full records of discussions and decisions. 

Annual subscription: $2.50, 10s, 


Reprints and translations of laws and regulations. 

Annual subscription; $5.00, 20s. 


Problems of accident prevention. 

Price: per No., 50 cents, 2s.; per year, $1.50, 7s, 6d, 


EHCE (Annual). 

.Questionnaires and Reports, the Director's Report, Final Record, and 

texts of Draft Conventions and Recommendations. 

Annual subscription : $10.00, 40s, 


Survey' of social and economic movements and labour legislation. 

p . (Paper bound. ... . .$2.00, 8s. 

* nce \Cloth bound, . .$3.00, 10s. 6d. 


Unemployment, Hours of Work, Wages, Prices, Migration, etc. 

p . (Paper bound. , .$2.00, 8s. 

Kncc \Cloth bound ,$3.00, .10s. 6d. 


ISATIONS (At irregular intervals). Tenth edition, 1939. $1.00, 4s. 


Works dealing with various labour problems, e.g., Wages' and Hours, 
Social Insurance, Industrial Relations, Economic Questions, -etc. 

Annual subscription: $7.50, 30s. 

To all publications given above $30; 6 per year.